

8 JUN 54

LINC 3631 (IN 15716)

PAGE 2

6. MORE LEAFLET DROPS, INTENSIFIED SHERWOOD PROGRAMS
CONTEMPLATED.

7. IT WOULD THEREFORE BE REGRETTABLE IF, BY YOUR DEPARTURE,
YOU WOULD TEND CONFIRM APPARENT IMPRESSION OF SETBACK TO PBSUCCESS.
ON CONTRARY, YOUR MISSION NOW TO COUNTERACT [] DEPRESSION
AND DESTROY WHATEVER SMUGNESS/FATALISM HAS ARISEN AMONG ARMY
THROUGH [] COMPROMISE.

8. IF [] YOUR SOLE CHANNEL AFTER [] DEPARTURE,
MAKE MAXIMUM USE TO CONVEY "YOU AIN'T SEEN NOTHING YET" THEME TO
[] ETC. THIS MIGHT BEGIN SOONEST. EVENTS IN NEXT
WEEK MAY MAKE YOU APPEAR AS PROPHET AND MAN WORTH DOING BUSINESS
WITH.

9. WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE YOU LEAVE ON EVE OF AUTHENTICATION
YOU HAVE BEEN REQUESTING.

10. REQUEST YOU WEIGH FOREGOING INLIGHT SECURITY AND OPERATIONAL
FACTORS AND ADVISE YOUR CONSIDERED CONCLUSIONS FOR LINC DECISION.

11. ALSO REQUEST YOU ATTEMPT RETAIN [] IN PLACE DURING
FORTHCOMING PERIOD.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
FOR RELEASE, AS SANITIZED, BY
CSI/HRG ON 5 JU 95

13 January 1954

F N 28

C/R 34

CONTACT REPORT

Persons Present: ()

Place: ()

Date: 9 and 10 January 1954

Reason for Contact: Discussion of Matters Pertaining to PBSUCCESS

I. SUBJECTS DISCUSSED

A. () briefed () on operational, zone of responsibility, financial and support matters as follows:

1. a. General - () was told that in his conversations with Rufus to keep the following in mind:

(1) The conduct of operations from this point forward will be based on unconventional warfare program. This program consists of a tying together of () legs. At the same time keeping them from compartmented.

(2) () and () legs are being carried out independently of () but each has the sole responsibility of servicing (). These ties are being made at headquarters level. ()'s assignment, once the new concept has been successfully established, would be in the field of () only.

(3) Insure that Rufus knows that his operational plan may be studied carefully in order to preserve full implementation of his slant as well as to fully utilize this planning to date. His plan, as submitted, will be built around, added to, and unfeasible portions, if any, discarded or might be completely discarded. The sole purpose of the final operational plan being to conduct the operation () by unconventional warfare means. This term allows flexibility to the greatest degree. () was warned that in the () field he must make Rufus acquainted with the general framework around which headquarters was basing its thinking and planning so that headquarters planning would coincide with Rufus' so that the reasoning behind our request to him would be apparent and the final operational planning would be compatible with his intra-organizational coordination and planning.

(4) Each item of the basic framework would be subject to change as () information and pertinent information on Rufus' assets in Rufus' former plans is made available to headquarters and this study might show some items to be superfluous and some might be more easily accomplished by hitherto unrecognized or unconsidered assets; however, as stated above, () was to insure that all concerned realized what the basic planning would be built around.

b. [] was informed that at present we are considering many key points with which Rufus will be concerned in the target country. One was Coban garrison; two was Zacapa; three was Jutiapa; four was Mazatenango garrison or field; five was Quezaltenango garrison or field; six was Quiche garrison or field; seven Guatemala City and central zone and garrisons and fields and major commo points; eight was San Jose; nine was Puerto Barrios garrison, port and field. [] was informed that having studied slightly into the geographical and active hypothesis and as yet being uninformed as to the exact assets available in Rufus' organization, it was highly possible that Mazatenango, Quezaltenango and Quiche might have only folding blocks thrown between them and Rufus' operations to forestall our entry into the action during the movement into target areas and operations against targets near the border. [] informed [] that a pouch had been sent to [] marked eyes only as requested by [] previously outlining Rufus' latest operation plans never before studied by headquarters. The pouch has not [] reached [] as of this date, 18 January, but a preliminary discussion of the contents of the pouch led [] to believe that the strongest approach to operational plans should be based around past planning and preparation. It was ~~matrix~~ decided between [] and [] that on arrival of Rufus' plans, headquarters would study for feasibility and convert the plan into an unconventional warfare operational plan sufficient so that upon Rufus' arrival for conference with [] on possibly 25 January, an operational plan could be discussed with []. At that time acceptance of such phase could be ironed out and the firm operational planning to proceed from that point.

c. The operations against each separate target would be compartmented except at Rufus' staff level. To maintain this compartmentation, separate staging areas for each operation would be obtained. In each case the staging area should be [] [] of the target when feasible. The selection and obtaining of these sights in [] would be a priority job for [] through Rufus during the remainder of January. It was initially thought that the [] would arrange for [] cities within its jurisdiction at [] request. [] brought up the fact that some 150 men [] are not located within these housing areas []. It was agreed that this situation would continue insofar as [] is concerned with emergency staging sites designed to receive the

men just short of jump-off time. Storage of pre-invasion weapons and equipment would be made in the vicinity of these emergency staging cites. Operational preparations would be made in the present housing area [] was told to be examining the problems being encountered along these lines. He was told of cites to be located should be isolated farm areas. He may find such farms impossible to obtain in the interests of security and to obtain black isolated bases on the border in place of those. Those observations should be clarified prior to the meeting approximately 27 January and we would discuss the action concerning same at that time.

d. The [] training now being laid on to commence 11 January is to produce, as discussed, four staff men, ten organizers, ten shock troop leaders, four sabotage experts and two assassination specialists. As discussed, the four staff men will be returned to Rufus to assist in his planning. The ten organizers and ten shock troop leaders would be retained and as two-man teams provide the trained specialists leaders and/or viewpoint for each specific target. These leader organizer teams may: (1) Send the organizer to the target to conduct organization while the shock troop specialists remain at the safe cite collecting personnel, training and preparing them for action, or (2) the organizer might enter the target area only long enough to instruct the selected leader who is already within the target complex. He will instruct them in organizing for partisan warfare and for setting up future actions of supplying those partisans that are organized and to conduct special courier supply operations as necessary. The shock troop specialists for that particular target might only instruct already positioned leaders or possibly lead a shock tropp action from the outside or act as adviser to already selected leaders for shock troop action from the outside. This man might be released to training and leading reserve units if we determine such personnel are available. The actual employment of these organizers and shock troop leaders can only be determined after Rufus' evaluation of his assets and capabilities are themxx thoroughly studied and assessed. Since it is necessary in order for Rufus' preparations to get the fullest attention to have an operational plan in his hands by 1 March at the latest, [] was told that it was a priority necessity to turn in the biographical data on Rufus' assets & Rufus' operational plans immediately.

e. Sabotage experts produced from the training are in turn conducting a 3-weeks' course at 4 appropriate safe areas [] for approximately 16 selected team leaders. Where it is possible those 16 team leaders will have recruited from within the target area and each will be responsible for a target near his natural habitat. When possible, an excuse for 3 weeks absence from the target area may be formulated for him, and a sabotage leader will be reinstated immediately to recruit and train this team and

commence his operations again where evaluation and assessment of our present assets near each sabotage target have been compiled and [] requests have produced sufficient information from which specific targets have been selected. It may be considered more feasible to use the trained expert as an instructor to persons on the spot in certain instances as well as melding back into his natural habitat and lying dormant until time to start. This flexibility and planning must be maintained until a final operational plan is forthcoming approximately 1 March, however positive sabotage target planning should be in [] hands from this headquarters 15 February so that Rufus _____ it accordingly. It is tentatively the trend of planning that the sabotage program will be in three stages. Stage one is passive sabotage which will be that produced through the effectiveness of psychological warfare efforts. This will not be a directed sabotage program nor will Rufus' [] personnel be responsible for any portion of it. Stage two is an active stage which in any case will not be activated earlier than two to three days prior to the movement to the target of the special units (tactical radio operator, shock troops, etc.). It is entirely possible that a study may show the feasibility of holding this second stage to occur merely hours short of H-Hour or even possibly to occur simultaneously with Stage three. Stage three will be D-Day H-Hour over sabotage using demolitions and arson and other overt means to coincide with the opening of overt [] action aimed at cutting communication lines, complete demolition of the main radio stations and blocking reinforcement by the active opposition. As stated above, designation of these targets should be forthcoming by the middle of February and recruiting should commence accordingly. Again after a study of the evaluation of the existing assets it will be decided whether assets exist within the vicinity of the target or whether training specialists will return and recruit a team to conduct the mission or whether training specialists instructing existing assets and provide for equipping them. The mission is to be initiated in concurrence with the attack or whether it is only set up to be used if needed during the attack and consolidation. This planning will comm as a portion of the final operational plan due approximately 1 March.

- f. The assassination specialists would be utilized to return to Rufus' [] teams for instructional purposes. These K teams should be compartmented now and EEI's on their targets to be compiled for them and their operational plans fitted into the over-all plan.
- g. The Commo trainees will be turning out both the resident operators (located near the target but compartmented from the activities at the target) and tactical operators (located at the staging cite

until just prior to the operation) who will be the communication link during overt operations on D-Day, and additional cases where the target commander is merely part of the target garrison, the tactical radio operator will be positioned with the protective unit and ~~message~~ with the partisan unit will be at each hour. Individual cases where the target will be attacked by shock troops from the outside. In combined situations a tactical radio operator will travel with the shock troops. The rest of the radio operators will not enter into the phases, but will provide intelligence before and after the operation. Using proper clandestine procedures, we will effect the contact with the leader of the underground and serve as a message center between the underground leader and Rufus. When the D-Day operations commence, transmission of radio traffic will go through the tactical radio operators. During the entire proceedings, [] will be getting field messages directly from both tactical and resident radio operators. [] will stand as the message during the whole operation. The first and best two radio operators will be sent to Rufus to establish direct commo link between [] and Rufus. All incoming intelligence will be forwarded to Rufus immediately. All Rufus' instructions will be passed to target leaders by way of []. This will in no way affect the speed of transmission nor will Rufus' control of the situation be lessened by the fact that the equipment and signal plan are at []. Until the D-Day trigger is pulled, headquarters will be utilizing this control to end direction /to all operations. During the overt action stage, headquarters can only act as a disseminator of messages and will be set up to handle the heavy traffic quickly. It is now estimated that 5 hours round trip traffic can be expected. Rufus to headquarters to Rufus and Rufus to headquarters target commander and vice versa. Allowing for decoding, answering, and recoding. Rufus should personally conduct the principal city target country operations physically at the scene of action. It is realized the principal value that can be gained from instantaneous radio communication from Rufus to his individual units; however, there is little that Rufus can do with instantaneous communications in this situation and the major job of conducting this principal city operation will occupy his whole time and attention. The 5-hour time lag will keep him well informed as to the events of the country before phone lines are re-established and inter-target consolidation is accomplished. Incidentally, [] questioned [] concerning his facilities at that station and it was unwittingly elicited that they could handle a small team of American radio operators and in this way [] has in mind for bringing up to the chief of the project the possibility of using [] to directly re-transmit

messages from the individual units straight to Rufus and vice versa once the overt operation is commenced, making [] an info station, as []'s capability of being able to do anything about overt operations would be very limited, and Rufus' need for immediate information from his sub-units is great.

h. The operational planning will allow for three different stages of planning the first being the one just discussed, the second being to accomplish the consolidation once stage one has been completed successfully. The third stage will be planned to insure that guerilla warfare can be conducted by such units *if* whose stage one was not completed successfully. This guerilla warfare would be carried on until such time as consolidated areas could come in touch with the units conducting guerilla warfare. The tactical radio operator can be used with the isolated unit to direct area re-supply and direct recontact with *if* units which have successfully completed stage one. This stage of the planning requires more thorough study.

2. Finance-

a. The \$19,090 pouched to you in care of [] is to be dispensed at the rate of and within the limitation that we discussed ~~NOTING~~ at our last meeting. This breakdown will be accounted for as follows:

(1) []

<u>Item</u>	<u>Minimum</u>	<u>Maximum</u>
Food, 35 men & 15 guards	\$ 1,500	\$ 2,500
Pay, gd. force, 15 men	300	500
Medical supplies	100	100
Clothing	500	750
POL	100	250
Land rent	300	500
[] office, 2 men & rent	200	500
Trans. facilities	200	500
	\$ 3,200	\$ 5,600
Emergency fund		840
TOTAL		\$ 6,440

(2) For holding 220 men (Incl. selection SAB. experts)	11,000
Emergency fund	1,650
TOTAL	\$12,650

b. As per our discussion the accountability for January expenditures will be your responsibility. In view of the fact that your negotiations [] are unfair at this time, you will be responsible for the [] disbursement of funds for [] camp until such time as you are directed to turn over the accountability and responsibility to []

c. In addition, specialists for running the Commo training camp will be poached to, dispensed by and accounted for by the Commo men at the training camp.

d. As discussed, the other phases of project expenditures ~~may make (?)~~ [] and [] will be the responsibility of those officers in charge of their phase and will be of no concern to you.

e. Your February finances will be delivered at our February meeting and accounting of January expenditures, insofar as possible, made at that time.

3. Scope of Responsibility-

a. The entire project as discussed has been broken down into [] [] [] and [] consists of (1) training and (2) operations. [] has been responsible for training, including directing the conduct of training and insuring that training meets project standards. Your responsibility is in operations as [] case officer, which officer (1) directs the principal agent in all [] matters to see that [] standards are maintained in the fields of (a) recruitment; (b) dispersal of funds; (c) preparation for operations including all contacts made by the principal agent, all commitments made in the project named by the principal agent, and the conduct of all preparations so that [] operations can be carried out as the operational plans direct; (d) conduct of [] operations in accord with project headquarters directives; (e) security in that the principal agent fully understands the necessity of confining the development of the operational plans to his immediate staff.

b. It is not expected that this direction of the principal agent by [] would be in the form of commands to be followed or else, nor is it expected that complete leeway would be even intimated by [] in dealing with the principal agent. [] has been commanded to employ methods of presentation so that the preparation for operations are carried out within the framework given by project headquarters. Latitude would be considered in every case to allow for [] advice and experience to be utilized and for Rufus' advice and experience to be utilized, but such latitude would be checked out through me when practicable and I have instructed [] that he would be directed within the framework

of my directive. [] was informed that every attempt would be made to give his advice complete consideration, and that he is to work within the directives which have been broadened as far as possible for his implementation.

- c. He is instructed to maintain a flow of information to project headquarters through (1) monthly assessment of [] personnel as to their ability, morale, and their state of ~~lessness~~; (2) bi-weekly assessment of the training program as directed; (3) monthly accounting of expenditures; (4) maintain a close/bibliographical analysis on all recruited personnel and all potential personnel being considered.
- d. [] was instructed to add his advice on the practicality of the planning and form an indigenous perspective for us in our planning, and from his knowledge of the active opposition advise on the practicality of all matters under consideration by project headquarters.
- e. [] is to maintain compartmentation between training and operations. [] command channel is straight to this office. [] connections with the training camp have been limited to, (1) setting up of the camp and camp procedures, as directed; (2) presentation of [] to project personnel in the necessary spirit; (3) liaison with [] within the limits of our previous discussion; (4) delivery of the bodies and assessments to the training arrangement (all assessments to be known to the training chief by code number only); (5) delivery of the bodies from the training area to the staging area; (6) furnish [] contact and coordination with Rufus to insure that his personnel receive instructions to properly motivate and prepare them to come up to [] standards of training; (7) bi-weekly assessment to this office on training progress and standards; (8) close coordination between [] and [] for the purpose of implementing operational ideas and training; (9) the reception of incoming equipment and training as and disposal of equipment for training as set up in December 23 and 24 [] contact report; (10) It is not anticipate however, in the event [] considers training standards are not sufficient or are above the capability of the personnel, he is to inform [] but to take no steps except directly through me.
- f. [] is to operate independently of the [] except to keep them informed on matters they need to know in order to cover up illegal operations connecting the U.S. Government.
- g. [] is to discuss all problems within the jurisdiction of [] with [] receive his approval before (1) making contact with [] indigenous personnel outside of Rufus' organization, or (2) acquire land within the jurisdiction of [] responsibility.

h. NOTE: After a discussion with [] on the situation at [] it was decided against placing him within the jurisdiction [] in the manner he is placed under the [] [] The reason for this being the present utilization of [] mostly as a Commo link with headquarters rather than being acquainted with operations that are going on within the area. Further discussion on this matter will be taken up between the chief of project and Chief of PM.

i. [] is to receive Lincoln approval before recruiting non-Rufus personnel for any witting deal within the project.

j. []'s reports, verbal and written, and his cables are to be submitted to Lincoln.

4. Support -

a. [] [] have the sole function of making [] activities a success.

b. The initial equipment is arriving as discussed in the [] 22, 23, 24 December meetings. (NOTE: Black flight arrangements memorandum PM to Chief of Project) [] turned over to [] the requirements of the black flight landing [] as presented [] through [] contact, [] [] gave initial approval to the plan; however, final approval would have to be given by [] That approval was forthcoming on 12 January. If there are no changes in plan, no word will be received [] If for some reason, changes in plan are forthcoming, they will be cabled forward commercially to [] as mailing address drop located in Florida. As of the late afternoon of 13 January, the commercial cable has not arrived. All planning is being conducted as if the initial arrangements by [] [] do hold true at the point of landing of the black flight. Those arrangements can be found in cable form, Lincoln to headquarters insofar as briefing of the pilot is concerned. In addition to the above, it was brought out by [] that at 7 o'clock on each evening all personnel at the landing field, except military personnel are removed from the vicinity of the landing field. This leaves the operation in control of the chief of the air group army at the field. Rufus' men will be in the control tower conducting the instructions of the plane as it lands in accordance with the pilot briefing cable sent to headquarters. [] will conduct security around the field. Rufus' men will be handling the fork lift equipment that will comprise the unloading of the

equipment for the plane. Taxi instructions will be given to the pilot, a 4,000 gallon refueling truck will come to a standby position just opposite the plane and will stand off unless called by the plane. Emergency refueling has been arranged and, if called for the truck will be handled and ~~hoses~~ the hose handled by Rufus' men. [] will be in the background to help conduct the indigenous side of the operation, although he will not appear except under emergency. Upon the approach of our plane all other planes in the area will be directed away from the air field and only an emergency landing might be conducted during the time of the off-loading of our plane. [] army trucks will be standing by until the plane arrives at a taxi stop. All unloading personnel will be Rufus' men under the direction of the Rufus labor pusher. Trucks are to be off-loaded and will immediately proceed to the training area with the MM gear which is the [] gear for the training camp. The trucks contacting the [] gear are to proceed to a central unloading spot which will be under the continual supervision of [] until such time as the training sites for [] activities have been made available.

c. (1) A break-down of equipment per target for placing at the safe cite areas for that target is being considered. The sum total of initial equipment would be placed on hand for delivery to present underground assets is as discussed in the arms and equipment assay [] memorandum. This is designed to make all men self-sufficient during the short-term active operational period as to weapons, equipment, medical and survival rations, to operate with full sufficiency and self-sufficiency for a ten-day period. [] brought up the possibility that the men would not be ~~willing to~~ ~~exist on~~ exist on evil tasting survival rations, and it was directed that such would be the case if there were plentiful supply, but [] brought up instances in which the emergency rations had been used successfully and it was agreed that training should be slanted so that the men would understand the necessity for ~~if~~ living off the rations for a short period. [] felt that under those conditions the men could be mentally conditioned to depend upon the rations rather than along logistical supply lines []. The method of getting the materiel into the safe cite was discussed in that [] is selecting and will forward for consideration air fields along with their security hazards from which black flights could bring the materiel for a safe cite to the field nearest that safe cite. A further [] study of this plan will be presented to the chief of project with suggestions by Chief of PM having seen the set up at []. The method of getting equipment and materiel into the target area to presently existing underground forces, the time of movement of the equipment to the target area is yet to be firmed up, except that it is contemplated movement into the

staging areas will be by black flight to the nearest fields. Movement into the underground will be determined by the target area situation and will satisfy the individual case.

[] It is contemplated by [] that continuous black trips by courier transports utilizing [] surplus personnel as couriers and utilizing subsequent stashing and caching would permit a build-up at the target area for the assets which are in position. The 50-pound self-sufficiency kit designed for the occasion would enable shock troop and outside specialists, including radio operators and incoming sabotage teams to be self-sufficient transport and existing for the ten-day maximum expected period. More research will be forthcoming along this line of thought. The necessary scheduled report to chief of project will outline in detail the pre-arranged staffing that has been done on this subject.

(2) Support requirements during the second phase of overt [] operations, in other words a consolidation phase, will be limited to possible replacement of key instruments and items necessarily destroyed by sabotage and to extra consolidation requirements including operational funds and propaganda material and [] special Commo gear will be required. Support requirements for the third phase of the overt [] operations will have been arranged, gathered and packaged and ear-marked for an emergency black flight so that if any of the units find it necessary to go into this third phase, resupply can be arranged through their tactical radio. This third phase operational plan will of necessity be limited to a short number of weeks due to the topography of the target country and the nature of the expected consolidation of those units successful in the first stage. Proposed, detailed report for the preparation for this third stage support requirement will be forthcoming to the project chief on the Chief PM next report.

B. [] brought up the fact that some months ago he had been alerted [] [] that much Guatemalan money was available if he could procure a certain amount of cash. The subject was brought up with the Chief of WBD and [] was told to tell the man to acquire \$400,000 U.S. cash. The man for some six months now has announced that he has the \$400,000 in foreign currency and is requesting of [] that he produce the \$400,000 U.S. cash. This matter has been brought to the attention of headquarters before and Chief of PM feels this man has placed under commitment by this Agency and that a follow-up on this commitment should be made immediately to take him from an embarrassing position. [] informed [] that this money would be forthcoming

~~SECRET~~

if the commitment is in truth as outlined to []

C. [] inquired as to the report on [] contact with [] [] on 16 December. [] felt contact between [] and [] could be misconstrued even by [] as [] representing U.S. policy. []'s instructions to [] to go forward with his plans to [] in his proposed operations could be misconstrued by [] as U.S. approval. In addition, it was pointed out to [] that his mission was PBSUCCESS, that he should stay within that mission until so instructed by Chief of PM who would receive his direction from project chief and project chief receiving his from our headquarters. [] informed [] that he had received approval from the Deputy of WHD, that stemmed from occurrences months ago during which [] asked [] to feel Rufus out concerning future aid to []'s forthcoming operation. Rufus gave his stamp of approval on aid to [] in changing the date of his move to some time in February. [] sent word to Rufus through [] that the February date had been arranged and consequently Rufus was employing [] to convey his (Rufus') attitude on the affair. [] felt that he was there as a representative of Rufus and not as a representative of the United States. When it was pointed out by [] that again the target country was that of PBSUCCESS, [] pointed out that he had received instructions to talk with [] from the Deputy of WHD. [] agreed to remain within the [] limits of the target country of operations against the target country of PBSUCCESS, but stated and this statement is fully agreed upon by the Chief of PM, that his position as to past [] commitments should be fully cancelled by the persons who laid those commitments on or he is placed in the nebulous position of choosing which set of instructions he is going to follow. It is felt by me that this position should be clarified for [] by the persons who gave him past commitments, if containment within the operations of PBSUCCESS is truthfully expected to be of []

D. Since [] final approval has not been obtained on the pre-arranged bi-weekly flight, it has been decided that a personal commercial cable from [] to the [] mailing address which contains a negative attitude on any subject will be warning to [] that the flight is for some reason cancelled. If [] finds some reason for dealing from this end, he will send a commercial cable in []'s true name to [] from a pump company concerning a pump that [] has ordered. The pump will [] have a number. That number will contain the new ETA of the airplane. If the flight is cancelled altogether, it will mention that the pump cannot be found, it will not refer [] to a number and that there will be no pump forthcoming. If the [] date of the arrival of the shipment

is to be delayed, the number of days of delay will be indicated by headquarters in the commercial cable to [] by indicating that the pump left headquarters so many days ago. The number of days ago indicating the number of days delay in the ETA of the airplane.

E. COMMUNICATIONS

[] warns that if communications are [] down to very quickset, it is possible Rufus will establish his own communications, which in the opinion of the writer is only natural. The man in the field ~~is~~ at the time needs instantaneous communication. I hope that my proposal for communications will be considered in that light and that if immediate communications are not established, Rufus will establish his own by other means. Also in one case where radio Commo would have added to the efficiency of our movements, it was found that the necessary Commo stations were closed for the weekend. It was suggested that headquarters' action would activate a system to eliminate the situation. [] was notified and the three a day contact is now set up for weekends between []

F. [] was alerted to prepare Rufus for a trip to the Miami area approximately 25 January. Rufus will be ready when the details of black flight arrangements have been forwarded to [] Rufus will be alone unless otherwise specified. [] feels that rather than ramrod a meeting for [] and Rufus, what a spirit of trust could be incorporated into this meeting by allowing [] and Rufus to spend a day together before meeting with project personnel. This idea meets with the full concurrence of Chief of PM.

II. COMMENTS

[] is a capable, eager, hard-working man. He needs direction from professionals. Such direction must be in the form of intelligent leadership and must shy away from hand-shanckling restrictions. This statement is made because of the realization of the inability of non-field personnel to grasp the true problems facing our man on the spot. If we feel that this man cannot work within the confines of a broad directive, we should remove him because whoever occupies the duty that we have assigned to [] must be allowed to use his initiative.

YES []

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
FOR RELEASE, AS SANITIZED, BY
CSI/HBG ON 5 JULY 9

FN 29

INFO: MISSIONS, Headquarters

Planning

1. The attached memorandum represents the briefing given by [] on 3 June to [], currently the Senior representative in [] while [] is engaged in overall coordination at [].
2. The true identities of the cryptos in the attachment are forwarded by separate dispatch.
3. It is believed that the attachment will be useful in your briefing of CLOSER. At given times, [] will be asking [] to follow up on specific parts of the attachment; at other times, his general knowledge will enable him to make intelligent, on-the-spot replies to trusted contacts.
4. Needless to say, the attached information is highly sensitive.

6 June 1954

Distribution:

- 2 - (w/att)
- 2 - WASH (w/o att)
- 3 - (w/o att)

5-6
RECORDED BY []

1.1 C/

SUBJECT: Briefing off []

I. Situation and general plan

A. Due to recent developments we are going to prepare the excess newsmen into 5 man harassment teams and launch into the target country shot-gun fashion to throw the opposition off balance, disperse their attention away from the [] border, and give morale support to inner forces through our ability to retaliate.

B. Rather than precipitate a premature D-day among easily excitable inner groups, we will bring our assets and facilities to maximum preparedness prior to launching these harassment teams. Within the next 7 days we will execute the following:

1. Launch organizers
2. Launch radio operators
3. Get shocks in position at the staging sites
4. Complete air support preparations
5. Get cab leaders with gear in to the organizations responsible for providing their teams
6. Where possible, move gear planes 5, 6, 7.

The above preparations will allow us to support any unusual developments with an approximation of the original operational procedure if it is deemed feasible to call D-day or if the situation develops to where we should support one.

II. Specific

A. Organizers

1. Present Status - 3 organizers have departed for [] before they could be stopped. However 1 man, [], was to have entered [] staff as coordinator and therefore had been thoroughly briefed on the [] operation less identities. He was stopped and is now being re-briefed to contact the above [] with new instructions.

[] and staff are now selecting lesser personages to whom the organizer [] to report due our lack of knowledge on extent

PBSUCCESS

~~SECRET RYBAT~~

last exposure. On your arrival you will find the organizers completely ready to go except (1) coordination of air supply, and (2) concept of what to expect in case of premature revolt. (i.e. Air, Ports C, and the following paragraphs).

2. The physical launching of the organizers will be executed on cable from []

The organizers will carry D-day instructions as originally designed plus the following contingency instructions:

- a. DZ's and alternates
- b. Time and date to expect supply under both conditions of supply, i.e. (1) permission to supply, commencing 12 June, (2) permission to supply only after a declared D-day.

Note the form sheet attached. This form sheet nearly completed by staff working with [] when filled, it will be made to fit the two contingencies above, i.e., if it were completed, the organizer, since assigned #1 priority, would instruct his men that (1) on 12 June and following days until supplied, be prepared to receive bundles at primary DZ or Alt _____ between hours of 2100 and 0142 and between 0435 and 1100.

or (2) on D-day, you will receive same drops.

The [] organizer, being 2nd in priority but, as [] is under contingency #1, would set up for 12 June with same morning hours and different DZ's.

A #3 priority would be the 13th under contingency #1 and D + 1 under #2. You can see that only after the accompanying form is completed can the inner organizations be advised what to expect.

By your arrival time, this should be completed and [] should have the details on DZ and priority by cable in order to prepare air support.

In each case the organizer should have a method for us to declare D-day via [] as well as by signal man action.

Send to [] by cable the sentence being carried in by each organizer to designate D-day is 24 hours away, i.e., a signal on Monday indicates 2030 Tuesday night as D-day, etc. A tape will be cut containing these messages for broadcast by Sherwood.

Once the priority, bundle requirement, and DZ and Signal List

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as per attached form has been completed and organizer briefed on his part of it, the organizers are ready to depart.

A. Shock troops

An advance party of platoon-leaders has been sent to prepare the staging sites under the leadership of the shock troop executive officer.

The shock troop leader and his staff is being briefed in []
Gear and men are due to move to the staging area when advance party says come.

These men have not previously been grouped, nor have they all necessarily handled their individual weapon prior to this gathering.

The [] staying is to be by assigning each man his weapon and each man traveling by plane, mule, etc., to gather at Rufus' [] farm and, just prior to D-day, were to move to the DZ being selected for [] (The Jalapa group will assemble at the DZ on drop day also, and an organizer is preparing for this grouping).

C. Air support should be prepared, under present planning, to commence supply drops to any point predesignated on the completed attached form by 12 June.

Your main mission, this subject, is to check the form for non-conflict and insure that organizers are capable of conveying instructions to field groups.

Another primary mission is to see that this information: i.e. priority, DZ, Signals for each of the two contingencies, is received by [] for placing in hands air support by cable when complete compilation is attained.

The chart should be completed prior to your arrival.

The tonnages available are approximately as listed in Logistics Memo to C/P.

D. Sab Team leaders are briefed and ready to launch. They should depart 2 days following the organizer of the area into which he is to report. His instructions are:

1. Primary Mission: Execute the action assigned at hour assigned in original planning or if his organization is prematurely involved in action.
2. Secondary Mission: On missing primary target, distribute his explosives over the area in noisiest, most flashy, and harmful to the opposition possible.

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E. Gear Movement

In view of the fact of major consideration, in order to support a popular movement within the next month, we must depend upon a major portion of arms movement to be by aerial supply. At present there are four possible means of arms movement being explored.

1. Plan #5 ... [] has announced his willingness and ability to fly 5 tons of gear to [] as soon as we indicate readiness.

A man has been dispatched to Pancho's farm near [] to arrange meeting the planes with trucks and prepare the farm for storage. He is to notify readiness and will receive the Pancho - [] arranged STA.

Meantime, Col. [] who owns a farm between [] and [] is being alerted that he may send for the gear via a horse-trail (as yet unguarded) anytime after 8 June.

2. Plan #6 ... A man is making the arrangement for purchase of a boat []

The reconnaissance man has returned, and the operational plan is being written up to move the gear via boat, with gun crews and labor crew, accompanied by the recon man, to a meeting at the []

a. To land to reception party for storage and future withdrawal:

b. To land via small boat to a carrying team back to the inner organization

or c. To rendezvous 1000 yards or so out to sea with small boats from the shore party.

[] is prepared to fly 3 tons []

[] has agreed to wire authorities there to lay off []

3. Plan #7 ... A boat is being sought in the [] Port Area [] 6 tons can be moved there from [] by truck with ease.

[] past flap means that the plan for the offloading of this gear at [] gear must be carried in by the [] organizer.

4. [] is now in [] has been instructed to get him in the Cessna 180 and back to [] A list of 28 black strips has been compiled to which [] can fly. 8 Groups are being sought who can be alerted for possible supply by [] can run the circuit, h strips at a time, landing to the proper signal and giving out

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approximately 1000 pounds of gear. The organizers will alert their group of a 4 day period during which they will be ~~given~~ given a proper signal. 1/2 the group will be serviced any of the first four days of service, and 1/2 on the second four days.

In addition from the cable traffic, [] is to service his own finca - further distribution unknown.

5. Pancho's brother-in-law in [] is being sent same tonnage according to cable for transport in via car behind trunks, etc.
6. [] has carried some gear and will carry more gear each trip.
7. The 200 bundles will be on standby at [] for the schedule arranged according to the attached list.

F. Radio Operators

1. The radio operators are [] and have been slotted. One RO is [] but his operational plan may have been picked up along with other [] gear.
I suggest the organizer going in for [] be instructed to move the operator to a black location if he is not already picked up.
2. [] in [] has been instructed to contact [] and obtain the 2 RS-1s sent by him. He is to set up a cut-out through which he can pass radios and pads, and inform us soonest. [] has been instructed that on receipt of the identity and addresses and contact signals, etc., he will launch RO's to their respective organizations with instructions to send a courier to pick up the radio as per assigned contact plan.
3. Tactical radios should be activated as soon as possible in order to iron out the kinks. When haven is provided by shock troop organizations at the staging sites, they should move to the staging area and commence operation as TRO.
4. On completion of the above steps, we will feel prepared to face any situation which might arise by turning on full force at any moment to perpetrate a D-day on [] (via EUBARK) direction.
At the completion of the above, as many 5 man groups as can be gathered from the 200 excess personnel recently arrived, [] is gathering them into 5 man teams. Although friendship of members, leadership for each team, and return to home area should be considered initially, the emphasis in positioning of the teams should be placed on the rear areas where possible. The purpose of these teams is to dissipate enemy attention from the border, disrupt the opposition communication, and give cheer to the inner forces as well as generally begin to set the stage for coming events.

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The teams should carry own gear where it can be deviced. Long barrelled pistols can supplant rifles where necessary and S.D.'s

Special areas for placing teams should be along

The team crossings and launchings must not resemble an invasion of groups but should be conducted by individuals reassembling at pre-designated points (set a deadline for reassembly so that those who get there safely can move away on premise that rest may have been captured. This will also prevent those captured to hold out information until deadline.)

Some teams might be scattered down the coast via the South Coast boat movement in conjunction with gear movement.

Although these untrained men should not be burdened with extensive operational plans and complicated assignments, [] has arranged that they should now be studying weapons. They should be given an understanding of harassment and told that each team in its area should concentrate on:

1. Killing known communist leaders
2. Disrupting communist rallies and meetings
3. Cutting telephone and telegraph lines
4. Firing on gasoline tank cars

Each team (and all other activities) are to lay off attack on any soldier and, if possible, to avoid harassment which would involve an army unit. Protection to the team on this score will be provided by a PP concentration through clandestine broadcast and otherwise.

No operational plans need be drawn up. Assign each team a code name like [] 1, [], etc. Cable code name, area of operations each team, as compiled. Cable when launched. Advise team that instructions or announcement for their good deeds, etc. will be passed via clandestine radio. In addition, the clandestine radio mention of their names will help authenticate them.

There are 440 - 10 day rations available, or 4440 rations. The shock troops will require 3120, leaving 1320. Equip these 5 man teams with 8 days' rations and 165 men can be supplied thusly.

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H. Tactics

1. July tactical changes in the original Planilla, are as follows:

- Several groups are being investigated for addition as [] groups.

Gravy IV turned out to be between 1000 and 2000 men if supplied. This group was run by [] brother and has been added to our supply missions. On signal to act (i.e. after supply) they are to place 50 men at [] in our original road block there, and proceed to [] to hold until arrival of []

[] is the Jalapa group (350) and is to receive supply by joining with [] (see revisions [] plan). [] is Palencia group for which supply by air is being arranged. This supply must be the last prior to D-day or on D-day. [] is to take to hills and remain mobile until [] arrives. We were trying to arrange [] to make contact on arrival at [] and pass a radio and operator there. Maybe it can be figured in.

- Frank, having given up on [] support, is to stage (as mentioned in shock stage paragraph) and infiltrate on D-3 to the inner drop zone - temporarily selected as [] but only the final filled-out attached chart is to be counted on to ensure clarity.
 - Pay particular attention to the [] Alternate plan and make [] consider it carefully because land ingress to Hick will be precarious at best.
 - Emphasize INFILTRATION and evasion tactics in approach of shock troops - from departure staging area on - these fellows think they can drive the opposition into the sea and although they agree on the silent approach, every once in a while I get the impression they feel that if no bugles are used, it can be considered silent.

2. Under a running situation under which we decided the time for a D-day had arisen early, the pattern of action will be initiated the same as the standard plan with all destinations and routes and procedures remaining as nearly the same as the tactical situation allows. Groups with radios will be directed by same from the [] and by [] via []

I. Command Channels

1. [] and [] Field:

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a. [] Field is authorized to proceed as quickly and by available means to the point of preparation outlined in this briefing to the point of launching the 5 man team.

b. [] will give the go signal on the 5 man teams.

c. [] will call the signals on commencement air supply under one of the two contingencies.

d. After commencement the air supply will continue as scheduled unless altered or halted by [] instruction []

e. [] will call the signal for D-day.

2. Within [] Field

a. Pancho's staff is set up in standard military operating procedure. [] is Chief of Staff.

b. As nearly as possible, [] is trying to arrange for you to live on a daily basis right by [] for the next few days. In addition to normal duties as C/S, [] is to personally act as his own []
(1) gear movement
(2) preparation drop coordination
(3) briefing shock leaders and ironing detail kinks out to insure tactical plan is followed
(4) preparation of shock troops

c. Your duty is to advise [] in his above duties. In the case of [] you will find him a practical man and a dear and easy to work with. Your responsibility is to see that necessary adjustments to the plans are practical from a combat standpoint and do not materially affect the manner of operation.

d. [], due to his past work with the staff itself, will serve as adviser to the []. Requests should be presented to [] by you, to prevent disturbance existing coordination there. In addition, [] will work on the [] duties of
(1) launching organizers
(2) launching sab leaders
(3) organizing and launching 5 man teams.

e. In the above [] actions assigned to [], you are only

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responsible to advise as to how it fits into the overall scheme.

f. [] remains as [] Representative and maintains jurisdiction over [] field personnel. He will handle Pancho. It is virtually guaranteed your handling of [] will be unaffected by this [] - Pancho echelon but in the event the occasion arises, [] is Senior in responsibility, you are Senior [] representative.

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CONTINGENCIAS. --

I. Lanzamiento antes del Dia-D, en adiccion a los Lanzamientos Regulares y de Emergencia. -

A. Antes del Dia-D

Grupo	Equipo	DZ	Alt. DZ	Prioridad	Senales	R7
Mazatenango	8 H (1)					
Quetzaltenango	8 H (1)	AF7643	AF8434	2		*
	4 B					
Coban	10 A (2)	BF9668		3		*
Palencia	8 D 1G (2)	BF8902				
	5 F					
Jalapa-Jutiapa	8 E 1G (2)			1		*
	5 F 5I (1)					
Amatitlan	6 D (1)			4 (night)		* ?
Glor'a	10 I	BF4701				

B. En el Dia-D y continuando hasta el fin de las operaciones.

Coban -	10-I (2)	BF9668	1	*
	10 B			
Quetzalt.-Quiche	5 A (1)	AF 7643	AF8434	2
Union sobre la	5 B			*
carretera				
Coban-Zacapa.	10 A (2)			*
Union cerca de	10 B			
Progreso.				
Puerto Barrios	10 I (2)			*
	5 B			

C. RESERVA PARA UNA LLAMADA DE EMERGENCIA.

25 cajas A
11 cajas B
15 cajas I
5 cajas C

NOTA: Los numeros entre parentesis, (1) y (2), que aparecen en las casillas de "Equipo", corresponden al numero de aviones que llevaran el equipo anotado en la misma casilla. -

II. Si no es - posible hacer el lanzamiento antes del Dia-D

A. El Dia-D, y continuando hasta el fin de las operaciones.
Lanzamientos segu: dispuestos.

Grupo	Equipo	DZ	Alt. DZ	Prioridad	Senales	R
Coban	10 A (2) 5 B	BF 9668				*
Quezaltenango- Quiche	10 A (2) 5 B	AF7643	AF8434	2		*
Coban-Zacapa	10 A 10 B					*
Puerto Barrios	10 I (2) 5 B					*
Mazatenango	10 A 10 B					
Jalapa-Jutiapa	8 E 5 F (2) 1 G			1		
Palencia	8 E 5 F (2) 1 G	BF8982				
Amatitlan	6 D (1)			3		*
Gloria	10 I	BF4701				

B. Reserva para una llamada de emergencia.

30 I

10 A

10 B

16 H

5 C

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PISUCCESS/DEAT

26 MAY 1954

Acting Chief of Station, Guatemala City INFO: PISUCCESS, Headquarters
LINCOLN

REF: []

{ } Tactical Instructions (Part II)

1. Request that you hand the attached notes to [] with the usual warning that he should either return them to your files or destroy them as soon as he has finished with them.
2. Expect the order to start Operation "A", as described in paragraph 6 of the attached notes, to be given on/or about June 3-5, with "B" following very shortly thereafter. Have [] time [] preparations accordingly.
3. Frequent and fast reporting on the progress of these tactical [] preparations will be greatly appreciated.

Attachment

25 May 1954

Distribution:

- 2 - GUAT (w/att)
- 2 - HABK (w/att)
- 3 - LINC (w/att)

~~SECRET~~
PISUCCESS/DEAT

24 May 1954

For []

1. This is the second instalment of the "Emergency Instructions" for [] which we began in our letter #751, dated 12 May. We were gratified to learn from your wire #643 that the chiefs for all city teams except one have already been selected and that the other preparations, indicated in our first set of instructions, are making quick progress.

2. The first tasks of each City Chief — apart from assembling the personnel specified in paragraph 5 of #751 — include particularly:

a) Establishing secure communications with [] underground headquarters. There should be at least one courier between each Chief and Headquarters; this courier should preferably not know the Chief, but should be dispatched from, and return to, some other point. Most definitely, he must not know the location of [] Headquarters, but must deliver and receive his messages elsewhere (safe house, live drop). In addition, there should be an emergency procedure for fast communications, telephone or telegram messages to a safe address, using a simple open code for instructions like "Start operation 'A' immediately" or "Expect new police measures today" or the like. There should be different codes for each team so that, if one code will be compromised, the others can be continued in use.

b) Procuring and storing the equipment described in paragraph 6, #751.

c) Giving his deputy all the necessary instructions as to how to carry on in case he, the Chief, should get arrested or should have to disappear in order to avoid arrest or other enemy measures.

3. Activities of each team (other than the preparatory measures described here and in #751) must under no circumstances begin before we give the word. Members of the teams should therefore withdraw from any overt oppositional activities in which they may have engaged — or, better still, should be chosen from among people who had not been especially active or at least are not known to the local police (or to the local communists) for such activities. Strict compliance with this rule — at [] underground Headquarters as well as in each of the nine teams — is imperative to conserve our forces for the critical phase. On the other hand, once the signal is given, all teams should become fully active at once. It is therefore necessary that you can pass the signal at all times to [] or to his deputy and that he can alert his City Chiefs without delay, as suggested in paragraph 2, a above.

4. Each City Chief must get in touch with the commander of the Liberation Forces in his city. The commander will tell him when and where to take specific local action within the general framework of the instructions which we are giving you. This subordination is indispensable in order to avoid as much as possible local confusion and to insure maximum integration of all available opposition forces in each given place. At present, each City Chief is only to be told in general terms that he will be brought into touch with other opposition groups in his area and the need for discipline and subordination must be explained to him. We shall send you specific instructions as to when, where and how these contacts between [] City Chiefs and the local commanders of the Liberation Forces are to be made, in due time.

5. [] ought to give each City Chief detailed advance instructions for the following types of operations, each of which ought to start on a given day. He should therefore arrange for a simple code word for each of these types of operations so that the beginning can be signaled quickly as soon as we tell you. (In one case, Operation "A" may be referred to as "Aunt Annie", "B" as "Uncle Benno", etc. while for another city team the code words may be trees or flowers with the appropriate initials, or the like).

6. OPERATION "A":

(I) Rumor campaign -- Specific themes for rumors are to follow later: [] must first explain to each Chief how to get rumors started (and believe as much as possible), how to take specific cues from the clandestine radio and from further messages he will send. FYI, the main purpose of the rumor campaign is to create the right psychological atmosphere for the final phase, to confusing and discouraging our enemies.

(II) War against enemy key personnel -- Each City Chief is to select a limited number of enemy personalities (government and police officials, communist leaders, uniformly army officers etc.), not more than he and his team can effectively handle. Against each of these target personalities, a series of measures are to be devised which will lower his morale, if possible get him to abandon the enemy side or at least get him out of the way in the critical hours. These measures must be "custom tailored" for each individual case, since different people have different vulnerable spots and react in different manners. Some of the means to be used might include the following (plus whatever local inventors may suggest):

- a) Sending death notices
- b) Telephone calls -- preferably between 2 and 5 a.m. --, whispering a threat or a warning (either against impending purge by PGT or government -- or against being blacklisted by Liberation Movement)
- c) Marking subject's house "here lives a Moscow agent" or the like (luminous paint?)
- d) Sending cardboard coffin or hangman's noose through mail or depositing before subject's house or office.
- e) Sending subject a fake summons, asking him to appear in Guatemala City to answer charges of deviation from the party line (if a PGT member), or embezzlement or betrayal of government secrets (if a government official)
- f) Informing subject's wife that he is in danger and that she must see to it that he seeks safety.
- g) Exposing true or very likely dark spots in subject's private life, by telling him, or his wife or denouncing him to his superiors or publishing the story via black leaflet.
- h) Sending subject a wire, announcing a successful business deal to be made, asking him to come for important meeting, or pretending an accident which befell family member, mistress or close friend in far-away place, to remove him from scene for critical moment, and so forth.

(III) Encourage people to listen to the clandestine radio, by word-of-mouth propaganda, by painting wave lengths and times on walls, etc.

7. OPERATION "3":

- (I) Start distribution of the material (leaflets, posters) which [] is receiving from you and which he will have divided up among the City Teams for storage in advance -- since bulk shipments to outlying cities are likely to become increasingly difficult towards the final phase.
- (II) Start production and distribution of local, mimeographed bulletins and leaflets -- exploiting the local situation plus news heard on the clandestine radio, publishing black lists of dangerous enemies, communists, police informers etc. (as a further step in the "nerve war" described in Operation "2" above).
- (III) Start painting slogans on walls.

8. OPERATION "3" (This is the most sensitive part of the entire enterprise. We leave it to your judgment how much of it you want to tell to [] already now. In any case, he must not tell any of this part to his City Chiefs any earlier than is absolutely necessary):

- (I) Delay, or slow down, as much as possible, hostile action by the Army or by the Police, for instance
 - 1) by preliminary propaganda aimed either at the military and police personnel as a whole or at individual officers and men, considered potentially friendly to us;
 - 2) by organizing, if locally feasible, demonstrations by women and children in front of the police station or the army barracks, slowing down the deployment of troops, preventing the use of fire arms, clamoring for the release of political prisoners, etc.
- (II) Provoke communist-led strikes or provoke, on the contrary, strikes which can help the liberation movement (like all parts of Operation "2", this one has to be particularly carefully coordinated with the local commander of the Liberation Forces, as set forth in paragraph 4 above) -- for instance, a railroad workers strike to hold up troop movements, strike at the city electrical power plant plunging the city into darkness, printers strike to prevent publication of pro-Abenz newspapers, leaflets or posters, and so forth.
- (III) Use all locally available resources, leaflets, bulletins, possibly also local newspapers and radio stations, word of mouth, meetings (if and as practicable) etc. to rally the local population around the liberation movement, to keep them informed about the progress of our action, to counteract enemy announcements, propaganda or rumors and to provide disciplined mass support for the Liberation Forces.

9. The security implications of the above are obvious. Just as you will pass these instructions to [] not earlier than required, [] in turn will give each City Chief and the men at his underground headquarters no information prior to the moment where it is needed and will give no individual more information than this individual requires in order to accomplish his own assignments. Each City Chief again will pass on instructions to the members of his team on a strict "need-to-know"

basic and will not reveal any sensitive fact any earlier than necessary. Certain parts of the intended activities require considerable preparations, for instance, the collection of relevant information for the "nerve war", defined above as part of Operation "A" - but this is a comparatively non-sensitive task. Information on communications, whether with [] Headquarters or with the local Commander of the Liberation Forces, or any preparation for Operation "C", on the other hand, is highly sensitive and must be confined absolutely to the people who need them. Impress upon everybody the fact that at least a few members of the entire organisation are likely to be arrested during the preparatory period, while others might talk under the influence of liquor, women or money: the safest way of keeping the possible damage to a minimum is to let nobody know more than he must know — or any earlier than he has to know. No amount of torture or corruption can extract from a person information which he has not got.

10. You may expect to receive the final set of our instructions as well as the signal to start Operations "A" very shortly. Complete preparations therefore as speedily as possible and keep sending us full reports on all phases of this work.

- - - -

FN 30

VIA _____
(Specify Air or
Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO.,

9 JUN 1954

TO

1803, Guatemala.

FROM INFO: 5

LINCOLN

SUBJECT { GENERAL
SPECIFIC

Instruction "Karma War Against Individuals"

1. The attached instruction, in both the English original and in a Spanish translation, is forwarded to you as a supplement to the instructions for Tactical Psychological Warfare which you have received with previous communications. A few additional copies of either text may be obtained from this station, if needed.

2. It is suggested that you use this instruction for the detailed briefing of all personnel involved in such operations, on a strict need-to-know basis. You may show the Spanish text to cleared indigenous personnel, but you must not leave any copies in their hands (they may take notes in their own handwriting, if they consider that safe and might need such notes for the oral briefing of their subordinates).

3. Note for Enc. The previous instructions mentioned in para 1 above were not sent to you since they do not apply to your operations. You may nevertheless find the attached instruction possibly useful to your work.

127/d
5 June 193

Directed buttons

Cost (2) Eng. 2 Span. 5

values(j) BspL. 1 Open. 1

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
FOR RELEASE AS SANITIZED, BY
CSE/HK6 ON 3 JULY 95

Nerve War against Individuals

DEFINITION

1. The strength of any enemy (foreign or domestic, political or military) consists largely of the individuals who occupy key positions in the enemy organization, as leaders, speakers, writers, organizers, cabinet members, senior government officials, army commanders and staff officers, and so forth. Any effort to defeat the enemy must therefore concentrate to a great extent upon these key enemy individuals.
2. If such an effort is made by means short of physical violence, we call it "psychological warfare". If it is focused less upon convincing those individuals by logical reasoning, but primarily upon moving them in the desired direction by means of harassment, by frightening, confusing and misleading them, we speak of "nerve war". Such a nerve war can be waged against an entire nation or against major groups of the population. In the present paper, however, we discuss only nerve war against individuals, that is, against key personalities in the enemy camp.

SELECTION OF TARGETS

3. In order to make your effort as effective as possible, select only a limited number of enemy personalities as your targets. Effective nerve war involves in most cases a considerable amount of work: concentrate it therefore exclusively on persons who are really important to the enemy or a real danger to you (for instance, as persuasive speakers -- or as successful organizers, penetrating your own ranks, or the like). Select not more persons than you are confident you can handle effectively. If there are definitely more enemy key personalities than you can attack simultaneously, make a priority list, deal with the first group on the list first and add persons farther down the list only, if and when you have disposed of members of the first group (or if your potential increases by recruiting additional active personnel on your side, etc.)
4. Select your targets not necessarily according to their official ranks and titles but according to their real importance as individuals. In a political party, the chairman is not always the most important personality -- nor is the Mayor always the real head of a municipal government, and so forth. Aim primarily at the man who has the greatest influence upon his colleagues and his followers, who has the best brains, who is most fanatically devoted to the enemy cause, who is the most accomplished speaker, organizer or writer.
5. Select your targets also according to your ability of attacking them. Assume, the enemy leader is a very strong personality, unquestioningly beloved by his followers, of absolute integrity, etc.: you will find it extremely difficult to shake him. As a matter of fact, your attacks against him personally may only infuriate his followers and stimulate them into an even greater effort for his cause. However, even the most gifted leader cannot work without associates, assistants of all sorts: if you can manage to deprive him of some of these (who may be weaker personalities, less popular, less integer than he is and therefore easier to attack), you will gradually weaken his position, too.
6. Once you have decided whom you want to make a target in your nerve war campaign, try to obtain all possible information about these persons: their political views (especially possible points of difference between them and the party, the government, etc. to which they belong), changes of opinion in the past, their personal habits and their private lives -- especially vulnerable points and guilty secrets (whether he has made secret trips to Moscow or receives funds from a foreign power, whether he is a drug addict, drinks too much, indulges in other vices, has embezzled money or is guilty of other illegal or immoral acts). It is also important to know who are his friends and who are his (personal) enemies, especially enemies close to him, in his own party, in his own family, men who aspire to the position which he now holds, and so forth. The more you know about the man, the better are your chances of conducting a successful nerve war operation against him.

PURPOSE

7. Your most natural objective will be to draw the person whom you attack over to your side. This, however, will not always be possible -- because the man might be such a dyed-in-the-wool militant of the enemy cause or may be so utterly opposed to you that it would be unrealistic to expect that you can win him as a friend or an ally. Moreover, there are undoubtedly certain persons in the enemy camp whom you would not even want to have on your side, even if you could manage to recruit them -- persons who are guilty of crimes or of shameful political or personal acts, persons whose names have become so closely identified with your enemy that it would compromise and embarrass you if they were to join your side.

8. In the latter cases, you shall try to destroy that man's usefulness for the enemy side. By "destroy", we do not mean to kill the man -- since physical violence is not discussed in the present paper, but we mean either to make the man leave the enemy (without joining you), for instance, by withdrawing from all public activity, or by emigrating -- or to make the enemy oust the man, because of suspicion which you might have aroused against him. --As a temporary result, you may at least send the man out of harm's way in the critical moment (for instance, through a phony emergency call from a relative in a far-away town or through a phony order from a superior, sending him in the wrong direction.)

TECHNIQUES

9. The methods which you could or should use to achieve the objectives defined above will naturally vary according to whether you want to recruit the man or to destroy him (or rather his usefulness to the enemy). Furthermore, these methods will differ according to the area in which you operate and the circumstances existing there at the time at which you undertake such a campaign. Finally, much will depend upon the person whom you have made your target. Do not consider, therefore, the following suggestions as a firmly established set of rules, equally applicable to all cases: examine rather every case on its own merits and find out which of the following bits of advice may suit your immediate problem. You will undoubtedly also discover ways and means of your own of which we did not think when preparing this paper.

10. If you want to win a man away from the enemy, over to your own side, you have to convince him that the enemy has evil intentions against him (whether against him as a person or as member of a given social class, or the like). For instance, if your target is a retired army officer and you can manage to convince him that the enemy party to which he belongs plans to oust all retired officers, he may leave the party rather than wait until he is ousted. Or, if you happen to know about a past legal offense of which your target has been guilty, but which went undetected (for instance, embezzlement of public funds) and you can convince him that his competitors have assembled evidence against him, he may resign his public office rather than await indictment.

11. On the other hand, if you intend to destroy a man, aim your efforts not so much at him personally, but at his colleagues or his superiors: furnish them (in a roundabout, devious way, of course) with material which indicates that the man is a traitor, that he is plotting to gain more power for himself, that he collaborates with their enemies, that he accepts money from a foreign power -- or that his private sins will cause a big public scandal soon so that it will be better for them (for their party, government, business corporation) to get rid of him immediately in order not to be affected by that scandal.

12. The most common techniques to be used for either purpose are rumors, anonymous letters, telegrams and telephone calls as well as visible symbols. Telephone calls should be made preferably in the early hours of the morning, say between 1 and 4 o'clock a.m., when a man's psychological resistance is usually at its lowest ebb. "Visible symbols" may include depositing a coffin or a hangman's noose in front of the man's house, painting threatening texts on the wall ("Here lives a spy", "You have only 5 more days...", "Your secret life has been discovered" or whatever may be appropriate), sending a phony bomb

through the mails (include a cheap alarm clock, to suggest a time bomb, with a note "This is only a warning. The next time it will be real"), or the like.

13. You may preferably choose for your operations moments when your target is psychologically especially vulnerable. If, for instance, he is just celebrating his birthday and in the midst of a gay party, a telegram or telephone call with some ominous news (e. g., an impending party purge) reaches him, this is likely to affect him more -- because of the sharp contrast with his elated mood at the moment -- than at ordinary times. On the other hand, if your messages reach him when he is already very much depressed (whether for political, business or family reasons), you may achieve a cumulative effect and thereby hit him harder than you could otherwise. (This again indicates clearly that you must keep a close watch over the persons against whom you wage such a campaign.)

14. "The kiss of death": If a man suddenly begins to be praised by his enemies, this is likely to arouse suspicions among his friends. Assume, a political leader makes a violent speech and the newspapers of the opposition commend him for his moderation, emphasize that he is different from his colleagues, easier to get along with etc., this is bound to embarrass him, especially if he belongs to a party characterized by great inner distrust and permanent fear of "deviationists and oppositionists", like the Communist Party. This effect can also be obtained by writing to such a man a friendly letter from abroad, from a hostile political group or the like, if one can be reasonably sure that the letter will be censored and thus come to the attention of the man's superiors.

15. Legal harassment: if local conditions permit, one can denounce a man to the proper authorities for any violation of the law of which he is either really guilty or for which at least suspicious looking evidence can be prepared. Such denunciations may range from treason to income tax evasion. Some times, an apparently very insignificant law violation may have interesting political consequences: assume you know that a man left secretly town one night to attend a clandestine meeting; you go to the police and accuse him of having seen him committing an immoral act (or, perhaps having parked his car, without lights, endangering public traffic) on that same night. In court, the man will naturally protest that he was not there at all: it will then be logical to ask him to prove to the court where he was at that time -- which will be obviously embarrassing to him.

16. Private harassment: If you want a man to leave the enemy camp, you might achieve this by having rumors about enemy intentions reach his wife, his parents or other close friends and relatives who may have much influence upon him. If you make a wife believe that her husband will be sent by the Communist Party for one year's training to the Soviet Union, implying that the prettiest Russian girls are selected to keep these 'heroes from far-away lands' company, she may well insist that her husband not only does not go away, but quits the party. You may also make her suspect that the secret party meetings which he attends are actually visits to a mistress, or the like. If she is not the jealous type, you may make her fear for his life or indicate that he is going to lose his job because of his political activities or any such suggestion which is likely to make her interfere with his political work in the desired sense.

17. In certain cases, forged papers may greatly assist your campaign. For instance, if you mail to a Communist Party official a letter on party stationery, summoning him to appear before the party control commission to answer questions concerning his private associations with enemy agents, Trotskyites or the like, he may prefer to resign from the party rather than undergo the threatening purge (even if his conscience should happen to be clean -- but you will naturally choose a charge which has at least a small kernel of possible truth in it.) If you don't have the necessary stationery or at least a rubber stamp of the party, you'll have to try it by telephone call or by telegram.

18. Whichever method you choose, you'll have to pursue your campaign relentlessly and methodically, until your target either gives in -- or, on the contrary, until you recognize that this is, for the time being at least, a hopeless case and that you are wasting your effort. Repetition is one of the strongest devices in all propaganda and the cumulative effect of various means (as suggested in the foregoing paragraphs) increases with every additional step you take. Don't give

the man time to recover from the first shock: have him approached from different sides, by different people, but all contributing to the theme which you have chosen.

19. Never expose yourself in such a nerve war campaign: this is imperative not only to protect you from counter-measures and from possible legal persecution, but also because an unknown, invisible enemy has a much greater harassing effect upon most minds than attacks by a known adversary. Therefore tell your rumors just to one or two gossipy persons of whom you can be sure that they will spread the story until it reaches the people for whom you intended it. Have other persons (i.e. people not known to the addressee) write anonymous letters, if the man in question knows you. Never mail them from a place close to where you live, but from another town or from another part of the city. Disguise your handwriting. Do not use your own stationery but buy the necessary sheets and envelopes separately. Make telephone calls only from public telephones and keep them very short so that they cannot be traced back.

GUERRA DE NERVIOS CONTRA INDIVIDUOS

DEFINICION

1. La fuerza de cada enemigo (extranjero o del país, político o militar) consiste principalmente en los individuos que ocupan posiciones claves en la organización enemiga, como líderes, oradores, escritores, organizadores, miembros del gabinete, oficiales más antiguos del gobierno, comandantes del ejército y oficiales del estado mayor, etc. Cualquier intento para derrotar al enemigo debe por lo tanto concentrarse en su mayor parte en estos individuos claves del enemigo.

2. Si este intento es hecho por medios que no sean violencia física, le llamaremos "guerra psicológica". Si se centraliza mano en convencer a esos individuos por razonamientos lógicos, pero primeramente llevándolos a la dirección deseada por medio de la persecución, el miedo, la confusión y el engaño, nosotros hablamos de ello como una "guerra de nervios". Esta guerra de nervios puede ser emprendida contra una nación o contra grupos mayores de la población. En este artículo, sin embargo, discutimos solamente la guerra de nervios en contra de individuos, eso es, contra personalidades claves en el campo enemigo.

SELECCION DE OBJETIVOS

3. Para que sus esfuerzos sean lo más efectivos posible, seleccione como objetivo solamente un número limitado de personalidades del enemigo. Una guerra de nervios efectiva comprende en la mayoría de los casos considerable cantidad de trabajo: controlarlo, por lo tanto, en personas que sean realmente importantes para el enemigo o de gran peligro para usted (por ejemplo, como oradores persuasivos -- o como organizadores brillantes, penetrando sus propios rangos, etc.). Seleccione el número de personas que usted esté seguro de poder controlar efectivamente. Si hay en definitiva más personalidades claves de las que usted pueda atacar simultáneamente, haga una lista de prioridad, encárguese primeramente del primer grupo en la lista y añada personas más abajo en la lista, solamente siempre y cuando usted ya haya dispuesto de los miembros del primer grupo (o sus suministros potenciales reclutando personal activo adicional a su lado, etc.).

4. Seleccione sus objetivos no necesariamente de acuerdo con sus rangos y títulos oficiales sino de acuerdo con su verdadera importancia como individuos: En un partido político, el presidente no es siempre la personalidad más importante -- ni es el alcalde siempre la verdadera cabeza de un gobierno municipal, etc. Diríjase primeramente al hombre que tenga la mayor influencia entre sus colegas y seguidores, que tenga el mejor cerebro, que esté más fanáticamente dedicado a la causa enemiga, que sea el mejor orador, organizador o escritor.

5. Seleccione también sus objetivos de acuerdo con su habilidad para atacarlos. Asuma, que el líder del enemigo es una personalidad muy fuerte, inquestionablemente admirado por sus seguidores, de absoluta integridad, etc. usted encontrará extremadamente difícil el sacudirlo. En realidad, los ataques en su contra puede que solamente logren enfurecer a sus seguidores y estimularlos a un esfuerzo más intenso aún hacia su causa. Sin embargo, ni el más privilegiado de los líderes puede trabajar sin sus asistentes, asistentes de todas clases: si usted logra despojarlo de algunos de éstos (quienes pueden ser personalidades más débiles, menos populares, menos integras que él y por lo tanto más fáciles de atacar), usted podrá gradualmente debilitar su posición también.

6. Cuando usted ya haya decidido a quien desea usted hacer el objetivo en su campaña para una "guerra de nervios", trate de obtener toda la información posible sobre estas personas: sus puntos de vista políticos (especialmente las posibles diferencias entre ellos y el partido, el gobierno, etc. al cual ellos pertenecen), diferencias en el pasado, sus hábitos personales y sus vidas privadas -- especialmente puntos vulnerables y secretos vergonzosos (si él ha hecho viajes en secreto a Moscú o recibido dinero de un poder extranjero, si es un adicto a drogas, si bebe en demasía, o se deja dominar por otros vicios, ha desfalcado dinero o es culpable de otros actos ilegales o inmorales). Es también importante el saber quienes son sus enemigos (personales), especialmente enemigos cercos de él, en su propio partido, en su familia, algún hombre que aspire a la posición que él desempeña, etc. Mientras más usted sepa de ese hombre, mayores son sus oportunidades de dirigir en su contra una efectiva guerra de nervios.

7. Su objetivo más natural sería el affaer la persona que usted ataca a su lado. Esto, sin embargo, no será siempre posible -- ya que el hombre puede ser un militante acérrimo de la causa enemiga o puede estar absolutamente opuesto a usted y sería fantástico el esperar que usted lo pueda ganar como amigo o aliado. Por otra parte, hay sin duda algunas ciertas personas en el campo enemigo que usted no desearía tener de su parte, aún cuando usted pudiera atraerlos -- personas que son culpables de crímenes

o de actos vergonzosos políticos o personales, personas cuyos nombres se identifican tan estrechamente con el enemigo que lo comprometerían y avergonzarían si se unieran a su causa.

8. En último caso, usted debe de tratar de destruir la utilidad de ese hombre para el enemigo. Por "destruir", nosotros no queremos decir que se mate al hombre -- ya que la violencia física no se discute en este artículo, queremos decir, hacer que el hombre abandone al enemigo (sin unirse a usted), por ejemplo, retirándose de toda actividad pública, o emigrando -- o hacer que el enemigo lo despida, por las sospechas que usted haya logrado hacer recaer sobre él. -- Como un resultado temporero, usted puede por lo menos mandar al hombre fuera en el momento crítico (por ejemplo, por medio de una falsa llamada telefónica de emergencia de un paciente en un pueblo lejano o por medio de una falsa orden de un superior, mandándolo a una dirección errónea.)

TECNICAS

9. Los métodos que usted pueda usar o deba de usar para conseguir los objetivos mencionados arriba naturalmente variarán de acuerdo con que usted desee reclutar al hombre o destruirlo (mejor dicho su utilidad para el enemigo). Mas aún, estos métodos diferirán de acuerdo con el área en que usted opere y las circunstancias existentes en ese lugar en el momento en que usted emprenda tal campaña. Finalmente, dependerá mucho de la persona que usted haya convertido en su objetivo. No considere, por lo tanto, las siguientes sugerencias como reglas firmemente establecidas, igualmente aplicables en todos los casos: mejor aún examine cada paso por sus propios méritos y decida cual de los siguientes consejos es el indicado para su problema inmediato. Usted podrá sin duda alguna descubrir modos y maneras apropiadas en las cuales nosotros no pensamos al preparar este artículo.

10. Si usted desea ganar a un hombre del enemigo a su causa, usted tiene que convencerlo de que el enemigo tiene malas intenciones hacia él (ya sea en su contra como persona, o como miembro de cierta clase social, etc.). Por ejemplo, si su objetivo es un oficial retirado del ejército, puede que él abandone el partido antes de que éste lo eche o despida. O si usted conoce alguna pasada ofensa legal de la cual el objetivo haya sido culpable, pero la cual nunca se descubrió (por ejemplo, desfalcamiento de fondos públicos) y usted logra convencerlo de que sus competidores han reunido evidencias en su contra, puede que él se decida a renunciar su cargo público antes de que se le acuse.

11. Por otra parte, si usted intenta destruir al hombre, concentre sus esfuerzos no tanto hacia él personalmente, sino a sus colegas y superiores: suministrálos (por supuesto de una manera indirecta, tortuosa) con material que indique que el hombre es un traidor, que él está conspirando para ganar más poder personal, que él colabora con el enemigo, que él acepta dinero de un poder extranjero -- o que sus pecados privados podrán causar un serio escándalo pronto por lo tanto sería mejor para ellos (para el partido, gobierno, corporación comercial) el deshacerse de él inmediatamente para así no ser afectados por el escándalo.

12. La técnica más corriente a usarse para cualquier propósito es por medio de los rumores, cartas anónimas, telegramas y llamadas telefónicas lo mismo que símbolos visibles. Las llamadas telefónicas deben de ser hechas preferiblemente muy temprano en la mañana, entre 1 y 4 a.m., cuando la resistencia psicológica del hombre está usualmente en el punto más bajo. "Símbolos visibles" pueden incluir el colocar un ataúd o el lazo de un verdugo frente a la casa del hombre, pintando textos amenazadores en la pared ("Aquí vive un espía", "Solemente te quedan 5 días más", "Tu vida secreta ha sido descubierta" o cualesquier otro que sea apropiado), enviando bombas falsas por medio del correo (incluya un despertador barato, para sugerir una bomba de tiempo, con una nota "Esto es sólo un aviso. La próxima vez será real"), etc.

13. Usted puede preferiblemente escoger para sus operaciones el momento en que su objetivo está más vulnerable psicológicamente. Si, por ejemplo, él está celebrando su cumpleaños y en medio de una alegre fiesta, un telegrama o una llamada telefónica con nefastas noticias (por ejemplo, una inminente purgación del partido) lo llega, es muy probable que le afecte más -- debido al violento contraste con su exaltado humor del momento -- que en cualquier otro tiempo. Por otra parte, si su mensaje lo llega cuando él se encuentra muy deprimido (debido a razones políticas, familiares o de negocios), usted puede conseguir un efecto cumulativo y golpearlo más fuerte que de cualquier otra manera. (Esto indica claramente de nuevo que usted debe de mantener una estricta vigilancia sobre las personas contra las cuales usted dirija esta clase de campaña).

14. "El beso de la muerte": Si de momento un hombre empieza a ser alabado por sus enemigos, ésto levantará sospechas entre sus propios amigos. Asuma, que un líder militante pronuncia un violento discurso y los periódicos de la oposición lo elabran por

su moderación, enfatizando que él es diferente a sus compañeros, más tratable, etc., esto lo desconcertará, especialmente si él pertenece a un partido caracterizado por una gran desconfianza interna y un permanente temor a "divergentes y opositores", como el Partido Comunista. Este efecto también puede lograrse escribiéndole desde el extranjero, de un grupo político hostil, etc., una carta amistosa al hombre, si uno puede estar razonablemente seguro que dicha carta ha de ser censurada y por lo tanto llegar hasta los superiores del hombre.

15. Persecución legal: si las condiciones locales lo permiten, uno puede denunciar al hombre a las autoridades pertinentes por cualquier violación de la ley de la cual él sea verdaderamente culpable o se hayan logrado acumular evidencias sospechosas en su contra. Estas denuncias pueden variar de traición a rehuir pagar las contribuciones. A veces, una aparentemente insignificante violación de la ley puede tener interesantes consecuencias políticas: pretenda saber que el hombre salió secretamente del pueblo cierta noche para asistir a una reunión clandestina; usted va a la policía y le acusa de haberle visto cometer un acto immoral (o, quizás de estacionar el auto, sin luces, poniendo en peligro el tráfico público) esa misma noche. En la corte, el hombre naturalmente negará que el estuvo en el lugar indicado: será entonces lógico el hacerle probar ante la corte dónde él estuvo en ese momento -- lo cual será obviamente embarazoso para él.

16. Persecución privada: si usted desea que el hombre abandone el campo enemigo, puede conseguirlo haciendo que ciertos rumores sobre las intenciones del enemigo lleguen a su esposa, padres, parientes o amigos íntimos que tengan influencia sobre él. Si usted hace creer a una esposa que su marido va a ser enviado por el Partido Comunista a un año de entrenamiento a la Unión Soviética, implicando que las más bellas jóvenes rusas serán elegidas para hacer compañía a los héroes de las naciones lejanas, ella no sólo insistirá en que su marido no vaya sino también a que abandone el partido. Usted puede también hacerle sospechar que las reuniones secretas del partido son realmente visitas a una amiga, etc. Si ella no es del tipo celoso, usted puede hacer que ella teme por la vida de su marido, o indicar que él va a perder su empleo debido a sus actividades políticas o cualquier otra sugerencia que la haga intervenir en sus asuntos políticos en la forma deseada.

17. En algunos casos, papeles falsificados pueden ayudarle grandemente en su campaña. Por ejemplo, si usted envía una carta a un oficial del Partido Comunista, en el papel de cartas del partido, citándole a comparecer ante la comisión de control del partido para contestar a algunas preguntas concernientes a su asociación privada con agentes del enemigo, Trotzkistas, etc., él puede que prefiera renunciar al partido antes de someterse a la amenazadora purgación (aunque su conciencia esté limpia -- pero usted naturalmente seleccionará un cargo que contenga algo de verdad). Si usted no dispone del papel de carta necesario o de por lo menos un sello del partido, tendrá que intentarlo por medio de una llamada telefónica o de un telegrama.

18. Cualquiera que sea el método que usted selecciona, tendrá que proseguir su campaña implacable y metódicamente, hasta que su objetivo se rinda -- o, por el contrario, hasta que usted se dé cuenta de que es un caso perdido y usted está malgastando sus esfuerzos. La repetición es uno de los recursos más fuertes de toda propaganda y el efecto cumulativo de varios medios (como se sugiere en los párrafos anteriores) aumenta con cada paso adicional que usted toma. No lo dé tiempo al hombre para reponerse del primer golpe: atáquelo por diferentes lados y diferentes gentes, pero todas contribuyendo al fin que usted ha escogido.

19. Nunca se espomega en esta campaña de guerra de nervios: esto es imperativo no solamente para protegerlo de las contra-medidas y de posibles persecuciones legales, sino también porque un enemigo desconocido invisible tiene mayor efecto hostigante sobre muchas mentes que ataques por adversarios conocidos. Por lo tanto diga el rumor solamente a una o dos personas murmuradoras, de las cuales usted pueda estar seguro que propagarán la historia hasta que ésta llegue a las personas indicadas. Haga que otras gentes (por ejemplo, personas desconocidas por el destinatario) escriban anónimos si el hombre en cuestión los conoce. Nunca los envíe de un sitio cercano a su domicilio, sino de otro pueblo o de otra parte de la ciudad. Desfigure su escritura. No use su propio papel de cartas, compre papel y sobre separadamente. Haga las llamadas telefónicas de teléfonos públicos y que sean cortas para evitar ser descubierto.

AIR

Chief, WID

Chief of Station, Guatemala

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Activities

Operations Under

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

References: 1) WIDT 914
 2) WID Field Memorandum No. 119-53
 3) []
 4) []

1. Enclosed in outline form is a summary of proposed operations to be undertaken by [] in order to fulfill the objectives of project [].

2. As stated in reference 1) it is believed that the proposed operations constitute a continuation of and not a deviation from the original objectives of project [] as outlined in reference 3), and a formal project outline is therefore not deemed necessary. [] is merely replacing [] as the vehicle for the fulfillment of the original project objectives.

3. The [] group referred to in paragraph 6 a) of the enclosed operational outline is [].

[] claims to have established [] a dominant role in an association which now includes the []

4. Other groups are to become associated with [] through infiltration by [] sub-agents. These probably will include [].

[] will be able to exert a unifying influence on these various groups simply by demonstrating, without support and guidance, that it has a plan, leadership, funds, sources of materials, etc. Those who fail to cooperate will simply be

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ignored and allowed to follow their present ineffective course or die out completely due to lack of support.

5. Attachment A, reference 2), stated that \$6,000.00 had been established as the field ceiling for FY 1954 for project [] To date approximately \$3,350.00 of that amount has been expended in support of [] developmental activity and test operations leaving a balance of \$2,650.00. As shown in the attached outline, it is expected that [] operations under project [] will cost \$32,025.00 during the period 1 December 1953 to 30 May 1954. If possible, \$32,025.00 should be authorized for expenditure from the total of \$60,000.00 "authorized program budget" listed in reference 2). As already indicated in reference 1), this is an urgent matter since planned operations for the remainder of November and December 1953 will exhaust the balance (\$2,650.00) of the \$6,000 originally established as the field ceiling for FY 1954.

6. The costs relating to the equipment and supplies listed in Annex B of enclosure are very roughly estimated since we do not have the necessary cost reference materials available. Also, except for items 2 and 3 of Annex B, the nomenclature used is necessarily minimal due to lack of references. (A sample of item 3 was previously sent to Headquarters as an enclosure to [].

7. Additional operational data relating to [] activities is being compiled and will be pouches to Headquarters as soon as possible.

Enclosure:

Operational plan

Distribution:

3-Wash w/att (in trip)
1-Files w/att

RECORDED

PART I

1. AREA OF OPERATIONS:

- a. Republic of Guatemala
- b. Support and coordination activities in []

2. REFERENCES:

- a. There is no direct relationship to other projects or plans, but there is a similarity in objectives between this project and operations in other area countries which are designed to combat Communism in Guatemala.
- b. Background data concerning development activities in connection with this project may be found [] and []

3. OBJECTIVES:

- a. To create and thereafter render financial and material support and guidance to an indigenous psychological and political warfare mechanism which will endeavor, through overt and covert action, to carry out the objectives of []
(NOTE: The previous mechanism established for this purpose was suppressed by the Guatemalan government following the abortive Salama revolt in March 1953).

4. TARGETS:

- a. The Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (POT), the communist party of Guatemala; Communist front groups and sympathizers; the Communist-dominated labor movement, particularly the Communist-dominated Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala; Communists and pro-Communists within the government and in government sponsored institutions; foreign Communists residing in Guatemala; and the pro-Communist government of Guatemala.
- b. Organized and un-organized anti-Communist groups and individuals; dissident factions within the government or pro-government political parties; neutral or indifferent groups and individuals.
- c. Any other targets of opportunity whose exploitation will serve to fulfill the objectives of []

5. TASKS:

- a. In order to carry out the objectives cited in paragraph 3, above, [] will, with the support and guidance of Headquarters and the Field Station, take the following steps:

SECRET

Attachment 64

PT-1 T-1 104-2

- 1) Reorganize and/or reactivate, and utilize, through sub-agents, existing anti-Communist groups for the purpose of disseminating "white" anti-Communist anti-government propaganda, employing newspapers, leaflets, handbills, posters, radio, demonstrations, rumors, and any other available or feasible methods and media;
- 2) Organize through sub-agents a covert anti-Communist anti-government group for the dissemination of "black" propaganda;
- 3) Organize through sub-agents a covert direct action group which will engage in harassment activities, undertake sabotage operations against Communist installations and communications, disrupt Communist meetings and/or demonstrations, and any other direct action of a violent/illegal nature that may be necessary;
- 4) Establish a secure courier system between Guatemala and anti-Communist exiled groups in [] in order to facilitate coordination and mutual support in the fulfillment of stated OBJECTIVES;
- 5) Establish a controlled anti-Communist, anti-government news bulletin which will ostensibly be the official organ of a militant university student group with an established record of anti-Communist activity;
- 6) Organize a daily half-hour radio program for the dissemination of anti-Communist propaganda;
- 7) Cooperate with and support, using [] as a "front" anti-Communist candidates for municipal and national offices;
- 8) Provide temporary financial support to assist the planned establishment of a local newspaper which will be openly and frankly anti-government.

6. OPERATIONAL DATA:

- a. The principal controlled group for the dissemination of anti-Communist propaganda (paragraph 5 1), above) will be known as [] identity and background contained in [] Control will be exercised by [] through two sub-agents [] and []. [] will be the dominant and controlling member organization of this organization to be tentatively known as []. [] himself will not be openly associated with any of these overt organizations. He will serve as principal agent and cut-out between the base of [] and the various units of the "black" propaganda group. [] will be comprised of approximately six persons including [] and [] who will be directed by []. The remaining members of [] will not be in contact with or operationally aware of [].
- b. The direction action group will be known as [] and will be headed by [] who will be the only member of this group in contact with or operationally aware of [].

- d. The courier group responsible for clandestine communications with exiled groups will be known as [] D. Couriers will be trusted members of [] under the control of [] and [].
- e. The anti-Communist news bulletin [] will appear to be the official organ of [] Control will be exercised by [] through sub-agent [].
- f. The daily half-hour radio program [] will be ostensibly independent and self-sustaining (by means of advertising solicited from local businessmen). [] will exercise control through sub-agent [].
- g. All units comprising the operational net will cooperate with and support anti-Communist candidates for public office. All units will be similarly coordinated to attack targets of opportunity and exploit local situations with a view toward fulfillment of OBJECTIVE 3.
- h. To the extent possible the various units will be organized on a cellular basis and will be carefully compartmented for security purposes. [] for example, will not be operationally knowledgeable of the other units. [] will only have contact with the sub-agents in charge of the various units and not with other members.
- i. A by product of the proposed net will be intelligence information regarding Communist, revolutionary and government activities and related matters. An attempt will be made to organize the net for acquisition of intelligence information.
- j. The anti-government newspaper will be independent and unrelated to any [] activities. Opposition leaders, including [], believe that a purely anti-government paper will attract dissident members of pro-government political parties and indifferent or inactive elements who cannot be reached through a purely anti-Communist approach. [] will be able to establish a sub-agent in a key position in this proposed paper and through that sub-agent it will be possible to exert limited control and use the paper as an outlet for anti-government propaganda as distinguished from the purely anti-Communist material that will be released through other outlets.

7. PERSONNEL:

- a. [] (principal agent)
[] sub-agent in []
[] (sub-agent in [])

- b. Personal data on [] previously submitted to Headquarters [] and []. Available data on sub-agents will be submitted as obtained. It is impracticable to obtain [] for project sub-agents.

6. COVER:

a. The case officer is [] known to Headquarters. Meetings with the principal agent are clandestine, but if detected the case officer can plausibly explain that he is maintaining a casual friendship which he established while residing in the area of operations. When the present case officer is replaced it will be necessary to [] [] [] for his successor.

b. The principal agent has his own business [] and is associated with his father in a legitimate business [] []. He was formerly active in [] political affairs. His contacts with sub-agents are ostensibly made for business reasons or to maintain friendships and acquaintances []

9. CONTACT AND COMMUNICATIONS:

a. Regular contacts are made at the apartment of the case officer who resides in a large building containing approximately [] apartments, business offices, and shops. The building may be approached from four different directions and there are four entrances. Once inside the building the agent can easily detect or evade surveillance before approaching or entering the case officer's apartment. Alternate contacts are made in a moving vehicle. Meetings are set up by phone (using innocuous phrases which in reality establish a time and place for the meetings) or are arranged at the next previous meeting. Station files contain a pre-planned system for contacting the agent if and when a new case officer is assigned to this operation.

b. Regular meetings between the principal agent and the sub-agents are usually conducted under the guise of social and professional contacts. Meetings are pre-arranged at various sites, including public places and private homes. Vehicular contacts are also employed. Phone calls, when placed, are seemingly innocuous but actually establish the time and place for alternate meetings.

10. CONTROL:

a. Because of the principal agent's long record of opposition to the present and previous administration it is unlikely that he would betray the trust placed in him. Furthermore, the threat of exposure (and ample information on his activities is available for that purpose), if ever required, probably would control him for operational purposes. Exposure probably would subject him to imprisonment, exile, loss of properties, or death.

b. [] is believed to be a patriotic, moderately conservative Guatemalan who is sincerely convinced that Communism and the present government represent a grave danger to the welfare

of the country. He is also motivated by a desire to protect his business interests which have suffered due to economic unrest and which he believes will suffer more if Communist power is permitted to grow. [] is also a Catholic and he is opposed to the anti-religious dogmas of Communism.

12. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT:

a. See Annex B.

13. COORDINATION:

a. Coordination with field stations engaged in support activities will be handled by Headquarters and/or the Guatemalan station.

14. TIMETABLE:

a. Development activity and trial operations were begun in March 1953 [] and []. Intensification of overt activities by [] and initiation of covert activities will be undertaken immediately after the project is approved. Radio broadcasts probably will not begin before January 1954. Activation will depend upon receipt of support from Headquarters and the station. The first edition of the [] bulletin is expected to be printed on or about 20 November 1953 and funds for partial subsidization are urgently needed. The independent newspaper is in the planning stage and a firm estimate regarding initial edition cannot be made. Limited direct action activities have been started (a report on such activities to follow under separate cover).

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PART II

15. ESTIMATED COST:

a. The estimated cost for this project for the period 1 December 1953 to 30 June 1954 is outlined in Annex A.

16. SPECIAL PROBLEMS AND COMMITMENTS:

a. No special problems exist at this time. No commitments have been made to the principal agent or the sub-agents. However, it is anticipated that the members of [] and possibly [] may by reason of the illegal nature of their activities be apprehended by local authorities and subjected to fines and/or imprisonment. It is also possible that legal propaganda activities by [] members may have similar consequences. It is in our interest to provide assistance to project persons in such cases (i.e., payment of fines, partial reimbursement for loss of income from regular jobs, legal fees, injuries, etc.). It is also in our interest to provide escape funds for any agents who are forced to flee Guatemala because of their activities in our behalf. Accordingly, it is recommended that emergency funds be available to cover such contingencies. An estimate of the amount that might be required for this purpose is contained in Annex A.

17. HEADQUARTERS SUPPORT:

a. Financial (see Annex A).
b. Special Equipment and Supplies (see Annex B).
c. Material and financial support and guidance as outlined in WH Field Memorandum No. 138-53 dated 13 October 1953.

ANNEX A

1. Personnel (salaries are included in the separate unit estimates below)	None
2. Printing and distribution of "white" propaganda and salaries of four "pegadores" (propaganda posters and (distributors))	6400.00
3. Financial support of news bulletin	3000.00
4. Emergency funds (fines, loss of income, legal fees, etc.)	1800.00
5. Radio program (salaries, radio time, equipment and supplies)	2630.00
6. Printing and distribution of "black" propaganda	2700.00
7. Direction action group (travel costs, subsistence, salaries, miscellaneous supplies)	5400.00
8. Miscellaneous operating costs (travel for [] sub-agents; entertainment; bribes; spot purchase of intelligence and operational data; escape funds)	2800.00
9. Newspaper subsidy	2000.00
10. Courier group (travel and subsistence, bribes, purchase of travel documents, etc.)	2400.00
11. Special equipment and supplies from Headquarters (See Annex B)	2895.00
	<u>32025.00</u>

12. FUNDING REQUIREMENTS

- a. All funds listed in paragraphs 1 through 10 will be required in local currency and should be available to the case officer through the station.
- b. Funds listed in paragraph 11 should be available for expenditure at Headquarters.
- c. All funds will be disbursed by Case Officer to the principal agent who will account for them by signed itemized receipt and supported by local commercial receipts when possible.

ANNEX B

1. Recording tapes (blank, emergency supply)	\$250.00
2. Two DITTO D-10 (liquid) Duplicators (see enclosure) and emergency supply of stencils, inks	500.00
3. Paper, slick, pre-gummed sheets (see <input type="checkbox"/> . <input type="checkbox"/> paragraph 3)	500.00
4. Special equipment for <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> in performance of its functions.	1145.00
5. Miscellaneous (recorded scripts, sound effects records, music (records), mats (for cartoons, photos, etc.)	500.00
	<hr/>
	\$2895.00

(Enclosure: descriptive literature regarding item 2, above)

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C32/HRC ON 5 July 95

2 March 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Meeting with ()

1. At 1910 on 28 February, I picked () up in my car at the corner of Massachusetts and Wisconsin. We drove for about an hour out River Road and I am certain were not observed.

2. () expressed his regrets for the compromise of the five paraphrased cables, and in a manner which appeared to be entirely sincere. I asked him how it was possible, with all of the security indoctrination which he had had, plus the great emphasis on secrecy based on all phases of PBSUCCESS, to have done such an unpardonable thing as to leave sensitive papers in a hotel room. He replied that he had no explanation, that it was a stupid, unpardonable thing to do, but that it was an act of thoughtlessness and carelessness. He expressed himself as most concerned over the effects on the operation and the OAS Conference.

3. I told () that while it was impossible to undo the past, it was his obligation and duty to () for a long while to come. He said that he realized how important this was during the OAS Conference. I told him it was equally important for a much longer period, because the enemy might time their disclosures to coincide with expected paramilitary action on our part, and that this might be many months in the future. To this he agreed.

4. It was agreed that for the next month () will remain in (). We discussed two general areas where he could bury himself after our date () and the (). While he is willing to go to () he prefers the ().

() has never been in the () and suggested as a possibility that he get a job until Fall as a fire watcher on a mountain top where he would meet very few people. Another possibility would be to get him a job as an engineer on one of the many construction projects that must be under way in that region. He believes that the () would be more secure than ()

5. It is my impression that () will be amenable and cooperative to any reasonable request on our part.

()
Chief, []

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~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~
WEEKLY PBSUCCESS MEETING WITH []

9 March 1954

Present: Mr. [] , Mr. [] (Department of State);
Mr. [] , Mr. [] , Mr. [] ,
[] , []

1. Mr. [] opened the meeting with comments on a paper entitled "Points for consideration concerning informant". It was agreed that the identity of Mr. X, who is in contact with Mr. [] , should not be disclosed at this time except on a strictly need-to-know basis. Mr. [] said that this contact fell in a vague and shadowy field where it is not clear when does such a case come into the zone of being a Bureau matter.

Mr. [] suggested getting in touch with Mr. [] Deputy Director for [] of the Department of State because it comes from a hostile Embassy and has begun to talk. It is suggested that the Bureau be notified of this development for the protection of Mr. [] and in order to prevent them from wasting time running after false scents. If by any chance the Bureau has a case, the Department of State would not want to cross wires. It is our hope that the Bureau would not wish to assert total jurisdiction. Information received from informant X is extremely interesting. Details are covered in memorandum referred to. Since the line may lead to [] through G-2, we are to determine who is the Pentagon's liaison with [] and how reliable and discreet is he. A paper for Mr. [] based on reports from [] is to be prepared.

(ACTION: [])

2. Mr. [] then stated that he and Mr. [] were there to take stock of the present situation, to determine where we stand now and what are the future prospects. Are things going downhill so fast in Guatemala that PBSUCCESS as it now stands may not be enough. Consideration must be given to the much greater pressure which may come from Congress and public opinion on the present Administration if the situation in Guatemala does deteriorate. It may be necessary to take more calculated risks than before. At the end of the Caracas Conference we should have a clearer view of our position and a re-assessment of the situation should be made at a briefing and discussion with the new Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. [] , General Smith and Mr. Dulles. Mr. [] replied "Let Caracas run its course and see what comes out of it". We agree to the need of making progress reports to policy chiefs of this Government so that we may obtain additional reassurance that the rug will not be pulled from under us in the future as occurred in the [] case. Mr. [] then asked Mr. [] exactly what was meant by possible additional calculated risks. Messrs [] and [] replied:
(a) We might reconsider exploiting the conclusion arrived at by Trujillo last year and transmitted to Perez Jiminez that the best way to bring about the fall of the Arbenz government would be to eliminate 15-20 of its leaders with Trujillo's trained pistoleros. (b) State might consider overt action along

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the lines of no more shipping to Guatemala, no more oil, no more air passengers or transport. (c) PBSUCCESS program through Phase IV appears insufficient to do the job and it is feared that Phase V shows the U. S. hand. Mr. [] then said that in his opinion the "gut point" of the operation is where does the Guatemala City garrison stand, and asked [] if he could answer that question. [] replied that he thought the operation could be brought to a conclusion by 15 June; that the program was complex but that we believe the Agency has the capability of doing the job. The radio program is to begin on 1 April and the last part of it, at D-Day, a terror program, is based on Orson Welles and is most effective. [] the build-up by training, equipment, etc. - is like a boiler under steam pressure; it cannot be stopped once it gets to a certain point. Mr. [] repeated that the important question is where does the Guatemala City garrison stand, and asked [] if he knew. [] replied that PBSUCCESS is a complex, top secret program which includes ghost voicing, deception, mines, bazookas, and fire power. "It is difficult to explain without the wall map and charts available at Lincoln. There remains a lot to be done but it is believed it can be done by June. While it is fine to talk about the OAS Conference and the need for a re-assessment of its conclusion, once we get beyond a certain point we do not believe that we can stop the operation. Mr. [] This is a much more optimistic resume than we had any reason to believe based on reports so far".

Mr. [] - "We have not yet come to the point of any reasonable assurance of success".

Mr. [] - "What is the chance of U. S. exposure?"

Mr. [] - "There is no official estimate yet. We have been concerned from the very beginning about keeping so much activity under a basket. There has already been one flap, although not the fault of anyone at this table. We have to be concerned and would like to know what is the position of high government authority if things go wrong."

[] - "Once arms are in the forward area, and according to present plans this will be in 30-40 days, we are practically committed. All the controls we have are not adequate to assure complete control from that point on. After 1 April we will be too far committed to call off the operation."

Mr. [] to [] - "Don't worry".

Mr. [] to [] - "Your job is to carry out instructions. You are to get the job done".

[] to Mr. [] - "Everything we do may be plausibly denied if uncovered".

Mr. [] - "We must bring our top-level people up to date one month from now."

Mr. [] to [] - "Watch out for compromising pieces of paper."

Mr. [] - "Because of disclosures by the Guatemalan Government and the appointment of a new Assistant Secretary of State, we must consider the 'broad'

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-3-

approach to PBSUCCESS from the viewpoint of the Department. We need a general go-around with consideration being given to (a) is PBSUCCESS the way to handle this operation (b) if it is the way to handle it are we using all possible means not attributable to the United States to carry the operation to a successful conclusion. If attributable to the United States, it should not be done. High level State thinking is that an act which can be pinned on the United States will set us back in our relations with Latin American countries by fifty years."

[] then expressed himself as opposed to the elimination of 15-20 Guatemalan leaders as a possible solution to the problem, although stating that such elimination was part of the plan and could be done. Mr. [] then said that knocking off the leaders might make it possible for the Army to take over. [] replied that it is an illusion to believe the Army has control. The Army is losing control to organized and armed labor and police. The 1952 revolution in Bolivia could be repeated, where for the first time in Latin American history armed labor defeated the Army. Mr. [] stated that it is not certain that the Army has lost control. Mr. [] said that he was much surprised at [] statement about the armed strength of labor because according to an Embassy report of two weeks ago there is no known training of labor groups and it must be that the Embassy needs jacking up in its reporting. [] said that our information came via RUFUS' nets and was a third country operation. Mr. [] then asked is it feasible to buy up the top Army command. []

[] Mr. [] replied this merits going into, but in his opinion the chances of defecting [] are much less than 50-50. A discussion followed of using [] as a one-man team in high-level defections, and Mr. [] raised the question what would happen to the RUFUS forces who already have arms if through successful defections inside Guatemala Arbenz was overthrown. Mr. [] said he opposed [] it was U. S. Government, [] He reiterated - "When we get to the point of making a decision where our action will successfully attribute to the United States Government the support of a revolution, it is our thinking at this time that we should not get on with it. He asked - "Is it possible to provoke an incident where OAS will intervene?"

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1985-07-18 10:11:11

29 March 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Report by Mr [] on OAS Conference

2. Mr. [] first discussed the behind-the-scenes efforts to persuade various countries which were on the fence to support the American anti-Communist resolution. An all-out effort was required of the U.S. delegation to obtain the 17 favorable votes that were cast.

At Uruguay. This country, formerly a staunch supporter of the U.S., is growing antagonistic because of our friendly attitude toward Peron and tariffs on Uruguayan wool. The Uruguayan vote was obtained by informally pointing out to the Chief of their delegation that the support which they could now expect from the U.S. in case of aggression by Argentina, is to a great extent pendent on Uruguay's anti-Communist position.

B. [] Vote was obtained by promise of a new credit for [] during the next fiscal year.

C [] Vote was tied to the U.S. position at a conference to be held in [] for consideration of the border dispute between []

3. Three delegations appeared to be closely controlled and under definite instructions. These were Guatemala, Mexico and Argentina. Mexico and Argentina, while definitely opposed to the anti-Communist resolution, because of their devotion to the principle of non-intervention and their fear that the resolution might be the opening wedge to intervention, found it expedient to abstain.

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4. Mr. [] was emphatic in stating that the cornerstone of the OAS is devotion to the principle of nonintervention, and that the leader of this principle is Mexico.— Although the U.S. delegation emphasized the distinction between international versus national communism, many of the Latin American countries are more afraid of the possibility of American intervention than they are of what they consider the vague threat of international communism. This is in spite of the American record of the past 20 years. That is why Mr. [] is so concerned about the possible disastrous effects on our Latin American relations if PBSUCCESS is planned on the United States government. All the delegations except the Mexican reacted to the Guatemalan "white paper" as if it were "the bunk". This attitude may mainly be attributed to the U.S. policy of non-intervention since the early 1930s.

5. The Secretary's decision not to pinpoint Guatemala assisted in pushing through the resolution. Even though it may have been with tongue in cheek, it was necessary opening to state that the resolution was not directed against any one country. Mr. [] is consequently very doubtful of the possibility of multi-lateral action against Guatemala. As a first step an air tight legal case must be constructed, built on intelligence much firmer than that which we now possess. The right emotional state must also be created. The best possible lawyer's brief must be prepared. Prior to the calling of a meeting of representatives of OAS to discuss multi-lateral action, there should be bi-lateral talking with all the doubtful countries and no meeting should be held unless a 2/3s favorable vote is lined up before the meeting.

6. Mr. [] commented on the reaction of the Latin American delegations to Toriello's main speech. Secretary Dulles was the only one who did not applaud. From the Latin American side Toriello received the greatest applause and ovation of the Conference.

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7. [] asked Mr. [] if he had changed his thinking since the Conference on the possible methods to get rid of the ARBENZ government. Mr. [] repeated that in his opinion the elimination of 30 of those in high positions of the government would bring about its collapse. He then qualified this statement by saying that perhaps that even a smaller number, say 20, would be sufficient.

Chief, []

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EN 57

VIA AIR POUCH

BY BAT

DISPATCH NO

PBSUCCESS

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

TO: []

DATE: 5 APRIL 1954

FROM: []

INFO: CHIEF,

SUBJECT: General - Political Action, []
Specific - Debriefings of []

Conversations, []

REF: []

1. Attached hereto is the debriefing of [] following the fourteenth (14th) [] as dictated by [] meeting.

2. It would appear [] is speculating about the identity of the people behind []. In this, it is believed, was attempting to "smoke out" [] by his remarks of Para 1 which, it is understood, [] successfully parried.

3. Both [] and [] are convinced a meeting must be arranged shortly between the purported top leaders of [] and [] whether or not the latter's efforts are to be utilized or merely neutralized, in order to relieve the pressure on their situation. (See []) They state [] is no fool and they firmly believe his organization has the means and the capacity to deal [] a most serious blow if [] should become suspicious [] had violated his confidence and mislead him. It will be remembered [] had given such assurances of financial and material support, to convince [] of the sincerity and capabilities of the [] that would insure his full support. (See [])

4. Again the Station feels compelled to recommend adamantly a meeting between [] and purported top leaders or leader of [] (See []) Para 6) in order to:

- Prevent the loss of services of, and unjust retaliation against, [] and possibly [] himself; and to
- Achieve a contractual control over []. Currently no effective control exists.

5 April 1954

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2
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8 APR 1954

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- 2 -

INCLOSURES:

1. Debriefings, [] meetings, 3 pages.
2. Photostats, Expense Report, 2 pages.

DISTRIBUTION:

2. [] w/encls 1 and 2 in duplicate.
- 1-Washington w/encls 1 and 2 in single copy.
- 2-Files w/encls 1 and 2 in single copy.

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Debriefing of [] by []

In re []

Meeting of Saturday, 27 March 1954 (11th meeting)

1. [] stated the request for a detailed accounting and the repetition of typical American questions made him confident he knew precisely with whom he was dealing. He said such requests and questions could come from only one source. [] then produced the attached expense report in compliance with our previous request. The report submitted earlier was only produced from memory by [] at the request of []. As a result of the request for an accounting and because we finally did produce additional financial aid instead of just eliciting information from [], he has changed his mind and plans regarding our previously offered support. He had decided previously the support would be inadequate and ineffective. The delay reminded him of his very first contact with [] when [] in Guatemala was driven under cover and in hiding. His wife flew to Salvador and asked [] for aid and assistance. [] assured her of the cooperation [] would require and told [] wife to return to Guatemala with the message that [] was to energize his organization and he [] would give [] \$100,000 as a first payment of \$500,000. However, when [] was ready for the money and sent his wife back to Salvador for it, [] stalled and delayed. [] finally received nothing and the activities of his organization came to a pitiful halt. Hence after the last meeting (13th meeting) with [] and receipt of additional funds [] revised his plans to go to Guatemala this week-end to call off the entire operation and put his organization again underground. Unless he were to go personally, his followers would not believe such an order from any other source. They would believe it to be a double cross. Once started, the movement is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to stop.

2. [] does not understand [] warning regarding []. It was [] who previously warned us about this man. [] contacted [] to learn whether [] had any plans to move against ARENZ. [] stated that he had no plans whatsoever. In the past there had been too many failures and he was placing his entire faith in the Caracas Conference. [] then left Salvador to visit CALLIGERIS. He asked [] for money and offered his services. When refused, he proceeded to Honduras to make the same request of CALLIGERIS.

3. [] spy [] heard a conversation between the Guatemalan Military Attaché and []. [] told the Military Attaché that CALLIGERIS would come into Salvador by way of Ocotepeque on the 24th of March. On that date the Guatemalan Military Attaché went to the place and observed a station wagon coming into the country with a relative of VILANOVA and another person, who was not recognized by the Guatemalan Military Attaché. (Station note: The wife of President ARENZ is a member of the VILANOVA family.) [] stated a possible CALLIGERIS/VILANOVA/ARENZ connection must not be ignored.

4. Regarding means of communication with [] The usual method is by a wealthy Guatemalan exile living in [] Mexico, by the name of [] [] writes to [] through []. [] then transports, or has transported, the information over the border into Guatemala. Incidentally, [] will be coming to Salvador very soon. He will go first to Mexico City, then to Belize, and from Belize to Salvador.

5. [] has recently sent money to aid the destitute children of a woman in Guatemala who received word and instructions from CALLIGERIS to place publicity in some Guatemalan newspapers consisting of articles publicizing the CALLIGERIS movement and trumpeting its cause. As a result the woman was arrested, imprisoned, and has since completely disappeared. The children were destitute.

6. Names of key figures [] hopes to have assassinated: [] stated it is a mistake to have anyone killed who is in the position of an apostle or an ideological leader. It only makes them martyrs in the eyes of their followers. However, there are many Communists in Guatemala who are living by the sword--assassinating people and causing great suffering. The death of these people, on the contrary, would be very popular. [] has picked out ones whose death would create fear, doubt, confusion, and mutual distrust within the Communist Party of Guatemala. These are:

A. []

B.

C.

D. []

7. Regarding the Junta which [] believes should be installed between the time ARHENZ is overthrown and the first elections; - The Junta should be composed of two civilians and one military man. The two civilians should not be prominent, powerful people because such people would be difficult to deal with later and possibly refuse to step aside after the Junta has served its purpose. However they should be persons who are very fervent patriots and extremely loyal. [] suggests:

A. [] Brother of Colonel []

B. [] a rancher (finquero) and a self-made man living in Guatemala City. [] hasn't made up his mind completely whether [] is the best man or not but currently it would appear that he is.

C. If a confirmed capitalist were put in so soon after the overthrow of the present Government, the people might well feel they were back in the hands of the capitalists and sold down the river.

D. If [] should not meet the test then [] believes the candidate should be [], a self-made industrialist in whom the lower classes have complete confidence.

E. The military man would have to be the person who most proved himself in the campaign against ARHENZ. The country would expect this and be solidly behind him.

8. Regarding Barrios PENA: [] has not informed him of his activities because, although Barrios PENA is a very capable military man who planned and executed the change in the Guatemalan Military Organization from the Spanish to the Anglo-Saxon system, and a completely honest capable officer, such as also is PERALTA, he is not a clever politician and tends to be boastful of his connections--such as his association with Senator []. He could be well used in a military position but not in a political position.

9. [] states a very loyal man, Capitan ZAPETA, now stationed in Quiche, just sent [] the name of Colonel ARDONEZ, who is in the Guardia de Honor at the Military Base in Guatemala City. ARDONEZ has obtained the allegiance of Colonel Francisco CRUZ, Commander of the Military Base of Juliapa.


10. Regarding the reported rumor that [] is giving orders to CALLIGERIS, [] states that he knows absolutely nothing about this. He has absolutely nothing more to add regarding his relationship with CALLIGERIS except the following: [] has just received a letter from an extremely good friend of his in Caracas by the name of [] who is the owner of the [] Hotel in Caracas. The letter states that CALLIGERIS was there with 15 associates and followers, which is, incidentally, a larger traveling retinue than allowed Guillermo TORIELLO. They were well supplied with money and were spending it most liberally.

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16 April 1954

MEMORANDUM TO: C/P

FROM : C/PI

SUBJECT : Summary of []

1. [] has been an exile in [] since he entered [] in []

that cou[] December []

[] he has been described as ambitious, opportunistic and unscrupulous. During this time he has carried on correspondence with [] and representatives of other lesser opposition groups.

2. In February 1954 [] was set up with the objective of exploring the assets and capabilities of [] and determining the course of action which should be taken by FUSO with respect thereto. It was to be pointed out to []

[] was his best hope for personal support, and that his only chance to realize his ambitions lay in cooperating with [] together with []. [] was to be provided with sufficient assurance of financial and material support to convince him of the sincerity and capability of []. Efforts were to be made to align him with CACIQUIS, and in the event this was not possible he was to be effectively neutralized.

3. [] decided to use [] as the cut-out and [] as the man who would make all contacts with []. [] is a [] citizen. Both agents were assigned to this task exclusively. The first meeting between [] and [] took place on February 20. In this conversation [] said that he had the support of [] and that his principal backing came from (1) a group headed by four nephews in the Guatemalan Army (2) a group of loyal Army officers (3) another group of Army officers who are anti-MARZ but who want evidence that [] movement has solid support, and (4) a third group of Army officers who are scoundrels and who will go with the highest bidder. [] emphasized that any successful movement must be centred on an internal uprising and have supplementary assistance from abroad.

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C/S/C, APR 14, 1954
C/S/C, APR 14, 1954
C/S/C, APR 14, 1954
C/S/C, APR 14, 1954

4. In a cable dated 26 February [] was told that the purpose of the project was only to explore and that no mention was to be made of [] until the [] was well established. It was pointed out that [] status is limited and that LINCOLN will determine when and how he will fit into the overall program. [] was to be debriefed factually and the results forwarded to LINCOLN for study. At all times he must be compartmented from CALLIGERIS.

5. In a dispatch of 2 March, attached to which were seven debriefings of [] over the period from 21 to 26 February, [] states that []'s potential assets comprise a political organization in Guatemala which has pledges of support from political leaders and a liaison relation with prominent [] military and political figures. He made no pretense of having an external striking force, but he did say that he has the support of key military men in Guatemala. He also stated he has tight loyal cells in every department. He added that he had means to smuggle men and arms through [] and across the Guatemalan border. [] said that he would be willing to cooperate fully with CALLIGERIS, although he does not trust him.

6. [] said that he has three political parties pledged to him in Guatemala; the Redemption Party, the Partido Unida Anti-Comunista (PUA), and the Partido Juventud Nacionista. His key men were stated to be []

[]
He claimed to have potential control of two military barracks, one of which is that at the Aurora airport.

7. In early March the meetings with [] were held less frequently in compliance with LINCOLN instructions. In these conversations [] showed a tendency to become more general, instead of more specific as requested. He stated his strength lay with the people, and he discussed the problem of the Indians and the necessity for unity in all the classes. He indicated those persons he would prefer to have in his cabinet and provided a long list of Communists in Guatemala. On 13 March [] furnished a list of his men in the various departments. In general only one person was named in each section, and practically all are civilians. No details were provided concerning the assets or capabilities of these persons. He mentioned three loyal anti-Communists in Guatemala on 15 March, namely []

[]

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CST/HAR
ON 03/07/95

8. In a meeting of 16 March [] furnished a list of his chief political adherents in each Guatemalan district. There were 27 officers on this list, including []

9. In a cable of 23 March [] was told that [] must soon demonstrate the ability of working in harness or else. On 27 March [] was asked to get more details regarding the exact nature of the [] organization. In a dispatch of 5 April [] states that a meeting between [] and [] leaders must take place shortly. An attached debriefing of 27 March contained more [] attacks on CALLIGESIS and provided a list of prominent Communists he hoped to have killed. He said that the Junta which should rule from the time AUGENZ is overthrown until elections take place should be composed of two civilians and one military man. He suggested []

10. At this stage [] begins to point out the risks [] and [] are running, and that they cannot continue to stall [] without hazard to themselves and their families. They say they must withdraw unless there is an immediate conference between [] and [] directors. On 6 April LIVCCLZ advised [] that the [] operation was temporarily suspended because of [] pressure tactics and the low evaluation of his effectiveness. [] suggested on 13 April that [] not be dropped unceremoniously, and that a temporary solution be devised. On 13 April [] says that [] and [] believe their withdrawal to be impossible on the basis of [] non-compliance with requests. A meeting was held with [] on 9 April, and it was anticipated that there would be one additional meeting. [] said that he would supply more names of his followers, consisting of those who do not constitute the core of the organization but who can be relied upon to join a resistance movement. [] was asked to prepare an estimate of his financial requirements and a proposed schedule or timetable.

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P
Y

22 April 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Synthesis of []'s Remarks Relevant to
PBSUCCESS Made at a Meeting 21 April 1954

Present: [] and []; Messrs [] , , , , ,]

1. [] described the general situation as having worsened beyond that described in his February report. As an example of this, he cited his belief that the Guatemalan Government is leading up to suppression of the independent press. He concluded that the usual diplomatic methods did not suffice to correct the situation and inferred that more drastic and definitive steps to overthrow the government must be taken.

2. [] commented that despite the poor situation, there were some events such as the Archbishop's letter that are definitely encouraging. He said this letter has reached the man in the street and is well received. He suggested that our propaganda not fail and to continue to exploit the letter and tie it into other opportunities.

3. The government, he said, is absolutely under control of a small Communist group and the government as a whole is moving in the direction of Communism. Such things as withdrawal of military pacts and other economic sanctions may irritate these people but will not stop them.

4. It was []'s opinion that the country is now in a receptive mood and that various groups, particularly the students, are believed to be ready to act. As an example of the atmosphere in Guatemala City, he said that most people are armed when they go to social functions and that all Latin American diplomats are armed wherever they go.

[] saw little to be gained from economic sanctions and from OAS action and agreed with the view expressed that the United States would face less of an outcry if it achieved a successful coup than it would during a long trying period of sanctions which, in any case, will possibly not be effective. He did not think, moreover, that Latin American countries, with the possible exception of Mexico and the Argentine, would go after the United States following a reasonably secure coup. In connection with the consideration of economic sanctions he pointed out that in Guatemala time is running against us.

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-2-

-5. He expressed the opinion that Pellecer has not split with ARBENEZ and doubts that Pellecer will get an overseas assignment since he and GUTIERREZ, who are in fact running the country, are too important to ARBENEZ. As an example of Pellecer's current political thinking, he recommended we consult Pellecer's speech made recently at Chimaltenango. In reply to a question as to DIAZ' present position, [] stated that he had been advised that DIAZ is "out" as a result of a disagreement with ARBENEZ over the choice of the president of congress. [] is inclined to doubt this as he believes that if it were true DIAZ would have made an attempt while he was still in command.

6. With regard to the arming of labor elements [] said he did not doubt that some arms have reached the campesinos.

7. As to the attitude of the army, [] noted that there are all sorts of reports but that it is his view that the army is opportunistic and would move against the government if they thought it to be to their advantage. He said that the army is in a vulnerable position because ARBENEZ could gradually remove suspected officers from key positions and replace them with others. [] concluded that time is running against us particularly with regard to the army. The political situation is worsening he believes as the other parties of the national front, while they are not Communist are falling more and more under the influence of Communist leadership.

8. In speaking of the need for action in Guatemala, [] said, "If we maintain the status quo, we shall in the end have to use 'those gallant marines.'"

9. He stated the belief that hard hitting speeches against Guatemala by personages in the United States Government could be counter-productive and would particularly alienate those non-Communist whose actions are influenced by nationalist emotions.

10. He expressed doubt as to the feasibility of the "cotton plan" and believed that the alternative plan to blow up cotton gins owned by the ARBENEZ coterie would be desirable. He stated occasional sabotage of pipe lines, one or two bridges and installations in the Puerto Barrios area would cause great commotion in the country.

11. He specifically recommended a leaflet air drop on Guatemala City on May Day and suggested the leaflet material should include some reference to the Archbishop's letter.

12. In reply to the question as to whether [] is salvageable, [] replied in the negative and he suggested he be eliminated.

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CIA ON 02/10/1968
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~~SECRET~~

-3-

13. He pointed out that some of the project's buildup phases could in themselves precipitate the fall of government.

14. Mr. [] asked [] whether he thought the project is exerting pressure on the government. [] replied in the affirmative and added that one hears about RUFUS coming back and the rumor has even set dates for such a coup such as Holy Week and now May Day. He concluded that there is in this connection considerable nervousness on the part of the government.

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ON 03-JUL-75
C S I / MR C

~~SECRET~~

15 April 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: ()

SUBJECT : () Administrative Details

1. () is staying at ()
2. He has an appointment in Chicago at 1100 hours with ()
President of the ()
3. He will call me at my home at 2400 hours Monday, 19 April 1954
and advise me of the results of the above conference. I should like to
be able at that time to advise him as to his future status, vis-a-vis,
next personnel meeting, pay, and any other pertinent information you
might think of. He is particularly concerned over his personal gear.

()

15 April 1954

~~SECRET~~ PBSUCCESS/SECRET

[] Lincoln

[] , Guatemala [] [] Info: Washington

[] [] Operational Report

1. Attached are copies of letters sent to []

2. These letters were prepared by the station from drafts submitted by []
[] They were passed to [] on 11 May 1954 for posting by []

3. [] observed that the violent disposal of one of the addressees, partic-
ularly [] might have considerable propaganda value, espe-
cially if the death of either was followed by black distribution of the
attached letters in leaflet form.

[] feels that it would demonstrate that the opposition really means busi-
ness and the sending of more letters thereafter to selected target personali-
ties would have a terrific impact. He added, however, that he does not have
anyone who could handle the violent disposal and suggested that someone might
be sent in from outside. This course of action might, of course, invite whole-
sale reprisals that would negate any supposed benefits. For that reason we
are not disposed to recommend such action at this time. Lincoln, however, may
wish to study the suggestion for utility now or in the future.

Encls: as noted

13 May 1954

Distribution:

2 - Lincoln v/encl
2 - Washington v/encl
1 - [] v/encl
1 - Files v/encl

~~SECRET~~ PBSUCCESS/SECRET

[3-page attachments to 14 May 1954
Operational Report have been withheld]

CSI/HRG

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTINE
1
2
3

DATE : 13 MAY 54

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : GUATEMALA CITY

ACTION: WH (PBS) (1-3)

INFO : WH (4), DCI (5), D/DCI (6), DO/P (L) (7), SA/PC/DCI (8), A/DD/P/P (9)

GUAT 553 (IN 47022)

1226Z 14 MAY 54

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

TO: SLINC

INFO: DIR

CITE: SGUAT

PBSUCCESS RYBAT

29

1. CONSIDER ESSENTIAL THAT LETTERS REPORTED [] BE BACKED WITH PERSUASIVE MEASURES SO WILL NOT APPEAR AS IDLE THREATS.
2. REQUEST FORWARD SOONEST DOZEN FRAGMENTARY AND DOZEN CONCUSSION GRENADES PREFERABLY OF CZECH, GERMAN OR OTHER MANUFACTURE. WE WILL USE THROUGH [] PLAN SCARE NOT KILL.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

3

FM 39

Routing Form

Doc. No.

Date:

Indicate title of person to take action and that of the originator. Place comments there under by numbered paragraphs. Initial in center of page and draw a line across the page and forward. Each recipient is to repeat above procedure until action completed and ready for filing. This cover-sheet must be retained with enclosure.

TO:

FROM:

DATE:

Yours views were reviewed with
who concurred in the decision
not to disintegrate nor divert our efforts
by such targets and this in particular
as all effort should be reserved for
the major personality target. Best not
close to continue ~~and~~ compile all
details on this target for later ops use.

Note above

[]

PBSUCCESS

FN 39

~~SECRET~~

RYBAT

16 May 1968

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
FOR RELEASE, AS SANITIZED, BY
TSI/HRG ON 6 JULY 95

MEMORANDUM FOR: DC/P; C/P

SUBJECT : Acts of Force Before D-Day

1. In view of repeated observations by Guatemalans to the effect that the anti-Communist forces must prove their strength by deeds as well as words, as well as the need for accelerating the psychological pressure on Guatemalans, certain limited, specific acts of violence prior to D-Day are hereby proposed.

2. The acts are as follows:

a. D-12. Raid on [] This raid should be a combination of arson and demolitions work, but should not attack personnel. It should be conducted in the absence of [] from the finca. The purpose of this raid would be to focus public attention on the fact that [] is the enemy of the anti-Communists and that more dire things are in store for him later.

b. D-10. Disposal of [] This would be the first anti-personnel action. Its purpose beyond that of helping to paralyze [] is to show the public that the anti-Communists resent the Soviet-style [] system and consider [] a prime symbol of oppression.

c. D-8. Disposal of [] for the same reasons as the disposal of []. The disposal of [] and [] would make the anti-Communist protest against the [] character of the Arbenz regime perfectly clear.

d. D-6. Disposal of [] This action documents the anti-Communist character of the revolution and leaves [] leaderless.

e. D-4. Disposal of [] With this, opposition to both the [] character and the [] regime will have been effectively displayed.

PBSUCCESS

~~SECRET~~ RYBAT

PBSUCCESS

Page Two

~~SECRET~~
~~REF ID: A11985~~

f. D-1 or D-Day before H-hour. Disposal of [] It is apparent, from [] debriefing of [] and many other indications, that the fate of [] may well be the key to the entire D-Day situation. With [] still on the scene, he would undoubtedly be able to command certain support which would render the task of friendly forces more difficult. If the issue were in doubt, [] could tip the scales unfavorably. An attempt should therefore be made to have victory grow out of the disposal [], rather than reckoning with [] after victory. This action must be carried out as close to D-Day as possible; otherwise, members [] or non-PBSUCCESS forces might fill the vacuum before CALLIGRUS could.

*free
but public
fact!*

3. In any program of this sort, the possibilities of reprisals and their damaging effect on the D-Day objective must be considered. The above actions would undoubtedly invite some reprisals and lead to an attempt on the part of the government to tighten security. However, such government actions in the period D-14 to D-Day must be expected anyway. On the other hand, successful accomplishment of the above actions should cause panic among the government sympathizers and possibly negate their increased vigilance. At the same time, friendly forces should be greatly heartened and mobilized. The program as described above would give enough time for both enemy disintegration and friendly mobilization prior to D-Day. On balance, it is believed that these shows of friendly strength and these efforts to "soften up" the enemy would be beneficial and would decrease the risk of putting all PBSUCCESS eggs in the D-Day basket. It may also be that the government reaction to one or the other proposed acts of violence would provide significant guidance to existing friendly D-Day plans.

4. It should be emphasized that the success of only one or two of the proposed actions would be insufficient and would give a "flash-in-the-pan" impression to the public. Execution of the whole program, with proper [] exploitation, would be not only physically impressive but psychologically most explicit and significant.

5. If the foregoing program is approved. [] should be immediately requested to obtain, under the direction of [] the requisite information relative to the personal habits, movements, etc., of the target personalities and appropriate data on []. Guatemala, has indicated his ability to procure such information on short notice. The first three proposed actions have been suggested by him, either orally or by dispatch.

→ Should work up some


Guidelines for Submission on this point -

PBSUCCESS

~~SECRET~~
~~REF ID: A11985~~

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 21 MAY 54



ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FN 40

FROM : LINCOLN

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
FOR RELEASE, AS SANITIZED, BY
LCSS/HRC ON 6 JULY 9.

ACTION: WH (PBS)(1-3)

INFO : DCI (4), D/DCI (5), DD/P (L)(6), WH (7), A/DD/P/P (8), SA/PC/DCI (9)

LINC 2957 (IN 49917)

2128Z 21 MAY 54

ROUTINE

PRECEDENCE

TO: (PRIORITY) SGUAT

INFO: DIR

CITE: SLINC

RYBAT:PBSUCCESS

1. TO SHOW FRIENDLY STRENGTH, LINC CONSIDERING ACTION ON
IDENS.

2. ADVISE IF YOU CONSIDER HITTING THESE TARGETS CURRENTLY
FEASIBLE, PSYCHOLOGICALLY BENEFICIAL. EFFECT SHOULD NOT BE SO
GREAT AS TO TOUCH OFF FULL REVOLT. REQUEST YOUR LIST OF ALTERNATE
OR ADDED PRE-D-DAY TARGETS, WITH EYE TO [] RATHER THAN []
UTILITY.

3. SUBMIT OPERATIONAL DATA AND SUGGESTIONS YOU AND LINC
TARGETS, I.E., LOCATIONS, VULNERABILITIES, ROUTES OF MOVEMENT,
GUARDS, ETC.


END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

FN 41

DATE = 29 MAY 1954



ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : []

ACTION: WH. (PBS) (1-3)

INFO : WH (4)

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
FOR RELEASE, AS SANITIZED, BY
CST/HRG ON 6 JULY 9

[] 1833Z 30 MAY 54 ROUTINE

INFO: DIR PRECEDENCE

CITE []

TO: SLINC

RYBAT:PBSUCCESS

FROM []

REQUEST IDENTITIES AND AVAILABLE INFO ON FOUR PERSONS
DISCUSSED WITH [] FOR EARLY ERADICATION. CONFIRM EARLY
DATE.

END OF MESSAGE



IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

Copy No. 3

CONTACT REPORT

FN41

DATE: 2 JUNE 1954, 11:00

PLACE: War Room

PERSONS PRESENT: ()

()

()
()
()

DISCUSSION:

Mr. () opened the discussion by giving a brief resume of his activities in Washington on Tuesday; stated that he had talked with () and () and that the attitude in Washington at present is pretty good. There is presently a very strong feeling in Washington that ARKENZ must go; how does not matter. There were no decisions as to what should be done from here on (suggestions should come from PBSUCCESS) but just that something should be done. They will be waiting for our recommendations as to future activities. No help from () on the () issue at all but as far as other activities are concerned, he feels it is up to us.

() stated that operationally we needed to look the situation over thoroughly. All our actions must be centered around the Guatemalan army. He asked for a report from () and stated that following that there would be general discussion on that report. () was interested in the operational plan for the month of June, most particularly the course of action to be followed during the next 10 days needs to be decided and set up for PM, PP and certain specific FI targets.

() began by discussing the recent loss in the target country and opinions of personnel in the field as to what it entails. It is not likely that army identities will be disclosed nor is it likely that there was a key list of civilians. The worst that could happen would be for the army identities to be disclosed and the army to take action and there be no re-contact. Several other possibilities were discussed.

() stated that the last 50 bundles of cargo were ready to go () () stated they were going in on tonight's flight; the organizers are briefed and ready to go. The man who has gone to Guatemala is briefed on the over-all sabotage situation in Guatemala City. He knows the sabotage set up for the city and is supposed to organize that. S4hock troops are assigned and ready to leave; leader and staff were to remain at house to start briefing today. The executive officer and platoon leaders are to leave for the fincas today. The organizers could be started tonight by cable: () and his staff are briefed.

General random thoughts of () brought out that "RUFUS is sure not a leader"; he has never delegated authority; it is almost too big for him. RUFUS had () and the other Americans set up a staff. () is his S-4 for sabotage actions; S-1 and is helping the S-2 set up an intelligence section. () is needed at this point to help on tactics.

- 2 -

At first it seemed that there was evidently no cooperation from () and it was thought that he was purposely stalling. Further developments brought out that it was merely that he had not been told what to do and when he was told where the gear was wanted, it went immediately. In fact, 5 tons were across the border and almost on the () finca by the next afternoon. No unusual troubles or difficulties were encountered - just the normal run. () said he would fly 5 tons of equipment any day we let them know we wanted them to (Plan 5).

On Plan 6 - () . The boat purchase price is \$15,000 and if we do not burn it, we can re-sell it. He was going to La Ceiba to look at it.

They are waiting for a recon man to return. The man is at the mouth of the river at Pto. Barrios. It is proposed to unload the equipment off the coast into small boats.

In discussions of the groups, relative sizes, etc. it was pointed out that some groups may be more than we can possibly arm. If we drop at night, the parachutes won't be seen but the arms might be messed up by dropping. () has set aside 8 cases of ammo, 900 rifles which will fill up the available parachutes. As long as () is packaging and there is a reserve supply, () is all right as a re-supply base.

Out of 11 groups, 8 have access to radio; 5 have ^{11 radio} OFF of these 8. ()

The 200 men who recently came out of Guatemala did not do so under CALLIGERIS orders. () sent them out. Over 100 are now () Upped by one platoon the shock troops to Jutiapa. As of today men are going to the farms. These men are being grouped in 5-men groups and are to be taught to work as a team. CALLIGERIS thought that if these last named groups could be back in and starting to work 5-6 days before the actual day, it would really confuse the issue. Men are to be sent back to their own area.

Word has been sent in to knock off the recruiting and stop sending people out.

Shock troops can be organized and in position to go; we are capable of putting people in there, capable of handling emergency within 4 days. Coban is the only area where they feel concerned at all. There is an organizer to go in there, too. The organizer is not known to () (he knows none of them). There is an organizer for Quetzaltenango - in fact, for each of the target areas.

Sab leaders will be briefed during this coming week. There are people moving with suitcases. None of the volunteers have been turned back with arms yet.

() questioned () about the methods of communication in () and this was explained to him. Messages (cable) are passed in sterile form only without references although an indication is made to the reference through a reference to the text.

Under the deception plan RUFUS will set it up so that he will obviously be in Panama on D-4. He will go to the () Embassy there and arrange a visa for D-6 and on D-5 he will depart () for Panama. He will, in addition, arrange for a tour through other countries. On D-4 () advance post leaves (). All members of the staff apparently will break up.

- 3 -

However, RUFUS will go back with his staff by black flight and will meet with the others at a safehouse. The only ones cut in on this plan were () and RUFUS. The American operators will be at the safehouse where this meeting will take place.

Status of the () signal plan was questionned. () passed them to the ROs 2/3 days ago. RUFUS knows these are his communications with the Group. () government has not been told that RUFUS wants a radio and should be. Whether or not this would be identified with RUFUS or would be an official radio was discussed. () said it would be laid on through (). It was also questioned as to RUFUS's explanation for the radio.

There has been no word on the ROs yet. Two radios have gone in, one is in Quezaltenango. The two which were sent to the Embassy are still there.

() made the statement that in 13 days the U.S. could paralyze Guatemala economically.

With regard to the leaflet drop - the Guatemalan government said that they did not know who it was but that it must have been a well-equipped plane with radar since Guatemala did not even get their fighter planes off the ground. () and () were very excited about the leaflet drop. () likes () but he thinks it isn't punching back quickly enough.

() was discussed and the possibility of using him, the 180 Cessna, etc. During this discussion a cable from () was received re this subject and read to those present. () will lend his maintenance man and private strip across the way for the Cessna.

() was interested in the reliability of ground signals in operation. They are not very reliable.

() is now in () willing to pilot a P-39 or anything we want him to do. () vetoed his use.

() was asked if he had heard anything of Calderon Guardia's negotiations with Perez Jimenez in Venezuela.

General discussion of RUFUS' assets, aptitude and potentiality followed. It was agreed that the men would do as they are directed but would not be able to carry out too complex a plan.

() requested that Messrs. () prepare a rough draft of suggested or contemplated activities for the next 10 days and turn them in before leaving today. This would be the period through 12 June.

Mr. () was checked on the status of the terror broadcast and said it would be ready in 3 days if notice were given. It can last from 20 minutes to 2 hours as desired.

Meeting adjourned at 1610.

TQ75R

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FN 44

THIS DOCUMENT WAS DRAFTED APPROVED
FOR RELEASE, AS SANITIZED, 5
CSX/MRG ON 5 JULY 95

ROUGH DRAFT
Rewrite Mr. ()
6/1/54

SUBJECT: Present status and possible future course of PBSUCCESS.

1. Mr. () has reported his very tentative view -- which is his own estimate of the situation and which lacks the benefit of a report from ()

() (who will return to LINCOLN Monday night), that in case the originally conceived, carefully-timed paramilitary action should prove difficult of fulfillment, an alternate approach might well be considered. Nothing but tentative conclusions while a careful review of all available facts resulting from the () action and from () are studied.

2. The main premise for any plan from now on should be the build-up of pressures both internal and external on () both because the internal situation is such that anti-government action should result in continued tension and uncertainty and because there should be fairly quick counter action to avoid any inference that the () episode has caused any problem.

3. The basic concept for any successful result is that the () army must move against the regime -- consequently the major issue is what action is necessary to persuade the appropriate officers to move. It is felt that a carefully integrated large scale action, as originally planned, would clearly produce the result. Due, however, to unforeseen problems in material movement, uncertainties as to the leadership of Calligeris and possible internal losses via the () episode, the capacity for achieving the integrated plan may have to be unduly delayed or actually substantially changed. Therefore, a different stimulus to produce Army reaction should be planned at least as a contingency alternative.

4. The most promising alternative would seem to be the despatching of organizers and RRGS as soon as the effects of the () episode establish the proper method for doing it. Concurrently leaflet drops, specific sabotage and possibly political assassination should be carefully worked out and effected. Moreover, material should be moved into () and cached in all ways possible. The hope would be that this approach might persuade the () Army to take anti-Arbenz action on its own. If not, the results of

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the organizers' efforts, accentuated by the affirmative steps just mentioned, could be assessed. If resistance potential develops, material could be distributed either from internal caches, if developed, or dropped by night flights and action comparable to the original plan undertaken. If early action proves unwise, then a classical longer range resistance build-up can be adopted with a view to action at the first propitious movement.

5. It is obvious that this alternative in the first instance would mean a different use of existing assets than presently contemplated. On the other hand, the possibility of successful pressure on the Army for independent action, and the alternative of longer range build-up if earlier solutions do not occur.

SECRET

FM 95

3 June 1954

THIS COPY

EXPLANATION FOR THIS RECORD

SUBJECT: Points Covered in [] Discussions of June 1 and 2.

1. The following is a list of the points which were discussed in the above mentioned conversations, together with an indication of the extent of agreement reached and/or the policy guidance provided to each.

2. Concerning further airborne leaflet drops, [] advised [] we were considering the desirability and timing of additional leaflet drops. He explained we might wish to do this at any time and moreover that there might be occasion to use [] (who have been recruited on an unwitting basis) for certain of these flights. But that the use of such pilots would be reserved for flights involving the use of particularly significant and important pamphlets and where accuracy of delivery is a special requirement. [] further stated that the operating headquarters had been directed to explore fully and carefully the possibility of using indigenously procured planes and indigenous pilots for certain of the leaflet drops viz. those of lesser importance and of shorter length, not requiring such deep penetration. [] stated he saw no objection from a policy standpoint. [] recommended that we give further consideration to the use of leaflet rocket bombs especially for the area of the capital city. These are simple devices the release of which is both easy and capable of accomplishment with little risk.

3. The evidence of an additional and very substantial purchase of arms [] was also discussed with [] who requested that we do everything we can to procure documentary evidence of the purchase and application for export licence. Considered and rejected was the thought of letting the shipment go through and then attempting to waylay it shortly before arrival at destination. This course of action was considered too risky and as involving unnecessary operational difficulties as well as raising more policy problems than the course of action calculated to prevent shipment of arms []. Moreover it was considered that documentary evidence of the purchase and application for export license should make a sufficiently valuable

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BY
SANTINI, SP
ON 6/15/54
FOR RELEASE
ON 6/15/54
C/N

* This subject covered and disposed of one basis [] telephone conversation of Saturday morning, June 5, 1954, after examination of available documents and photostats. [] would still desire the original OR a copy of the application for export license, in which case Embassy Rome could probably obtain special request.

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- 2 -

contribution to the department's "case" against Guatemala. It was understood that the possibilities of obtaining the documents would be explored by CIA, and that if it should prove to be necessary to employ Embassy approach to the [U.S.]. [U.S.] would wish to be advised so that he can clear this with EUR. An important unresolved question in this regard is whether the original documents are required for presentation at the OAS meeting. If the method of obtainment is to be clandestine then it would probably be an embarrassment to present the originals at the meeting, since it would be more difficult to explain how they were come by in original form than would be the case if photocopies were used (photocopies can be obtained in various ways, but official original documents would have to be obtained officially if it were not to appear clearly that they had been stolen).

h. The problem of shaking loose our [U.S.] in order to dispatch him promptly to [U.S.] was brought to the attention of [U.S.] and he agreed to provide his full support in the Department and with the Embassy in [U.S.] if this is necessary.

5. Concerning one very sensitive type of treatment, which was raised directly for the first time by [U.S.] in his memo prepared here, considered this and ruled it out, at least for the immediate future, on the ground that it would probably prove to be counter-productive. This decision was not conclusive and [U.S.] suggested that we come up with more specific plans both concerning the individual targets, the timing and the statement of the purpose sought to be achieved with respect to each. This would require a fairly solid showing of the advantage to be gained by this type of activity.

6. The petroleum supply situation was discussed at some length and reaffirmed his decision against efforts prior to the OAS conference to prevail upon the suppliers by means of direct approach to them to delay, slowdown and interrupt shipments. At the same time he approved of and encouraged us to embark upon a carefully selected series of attempts against certain installations. The hope was expressed that if results can be achieved of the right kind, these results might in themselves cause more general benefit by engendering disinclination on the part of suppliers to ship the goods.

7. It was agreed by [U.S.] that we might establish direct liaison with Mr. [U.S.] for the purpose of exchanging ideas and information with

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

him regarding statements and other forms of policy and propaganda output. [] was to speak to [] and [] was to pass the word to []

1 cc: Assistant Secretary []

~~SECRET~~

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FOR RELEASE, AS SANITIZED, BY
CST/HRG ON 5 July 95

FN 47

IA: COURIER
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. 1

SECRET - SUCCESS RYBAT

CLASSIFICATION

TO : LINCOLN

JUN 11 1954

FROM : Chief of Station, Guatemala *Z*

DATE:

SUBJECT: GENERAL - X-Program

INFO: Chief, WHD

SPECIFIC - ()

Attached herewith is a report prepared by ()

()

Attachment: report (2 pages)

10 June 1954

()

Distribution:

2-Linc w/att
2-Wash w/att
1-files w/att

SECRET - SUCCESS RYBAT

~~Secret~~

9 June 1954

K-Program
Subject: ()

1. This memorandum covers the highlights of a meeting between () and () on 9 June 1954 insofar as they have not been communicated to you () dated 9 June 1954.
2. In his talk with () suggested that the weakness of the Mexican Peso may be a direct result of the position taken by the Mexican delegation during the Caracas Conference. The reduction in tourist travel and business retrenchments on the part of United States firms could conceivably be put down to the same cause. () lapped this up and wanted to know whether this was a result of () study of the subject matter or an off the cuff opinion. He further asked () whether he would support him () meeting in case he should decide to bring up the subject. () declined.
3. () is of the opinion that () approach was honest and devoid of ulterior motive. He kept the conversation with () alive because he considers him a suitable tool for creating defeatism in the minds of important people.
- FIELD COMMENT: It occurred to me that it might be a profitable venture for Lincoln to put out a factual newsletter, providing leading Guatemalan personalities with the raw material from which they can extract their own assessment of the situation. What with news censorship just around the corner and with the confiscation of American newspapers and magazines only a matter of time such a newsletter may, by a process of elimination, become the only dependable news medium in Guatemala City save Sherwood.
4. () admitted frankly that () would detract from the prestige of any operation. However, "sometimes you have to use people, sometimes such things are necessary."
5. () believes that the regime can cope with him only in the following two manners:
 - a. they can offer him a foreign post. He feels that this may actually be under consideration and that, given a continuation of the present course of events, the offer may be made in a month or so.
 - b. they can have him rubbed out. This would only be resorted to under conditions of an extraordinary emergency and only if the regime is sure that () is engaging in activities to its detriment. The job would probably be done by some communist group.
6. Regarding his behavior, () pointed out that he will continue to act as he always has. Any deviation from his normal behavior would arouse suspicion. He cannot afford to dissimulate his anticommunist leanings in conversation.
7. On Monday 7 June () received a visit from () (alias "el Loco"). There is nothing crazy about him. He is a brave type, large in build. This man comes to see () about once a year. () is wondering whether his visit had any motives ulterior of discussing his problems in connection with land he had recently acquired. Referring to newspaper reports, alleging the arrest of () and (), () expressed

~~SECRET~~
relief to meet () a free man.
FIELD COMMENT: Request traces (incl ()).

8. On Tuesday 8 June, () who works at the Ministry of Defense came to see (). He too is an infrequent visitor. Their conversation was inconsequential. Altho he is a habitual drinker, he declined a drink offered him by ().

FIELD COMMENT: Request traces (incl ()).

9. () and () had a short talk about the advisability of naked United States intervention in Guatemala. () opined that hemispheric solidarity might suffer adversely. (He qualified this remark by adding that he actually lacked the necessary background to discuss the problem intelligently). He agreed that the consejo's procedure is a very good one inasmuch as it makes it obvious that the United States is intervening, yet not in a manner jeopardizing "hemispheric solidarity".

10. () asked () for more information on the stepping up of the consejo's activities. () "I had no answer for him".

11. () advised () that he has destroyed all papers which could be considered compromising. () asked () to make sure that his name is kept out of reports because any leak might alert () as to x the identity of the source.

12. () and () signed a notional contract over 10,000 coffee trees. A copy of this contract will be send forward in the 11 June pouch.

13. ()
the understanding being that this ~~will~~ will be applied to the purchase of a private motor vehicle. This will obviate future visits by () to the residence of (). Thus far () had to drive in his own car to () residence, pick him up, take him to his own residence and afterwards again deposit him at his residence. The hazards involved will be materially reduced once () is able to drive his own private car (he only has an official car with a two digit government license plate) to the meeting place. ()
()
()

14. The next meeting is scheduled tentatively for 16 June, the day after return from his trip to the United States.

()

~~SECRET~~

RECTOR
GUATEMALA CITY
H (PBS) (1-3)
MI (4), DCI (5), D/DCI (6)

GUAT 945 (IN 21545) 11 IN

TO: (OPIN) SLINC
RYBAT PBSUCCESS

1. () VISITED) THIS AFTERNOON WITH STORY THAT
) WISHES SPEAK TO SOMEONE ABOUT ()
) CONVERSED WITH () AND THEN WITH ()
) AND () AND () ARE RIVALS BUT
 3. TRUE STORY FOLLOWS: () AND () ARE RIVALS BUT
 UNTIL NOW () HAD VANTAGE IN CAPITAL BECAUSE HE CONTROLLED BASE
 MILITARY AND AIRPORT GARRISON. WITH DEPARTURE OF BASE MILITARY UNITS,
) COMMANDS APPROX 2000 TROOPS PROTECTING CAPITAL AND IS LOYAL
 TO (). () WILLING REVOLT BUT WAITING ORDERS FROM ()
 WHO INDECISIVE THOUGH BEING PRESSURED BY () AND () SUB-
 ORDINATES. () WANTS SHOW OF AIR STRENGTH AS EXCUSE HIS RISING.
 4. () INTRODUCED ONLY AS "A FRIEND", TOLD () THAT ()
) HAS MINIMUM OF THREE DAYS BEFORE ARMY WILL FACE WAVES BOMBERS AND
 FIGHTERS WITH MISSION EXTERMINATE ARMY. IF HE SURVIVES () WILL
 BE TREATED AS WAR CRIMINAL AND EXECUTED FOR NOT HAVING ACTED AND FOR

14 JUNE 54

BUKT 945 (IN 21145)

PAGE -2-

CONTRIBUTING TO DEATH OF ANTI COMMIES AND FOR TREASON. ()
NOT IMPORTANT EXCEPT FOR HIS ABILITY STOP USELESS SLAUGHTER.
ARMY MUST ACT NOW IF IT HOPES SALVAGE ANYTHING.

5. () TOLD THAT COMMIE LEADERS, ()
() MUST BE AMONG THOSE
ELIMINATED WHEN ARMY REVOLTS. HE AGREED STATING THIS VIEW PUSHED
BY () AND SHARED BY ()

6. WHEN ASKED AB UT UFCO AND OTHER AMERICAN FIRMS, () WAS
TOLD HE INTERESTED ONLY IN THAT THEY RECEIVE EQUALITY BEFORE LAW.
STRESSED THAT COMMUNISM IS KEY TO MATTER. ELIMINATION COMMIES AND
PRESENT REGIME MEANS PEACE.

7. () (PORTION MISSING BEING SERVICED) THAT OPPOSITION TO
CALLIGERIS CAMPAIGN AGAINST COMMUNISM WILL BE REGARDED AS PRO COMMIE
ACTIVITY AND PUNISHED. HE TOLD THAT UNOFFICIALLY OR OFFICIALLY
() HAS NO INTEREST WHO BECOMES PRESIDENT.

8. () IS SEEING () TONIGHT AND STATED IF LATTER WILL NOT
ACT HE WILL ALSO SEE (). HE CONFIDENT THEY WILL COVE SINCE
THEY SLOWLY REALIZING EXTREME GRAVITY SITUATION AND BECOMING AWARE
THEY HAVE EASY WAY OUT. () + 2

9. () STATED ARMY COMPLETELY DEMORALIZED. MORE SO, COM-
MANDER OF JUTIAPA, REMOVED FROM HIS POST FOR CRITICISM OF COMMUNISM.
SAME WITH RESPECT TO () OFFERED ARMY OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

24 JUNE 1945

AMT 945 (18 21545)

PAGE -3-

\$13,333 EACH IF THEY STICK WITH HI FOR NEXT FEW DAYS WHEN HE AS-SURED THEM DANGER WILL BE OVER.

10. () TOLD () TO TELL () AND () THAT NO COMPROMISE IS POSSIBLE, THAT MONEY NO LONGER COUNTS, THAT REGIME MUST AND WILL GO.

11. () SAID HE REALIZED DEFEAT () AND COULD'S IRREV-ITABLE, CLAIMED HE HAS 500 MEN WILL TRY SOMETHING HIMSELF IF () AND/OR () DO NOT DO SO. SAID HE HAS MANY FRIENDS IN POSITION SUBORDINATE TO ()

12. NEXT MEETING MORNING 24 JUNE. 240300Z.

END OF MESSAGE

FN 47
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FOR RELEASE, AS SANITIZED, BY
CSI/HKG 5 Jul 95

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 17 JUNE 54

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : GUATEMALA CITY

ACTION: WH (PBS) (1-3)

INFO : WH (4), DCI (5), D/DCI (6), DO/P (L) (7), SA/PC/DCI (8)

GUAT 874 (IN 19252)

0213Z 18 JUN 54

ROUTINE

TO: () SLINC

INFO: DIR

PRECEDENCE

CITE: SGUAT

REF: LINC 3946 (IN 18904)

1. () MEETING HELD MORNING 17
JUNE. FOLLOWING IS SHORT SUMMARY:

A. () AND () HAVE AGREED THAT IF EMERGENCY
ARISES THEY WILL MEET IN HOME OF FORMER, ()
()

B. () AND () AGREED THAT THEY WILL HAVE TRUSTED
ARMY OFFICERS WITH THEM. () INTENDS ATTEMPT TAKE OVER WITH
PROBABLE AID (), FORCE () RESIGN OR KILL HIM, FORCE
RESIGNATION () OR KILL HIM, ENTER INTO CONTACT WITH ALL
MILITARY GARRISONS, TELL THEM ATTEMPT PRESERVE ORDER BUT NOT TO
IMPEDE ELIMINATION OF COMMUNISTS BUT TO AID WHERE POSSIBLE.

C. HAVE WARNED () THAT COMBINATION (),
() AND () IN FORM OF JUNTA IS NOT SATISFACTORY. ()
NOW VERY CLOSE TO () WHO PROVING VERY WEAK WOULD
BE OVERSHADOWED HAVE CLEARLY TOLD () THAT ARMY HAS LAST
CHANCE SAVE ITSELF. HE AND () WILL BE ACCEPTABLE AND

~~SECRET~~

17 JUNE 54

GUAT 874 (IN 19252)

PAGE -2-

HONORABLY TREATED IF THEY GET MOVING. DELAY IS OVER. DECISION IS NOW.

2. () AGREED COMPLETELY WITH ABOVE BUT ASSERTED THAT ARMY AND GOVERNMENT KNOW NOTHING ABOUT ARMS BEING DROPPED EXCEPT THOSE WHICH TURNED OVER BY CAMPESINOS IN GUATALON. HE WAS TOLD THAT 800 TONS HAVE BEEN DROPPED. THAT GARRISONS ARE SUFFICIENTLY MINED WITH OUR PEOPLE TO MAKE THEM A BLOODY MESS WHEN THE SHOOTING STARTS AND THAT HE MUST ACT SOONEST OR HE AND ALL HIS FRIENDS WILL BE LOST.

3. () SAYS HE MUST WAIT FOR EMERGENCY. HE PLED FOR BOMB DROP ON RACETRACK ETC BEGGED FOR SHOW OF FORCE. VIGOROUSLY URGED TEAR GAS DROP AND BREAKING UP OF 18 JUNE DEMONSTRATION WHICH GOVT BUSILY ~~TRYING~~ STAGE ON MAMMOTH SCALE. SAYS ARMY AND GOVERNMENT DO NOT BELIEVE ANYTHING CAN OR WILL HAPPEN. ALL PURE TALK. NOTHING BUT PSYCHOLOGICAL STUNT.

4. () ASSURED HIM BOMB WOULD BE DROPPED, THAT PLANES WOULD FLY OVER, THAT TRACERS WOULD BE FIRED, THAT SPECTACLE FORCE WOULD BE PROVIDED. () PLEADED THAT THIS BE DONE SOONEST, THAT PLANES ZOOM CITY, () HOME, () HOME, GUARDIA CIVIL ETC.

5. HE CATEGORICALLY STATED THAT BOMB DROP AND IMPRESSIVE SHOW OF STRENGTH WOULD SWING ARMY OVER. HE INSISTED WITH OBVIOUS SINCERITY THAT SHOW OF STRENGTH WILL GIVE HIM AND FRIENDS

S E C R E T

17 JUNE 54

GUAT 674 (IN 19252)

PAGE -3-

OPPORTUNITY WHICH THEY WILL SEIZE. HE CONVINCED THEY CAN GAIN CONTROL. HE REITERATES THAT TIME FOR SHOWING STRENGTH IS HERE.

6. WE URGENTLY REQUEST THAT BOMB BE DROPPED, THAT SHOW
STRENGTH BE MADE, THAT ALL AVAILABLE PLANES BE
SENT OVER, THAT ARMY AND CAPITAL BE SHOWN THAT TIME FOR
DECISION IS HERE.

END OF MESSAGE

CABLE SECRETARIAT COMMENT:

() WH, NOTIFIED OF RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE
AT 2225 17 JUN 51

MIAS
En

e C M F ?

[] OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE []

D/R/M

[] (INFO DIR SIEC []

PDSUCCESS BY DAT INTEL

JUN 17 1954

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CSI/ARL ON 12 JULY 1975

[] []

1. IN VIEW CRITICAL SITUATION, RIPE PSYCHOLOGICAL MOMENT
AND IN COMPLIANCE REQUESTS MADE REFERENCE, AND SINCE DID NOT
KNOW WHEN [] WOULD ARRIVE, [] MADE COLD APPROACH
[] ON MORNING 18 JUNE. [] CONVINCED []
PILOT WHO HAD COME WITH SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FROM []
FOR FAST ACTION PART OF []. KNEW [] ONLY BY
TRUE FIRST NAME.

2. [] FIRMLY TOLD THAT TIME IS COME, THAT HE GET
MOVING, TAKES OVER ARMY, AND THAT THE LAST OPPORTUNITY FOR
ARMY TO SALVAGE ITS HONOR AND EVEN EXISTENCE.

3. HE AGREED, ADDED HE AND [] FULLY WORKING TO
GETHER AND WOULD DRAW UP PLAN OF ACTION. WANTED []
ELIMINATED BY CONSEJO RO CALLIGERIS PEOPLE. WAS TOLD THAT
THIS HIS PROBLEM AND HE EXPECTED TO HANDLE. IF IMPOSSIBLE
TAKE CARE ONE MAN WHAT PERCENTAGE HAVE ARMY.

4. SECOND MEETING WITH [] AND [] MORNING
16 JUNE. SAID HE AND [] SURE THEY CAN TAKE OVER ARMY BUT

P-35 DROP DOME DIRECTLY IN CENTER HIPPODROME LOCATED JUST WEST OF LA AURORA AIRPORT. ALSO REQUESTED THAT PLANES BUZZ 16 JUNE DEMONSTRATION AND IF POSSIBLE DROP TEAR GAS. HE TOLD THE DOME COULD BE DROPPED AND POSSIBLY TEAR GAS AS WELL.

5. VITALLY IMPORTANT THIS BE DONE. SUGGEST AT LEAST ONE LOUD DOME ON HIPPODROME. THEY PLAN SEIZE CONTROL [] AND MOVE.

6. [] SAID M.I. GEAR DROPPED [] WAS TURNED OVER BY CAMPESIORS TO GUARDIA CIVIL WHO HANDED IT TO ARMY. ARMY VERY FRIGHTENED SIGHT THESE WEAPONS. WAS TOLD THIS WAS PSYCHOLOGICAL DROP FOR THAT PURPOSE BUT THAT REAL DROPS ALSO BEING MADE. TOLD HE BETTER MOVE FAST. HE AGREED. SAID HE COULD PUT GUARDS AROUND ALL EMBASSIES AS SOON AS THEY MOVE SO THAT FOE CANNOT ESCAPE. SAID [] COMMIES, AND ENEMIES WILL BE EXECUTED.

7. AFTER MEETING HE DEPARTED TO MEET [] AND THEN PROCEEDED LINE UP REGIMENTAL COMMANDERS IN CAPITAL.

8. NEXT MEETING MORNING 17 JUNE AT 0000.

9. IN VIEW CHANGE FROM NEGOTIATIONS TO ACTION YOU WILL APPRECIATE IMPOSSIBILITY REINSERTING [] IN CONTACT CHAIN.

4173

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
FOR RELEASE AS SANITIZED, BY
CSE/HRG ON 5 JUN 1964

DIRECTOR

LINCOLN

P R I O R I T Y

TO: DIR

CITE: SLINC

WIBAT/PBSUCCESS

REVI: DIR 06853

4173

1. REQUEST FOR BROAD AUTHORITY WAS PREDICATED ON OUR DESIRE TO BE ABLE TO PROPERLY DIRECT FIELD OPERATIONS ON DAILY BASIS WITHOUT NECESSITY REVIEWING EVERY VARIATION WITH HEADQUARTERS WHICH OCCURS WHEN PRECISE AUTHORITY EXISTS. PERHAPS IN EFFORT TO CONSCIENTIOUSLY ABIDE BY YOUR LIMITED AUTHORITY WE HAVE LOST WHAT MAY PROVE TO BE PRECIOUS HOURS EACH TIME NEW CIRCUMSTANCES DEVELOPED.

2. UPON EXAMINATION YOUR CONCEPT OF AIR POWER WE FIND NO BASIC DIFFERENCE IN SUBSTANCE OR OBJECTIVE ONLY PERHAPS TERMINOLOGY WHICH IS NOT ESSENTIAL WHEN FOREGOING FACTORS ARE IN AGREEMENT. FOR EXAMPLE WE SAY "A STRICTLY MILITARY TYPE SITUATION HAS MATERIALIZED." MEANING, HAVING TRIED AND FAILED THROUGH PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL MEANS WE ARE NOW CONFRONTED WITH MILITARY SITUATION WHEREIN WE MUST ATTEMPT DEFLECTION OF ARMY THROUGH FORCE OF ARMS. THUS WE FELT OUR MILITARY CAPABILITY MUST BE EMPLOYED TO MAXIMUM AS LAST RESORT.

[]

~~SECRET~~
~~REF ID: A65105~~

3. WE ENJOIN YOU TO RECONSIDER POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THREE FIGHTER A/C MANAGED BY BATTLE PROVEN [] PILOTS. ON PRO-RATA BASIS, NUMBER OF ENEMY TROOPS TO NUMBER OF A/C, COMPARED TO OTHER MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS, WE BELIEVE RATIO ONE A/C TO TWO THOUSAND GROUNDED TROOPS IS VERY FAVORABLE. FURTHERMORE IT IS INCONCEIVABLE ENTIRE ARMY WOULD REQUISITION BEFORE LARGE SCALE DEFECTIONS OCCURRED.

4. USING DEFECTION OF ARMY AS OUR AGREED OBJECTIVE THEN IT FOLLOWS THAT ALL EFFORT MUST BE DEVOTED TO THIS PURPOSE ALONE WHICH FALLS INTO CATEGORIES OF STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL OPERATIONS.

A. STRATEGIC: TARGETS WHICH WOULD PROVIDE SERIOUS DISLOCATION TO ENEMY AND ALTHOUGH NOT IMMEDIATELY EFFECTIVE WOULD SOON IMPAIR HIS COMBAT CAPABILITY, I.E., FUEL STORAGE AND AMMO DUMPS, INTERDICTION, ETC.

B. TACTICAL: CONCENTRATION OF AIR POWER ON ENEMY'S MAIN POINT OF RESISTANCE IN A SPECIFIC ENGAGEMENT SUCH AS [...]

5. POLITICAL OR PSYCHOLOGICAL TARGETS SUCH []

[] RACETRACK, ETC. ARE NOT CONSIDERED WORTHWHILE NOR AS PRODUCTIVE AS COMPARED TO FIRST WINNING THE BATTLE OF [] AND ESTABLISHING DECISIVE MILITARY POSTURE. PRESENT THOUGHT IS THAT [] TARGETS MENTIONED WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE THUS NOT CONTEMPLATED IN PRESENT PLANNING.

6. BEFORE ATTEMPTING FORWARD PROJECTION OF OUR CONCEPT WE MUST STATE THAT PRESENT ENGAGEMENT AT [] IS SERIOUSLY REGARDED AS PLACE OF DECISION. SUCCESS WOULD MOST CERTAINLY SHAKE ARBEZ'S CONFIDENCE IN HIS ARMY AND ALTER ENTIRE SITUATION JUST AS FAILURE AND SUBSEQUENT ROUTING OF FRIENDLY FORCES WOULD REQUIRE COMPLETELY NEW EXAMINATION OF SITUATION AT THAT TIME.

~~SECRET~~
~~REF ID: A6512~~
~~PBSUCCESS~~

7. VIEW ABOVE, WE WOULD PREFER AT THIS MOMENT TO CONCENTRATE ON
TO-MORROW'S BATTLE AND ADVISE YOU SOONEST OF ANY ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY
WHICH MAY BE REQUIRED DEPENDING UPON DEVELOPMENTS. MEANWHILE WE WILL
PROCEED WITH OUR PLANNING AND SELECTION OF OTHER TARGETS SHOULD SITUATION
REQUIRE THEM.

END OF MESSAGE

INCOMING CABLE

~~SECRET~~

BT FN 4b
LINCOLN STATION COPY

TO: LINCOLN
FROM: SHERWOOD
INFO:

PRECEDENCE: U P I M
TOR: 252311Z

SHERWOOD 397

TO: SLINC CITE: SHERWOOD

1. DECISION HOUR BELIEVED BY ALL FIELD PERSONNEL TO BE WITHIN NEXT 60 HOURS.

2. ALTHOUGH OUR CONCEPT PROTECTION CIVILIAN IS COMMENDABLE, IT NOT BELIEVED STRONG ENOUGH, QUICK ENOUGH TO CATCH DECISION OUR WAY IN ABOVE PERIOD. TARGETS LISTED BELOW DESIGNED TO TERRORIZE RATHER THAN PERSUADE. PILOT ACCURACY ALREADY PROVEN.

3. CHIQUIMULA WAS REAL BLOW TO ARMY. THREE TRAINS TODAY IN SUPPORT ZACAPA AND BURNING MATAMOROS SHOULD AID TO PRESSURE WITHIN. DROP TO JALAPA THIS A.M. RECIPIENTS ALREADY BATTING LOCAL DETACHMENT.

4. PROPOSAL:

A. PANCHO CONSOLIDATE CHIQUIMULA.
B. EACH AIR STRIKE PASS CHIQUIMULA AND SUPPORT SHEN CALLED.
C. THROUGHOUT JUNE 26 AND 27 CARRY OUT FOLLOWING AIR MISSIONS WHILE PLANNING BETA:

1. ROOSEVELT HOSPITAL (ALFEM GEAR).
2. GUARDIA HONARE.
3. GUARDIA CIVIL.
4. TGA.
5. BASE MILITAR XX8XXXXXKXXM28X
6. ARMY HQS.
7. TELEPHONE CENTRAL. ACEITUNO.

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FOR RELEASE, AS SANITIZED, BY
C55/HRC ON 03/06/95

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING CABLE

S E C R E T

PAGE 2

LINCOLN STATION COPY

PRECEDENCE: OPIM

TOR:

INFO:

(CONTINUED)

[]

14. RADIO TOWERS QUEZALTENANGO.

5. WE DUE EVACUATE [] THREE DAYS COMMENCING JUNE 29. IF ISSUE
NOT DECIDED NIGHT JUNE 27, EXECUTE BETA JUNE 28.

END OF MESSAGE.

*NO SUB-PARA 8 RCVD; BEING SCVD.

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C.S.I.C. ON 03JUL95

CK NR: 167

S E C R E T

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EN 47

FROM:

CONTROL NO.

006

TO Officer	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S FULL NAME	COMMENTS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
()	125mg	()	()	()	Rybalt/PB success
()					By Hand
()					
()					
()					
()					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
PS3 file					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

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FORM NO. 38-13A
JUN 1949

TOP SECRET

GPO 16-61700-1

PLEASE RETURN
FORM TO

Declassify No. _____
 No Change in Class.
 Declassified
 Class. Changed to: TS S 1989
 Next Review Date: _____
 Actu. No. 70-3
 Date: 20 June 1979 By: 665

CO-7-2

REF ID: A65655
FBI/DOJ/RYBAT/SECRET

()
TS-006
Copy 4 of 8

LT COLN

Chief of ()

K-Program

cc: ()

() First Meeting

Attached is the report prepared by () regarding his first
meeting with ()

()

4 May 54

Distribution:

2-LINCOLN

2-Wash

()

2-Files

()

REF ID: A65655
FBI/DOJ/RYBAT/SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

27 April 1954

1. I have been sent to you by a G resistance movement, dedicated to destroying communist influence in this country. It is the only resistance organization of its kind.

2. Men and women from all walks of life, all professions, all social strata, have sunk their personal, political and religious differences, for the purpose of uniting under the leadership of X and Y. They have relegated any doubts regarding the professional competency of X or Y in order not to dissipate the strength of the G resistance potential. Any split in leadership would dangerously weaken the G resistance potential and thereby play into the hands of communism.

3. X and Y are being helped and advised by public spirited, influential and wealthy Americans who do not hold office. These Americans are not associated with business interests in G. They are politically and financially independent and have no selfish personal stake in the future of G. They are not operating under U.S. Govt instructions. It can be assumed, however, that the U.S. Govt which is firmly resolved to see G communism destroyed by all methods short of outright intervention, would not disapprove of their activities as long as it does not become involved.

4. The junta strives for one objective and one objective only: the destruction of communism in G. There are no other objectives motivating it. X and Y have not been required by their American friends to make political or economic concessions in exchange for American help. Conversely, the Americans have not committed the United States Govt to any specific course of action once G is free again. In particular, the U.S. does not stand committed to support any political faction, let alone any individuals, in quest for political power. The political complexion of G will have to be determined by the Guatemalan people and its chosen representatives. The same applies, without reserve, to the treatment to be accorded to foreign business interests in G.

~~TOP SECRET~~

5. The junta has been planning and preparing for over a year now. One of its problems has been to prevent well-motivated G's from striking prematurely and provoking a second Falaba. So far the Junta has been successful in this and its control over all resistance elements in G is getting stronger by the day. The junta is determined not to allow itself to be rushed or provoked into any ill-conceived ventures. The order to strike will be given as soon as chances of success clearly outweigh prospects of failure -- and not one day sooner. The junta is anxious to avoid prolonged bloodshed and relies upon the impact of manifest and overwhelming power to enforce communist surrender.

6. I am not acquainted with the junta's planning, and to the best of my knowledge no one inside G is. The junta is aware of the hazards of premature leakage and has taken elaborate precautions to prevent it. I happen to know that the so-called revelations of the White Paper were not in any way related to the activities of the junta. I also know for a fact that the plans of the junta do not envisage an invasion of G which would undoubtedly rally all nationalist elements - even those who abhor communism -- behind the defense of G soil.

7. In recent weeks an increasing number of prominent individuals known to be in the G government's camp, have been approaching the junta in order to protest their unswerving opposition to communism and to offer their help. These offers in most instances are likely to have been prompted by a realization that the day of reckoning may not be far off, or they may have been instigated by the G government for purposes of provocation. The junta is resolved not to accept any recent converts whose political past stamps them as rank opportunists at best and communist fellow-travelers at worst. In determining where these individuals stand, the junta depends upon the judgment of X and Y. No one will be accepted as an active collaborator who does not enjoy their complete trust.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

8. The junta has all along considered you a man sympathetic to its objective. It is confident that in any emergency it can call upon you for active help. Your past is a matter of public record and few O's in responsible position have been as forthright and courageous in stemming the communist tide, as you have been. Both I and Y share in feelings of the highest personal regard for you. The junta realizes that your range of activity in its behalf is of necessity restricted. It would have been irresponsible to get you involved in conspiratorial activities of a routine nature. The time has now come where the junta may need your advice and help and where unavoidable risks will have to be taken.

9. The junta has instructed me to put to you the following question:

Are you prepared at this time to receive a personal representative of I and Y in order to discuss specific issues of great importance on which the junta requires your help and advice?

Brief handed to ()

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1. In compliance with LINCOLN instructions, () upon arrival in Guatemala, took immediate steps to contact () The groundwork had been laid by Guatemala Station in developing () to the point where he indicated willingness to assist us in the development of this project. Without () unstinted support and without the information he supplied, the operation would have been fraught with incalculable hazards. He has proven a highly intelligent, trustworthy and courageous companion, the embodiment of a type of ideologically motivated career agent of whom our agency has alas too few. For a man whose personal roots are deep in the soil of his country () () he has launched into this perilous enterprise in an impressive spirit of self-abnegation. We trust that the agency, although no formal commitments have been made or requested, will take cognizance of a moral obligation to shield him and his family against harm and discrimination.

2. The basic concept underlying our resolve to contact () and, if possible, to enlist his support in pursuit of the objectives of P.E. CCNSA, was predicated on conclusions derived from a careful analysis of the assets which () claims to control in Guatemala. While the debriefing of () lent sustenance to CA 'I' 'RIS' claim to be in control of some of the military garrisons, it yet failed to provide a final and conclusive answer to our quest for substantive information. Prevailing conditions in Guatemala City fail to augur for a swift and bloodless investment of the capital. No claims have been advanced by CA 'I' 'RIS' to the effect that he is in control of any important segment of its military establishment. For planning purposes we must therefore assume that the armed forces will give combat to the insurgents, unless factors can be brought to bear, inducing the Army either to

stand by or to rally to the uprising.

5. It is believed that the strategy of PDCOCCE:1 encompasses the possibility of a prolonged and sanguinary struggle for the capital. Its rapid fall would no doubt clinch victory in the whole of Guatemala and assure one of our main objectives - the radical elimination of the militant functionary corps of the CR. An attempt had therefore to be undertaken to bring under Junta control those Army units stationed in the City which must be expected to serve as the government's obedient tools in quelling any uprising: The Guardia de Honor, the unit stationed at Aurora Air Field and the Base Militar. Failing this, a further attempt had to be made to enrol ranking officers of the Army High Command, on the assumption that they may conceivably be in a position to countermand the orders issued by the President, or issue conflicting orders, or influence officers under their command to rise in rebellion. A penetration of this level of the armed structure may now have been accomplished as a result of our dealings with () If all goes well, a faction within the highest level of the Guatemalan officers' corps stationed in the city may align itself with the uprising provided the initial impact of local successes, particularly in the provinces, bids more than fair to lead to success. We cannot, however, hold out much hope, that such a dissident faction will be prevailed upon to coordinate its moves within the framework of PDCOCCE:1 for reasons which will become apparent in our account of what () had to say. Any hopes we may entertain will furthermore have to be based on the expectation that normal command channels within the Army will not at the first sign of local unrest be superseded by an emergency setup, shunting off from the exercise

of direct command the very elements on whose support we may be counting.

4. As an attachment to this report you will find written instructions handed to () as a guide in his first exploratory contact with ()

You will note that these instructions are substantially in line with thoughts on the subject put forward by LINCOLN. It was our purpose to acquaint () in as condensed and intelligible a form as possible with the salient elements of PRACTICCESS without, on the other hand, giving away vital secrets.

5. In determining what could be conceded, we were influenced by a variety of factors. The circumstances in which the first meeting had been laid on did not bear any of the hallmarks of an ambush, nor did () antecedents suggest that he might lend himself for that purpose. There was in our hands evidence, though incomplete, that his mind had for some time been preoccupied with problems involved in unseating the regime. In an atmosphere saturated with rumors of impending revolt or invasion, any presentation, in form or content reminiscent of prevalent rumore, or in his mind conjuring up the recollection of previous false alarms or abortive coups, might have nipped our enterprise in the bud. The analysis was borne out by the genesis of our talks, inasmuch as () was indubitably most impressed by the fact that the uprising was presented to him as firmly planned, with no major deviations acceptable and with inexorable drive behind it.

6. In the light of previous unconfirmed reports, we had prepared ourselves for exception being taken to the role played by GALLIPOLIS. What we were not prepared for was the violence and complete inflexibility with which those exceptions were subsequently voiced. He did, however, decide

to meet the problem frontally in order to let no misunderstanding come up as to the firmness of our resolve to hold on to CALIGERIS. (Any concessions subsequently made in deference to () aroused feelings, were purely tactical and did not affect the substance of our relationship with CALIGERIS.)

7. We further, as it turned out rightly, anticipated that the questions of CALIGERIS' personal and political ambitions would come up in one form or another. The point was therefore made in the strongest terms that no political commitments had been asked of us, let alone had been proffered. Most of the points raised by () in his first talk with () are self-explanatory and will therefore be dealt with under subsequent headings. It should be stressed that () was able to read the statement verbatim, having briefed himself previously on the exact meaning of all technical impressions, so that for the purposes of your evaluation the brief can be accepted as having been communicated in toto and understood by () in all material detail.

8. In order to meet () objections to CALIGERIS, we reported to the adoption of a terminological distinction between "consejo" and "junta" which may not have the merits of logic but which, we believe, was of some help in getting away from personalities and focussing on the essentials of the problem. The "consejo", as we explained it to () in our meeting on April 29th, is a super-council, composed only of four powerful, independent American individuals, playing the role of a court of appeals as it were, and passing on all important decisions with finality. As distinct from the "consejo", there is the "junta", composed of the same four Americans, plus CALIGERIS and () this time in capacity of co-equals. Then there is

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a large staff of technical advisors, both American and Guatemalan, which give counsel to both the "consejo" and the "junta". CALIGERIS thus occupies a dual position: he is a member of the "junta", one of six members to be exact. And he is Chief of Staff and senior military advisor and planner (S-3), serving under (not in) the "consejo" and in all his moves answerable to the "consejo". While this presentation of the organizational structure may in one way detract from the concept of a predominantly indigenous leadership, surrounded by American advisors and backers, it was meant to serve (and may actually have served) as a device to place CALIGERIS' position in a prospective more palatable to () and his friends. In theory at least the "consejo" would be in a position to curb CALIGERIS' political ambitions should he try to launch them in the vehicle of his military position. In theory also the "consejo" could establish military and political contacts in the target area, without necessarily cutting in the "junta".

9. () position was explained to () in his first meeting with () as that of a representative of CALIGERIS and () implying membership in the "junta". Subsequently this version was tacitly dropped and replaced by a more convenient legend, making () one of the many technical advisors with a specialty in political affairs, which turned out to be an altogether satisfactory backdrop. The contradiction apparently went unnoticed. In the end, with no noticeable transition, () emerged as a representative of the "consejo", making a completely independent approach, thus avoiding all direct tie-in with either CALIGERIS or (). I trust that this latter version will linger.

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10. Turning to the actual course of events, short mention should be made of a brief and distasteful interlude which brought under consideration the use of () as an initial go-between. What weighed with us in this choice was the certain though impounded, belief that () in fear of a possible government provocation attempt would immediately raise the issue of authenticity and that the intercession of an individual known by () as occupying an official position would put to rest any apprehensions. We were confident that this could be done without even by implication involving the United States Government (a carefully devised legend taking care of that aspect). A brief prepared for () excluded all matter which could conceivably be considered controversial and all doubts on that score had been allowed for by emasculating () legend to the point where he had little more to do than to introduce an American who dislikes communism. This notwithstanding () who had noted a distinct chill in relations between himself and his erstwhile "friends" since he had last visited the country, began to develop cold feet -- a term which charity rather than accuracy impels us to select. Not wanting to/even the remote risk of losing () through inept handling, we decided not to avail ourselves of () services. Since his usefulness to K-Program was considered ended, he was sped out of the country. Any blame, if it attaches, should go to () whose assessment of () operational potential turned out to be inaccurate. With () having become available we believe that fate was kind when it held us back.

11. The meeting between () and () on 27 April 1954 was laid on by () after the idea had been discarded to venture a completely cold approach. () is thus aware of the fact that there has been a

meeting between () and () but what transpired has not been
vochsaed to him - at least not by () The latter is satisfied that
() harbors genuine hostility against communism and all its works.
and that he is not an instrument of deception or provocation. Since he was
all along the source of information concerning () we were in a position
to check on the accuracy of his reporting and it is fair to state that we had
been reporting the truth. He will of course infer that something is in the
wind and is likely to probe for further information. We console ourselves
in the thought that before this thing is over there are liable to be other
and more devastating leake.

12. The meeting between () and () was scheduled for 29 April
1954. As a meeting place the () town house of (), at
present unoccupied, was selected. () spent the night prior to the meeting
in one of Antigua's hotels and waspicked up in the X-program operational car,
chauffeured by () with () sitting next to him in the front seat.
After a short introduction, () using the name (), the group pro-
ceeded to the meeting place. There were no signs of hostile surveillance.
The conversation took place in ()
() The meeting
lasted from 9:00 a.m. to 4 p.m.

13. () started off by telling () that, following his invitation,
he had come to Guatemala and that he considered a great honor indeed to meet
face to face one of Guatemala's staunchest anti-communist. () added that
there were a few persons in leading pos tions in Guatemala whose invitation
he would have accepted or whose invitation he would have considered an honor.

The preambular part having been settled, () launched into a concise discourse, reiterating the substance of what () had already communicated to (). There were some indications that the previous briefing had sunk in and that the ground had been well prepared. The issue of accreditation never came up and () showed little hesitancy in disclosing his deep and abiding hostility to the regime and his deep resentment at the mesalliance it had entered with communism.

14. ()

(), struck () as "muy simpatico", but hardly endowed with superior brainpower. Without having such background in fixing up *Latinos*, () would describe him as the typical product of a military school, ridden by the taboos and narrow prejudices which such upbringing is bound to inculcate, in a country where opportunities for intellectual self-development are limited. This notwithstanding, () seemed to have undergone the kind of political schooling which the hectic history of modern Guatemala provides for all those who become involved in politics.

15. While time did not permit to delve into his personal and professional past, () inferred that () played some role in the conspiracy which resulted in CHICO's fall and which installed the quadruprate. Although it is difficult to fathom the ideological roots of his belief, his hatred of dictatorship appears to be strong; although it may not be matched by an equally fervent desire to see a parliamentary democracy installed in his country. There can be no doubt whatsoever as to his hatred against communism and the public record of his past bears testimony to the fact that it is more than academic. His falling out with () which is probably final

and irreparable, may not have been over the communist issue alone. Certainly they may now be considered irreconcilable political antagonists, with no illusions left on either side. (

16. There can be no doubt that (] wants to keep ()
() at close range (

) It can
safely be assumed that ()
() his access to classified information is limited to what
he can learn through his numerous close friends still in responsible position.

17. In order to size up () properly and in order to determine his potential in any conspiracy, it is important to view him as a professional officer first and foremost. He has risen in life with and through the Army and everything he has accomplished he owes to it. Owner of a ()

() he is bound to be a man of wealth who could live in easy comfort without a position in public life. Whether his () is inherited, or whether - like so many of his fellow-officers - he managed to make a fortune on the side, was not ascertained. Being a capitalist of some consequence he cannot possibly view the degradations of communist economic theory and practice in Guatemala with equanimity.

18. The basis for () opposition to communism must be looked for in his military upbringing which, even today, is the predominant environmental influence conditioning both thought and action. It is also doubtless the cause for a noticeable ambivalence in his reasoning if it comes to rationalizing what he refers to the "conqueraria" of some ranking officers with communism, and especially if he tries to explain the phenomenon of ARTERZ. There is no doubt in his mind that the Army (and in the context of our discussions this term never connotes the enlisted ranks) is predominantly anti-communist - 95%, as he repeatedly stated. Even those ranking officers whom he listed as firmly committed to the support of the regime are "anti-communist". Whereas () obviously recognizes the ambiguous position in which the officers' corps has been placed as a result of communist penetration of the governmental structure, he is inclined to look for the root of the evil in the acts and beliefs shared by at most four ranking officers in key positions and he obviously regards the President as the key to the problem. () strongly implied that he considers the overthrow of the regime, with the President firmly in the saddle and in a position to exercise effective command over the armed forces at the time of the uprising (an even temporary absence from the capital would in () opinion, afford him and his associates in the () a

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sufficient breathing spell to wrest control from the President), would make prolonged and
bloody strike unavoidable, because - as he stated repeatedly - ARBENZ is going
to fight and will go down fighting.

19. While it is quite impossible to weave () statements concerning the Army into a consistent and intelligible pattern of predictable behavior, certain of his observations evince that he has a shrewd and discerning mind when it comes to fathom the motivation of some of his friends and colleagues and his analysis of the situation, while hardly a masterpiece of cogent reasoning, deserves scrutiny.

20. By way of introducing the main topic of conversation, () presented () with the following estimate of the situation:

The "junta" believes that it is in effective control of a sufficient number of garrisons to be able to launch a military uprising at any time with considerable likelihood of success. The undertaking has been carefully planned and nothing been left to chance. A massive and timely supply of material is assured. The "junta" will have at its disposal a well-organized communications net, independently of locally available communication facilities. Teams of experts are undergoing training and will descend upon Guatemala at the appointed time, to discharge a variety of functions. (In answer to () question what percentage of the ranking officers in the various garrisons could be considered as under "junta" control, () denied any knowledge, but ventured as a rough guess, that it might be between 40 and 60% -- an estimate that left () visibly impressed.)

21. It should be stressed that the foregoing presentation was not an impromptu affair, but carefully weighed in the light of a number of pertinent

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factors. From a security point of view, it was felt that in case of disclosure to unauthorized persons, only the element of strategic surprise could conceivably suffer, the element of tactical surprise being left unimpaired. Another factor, allowing considerable latitude in divulging the training of specialists for specific tasks, was conditions by the realization that this phase of our preparations has already been subject to considerable compromise and that nothing much would be added to what the government already knows. The mention ^{as} of 1954 the period during which the Junta would be striking, left the actual date sufficiently vague and yet served the immediate purpose of imbuing() with a sense of urgency. The mention of control in the garrisons was an indispensable prerequisite for entering into any fruitful discussion of substantive issues, such as control over the Army as a whole and the role of Guatemala City and the Army units stationed therein. The cumulative effect of the disclosures, as far as they went, was felt to be one of counteracting the paralysis of will which is known to have affected a great many militant anti-communists as the result of too many futile hopes raised in the past. (In this context, it appears significant, that() declined() invitation to talk things over, one of the reasons being that he frankly disbelieved the account of events to come).

22. From a psychological point of view, transcending the immediate purpose of getting() to cooperate, the plan in its above version can therefore inflict but little harm, should it be divulged to unauthorized persons, and is bound to lift the morale of those whom it may concern. It is worth noting that() in the course of the conversation harked back at least four times to the emphatic statement made by() that no circumstances known to the Junta could possibly

result in a postponement or abandonment of the uprising, requesting each time that his understanding be confirmed. It is an impression, shared by () and () that this one statement did more to sway () than any other issue raised during the conversation. A further illustration of the pivotal importance of this particular issue is that () suggested a meeting between () and () for the primary purpose of assuring the latter that we were engaged in serious pursuit and that our singleness of purpose would not be deflected by any setbacks.

23. We had known from previous reports that () would not be party to an invasion of Guatemala. We had no difficulty in convincing him that an invasion was not in the cards and that the basic doctrine guiding our strategic planning was inextricably linked up with an overthrow of communism through Guatemalan effort. () anticipated the raising of this issue and emphatically stated that an invasion was bound to rally Guatemala's best elements in defense of her soil, nullifying all our efforts to vitalize homegrown resistance and in effect making us Guatemala ripe for a major communist assault under the guise of defending her national interests against the foreign invaders.

24. It was felt that the involvement of Americans in prominent positions called for some explanation in order to remove the stigma of American intervention. It came as rather a surprise that () himself did not raise this point and in fact did not seem to pay any particular attention to this part of our presentation. In () case, at least, American preoccupation with events in Guatemala did not seem to cause any surprise or resentment whatsoever. () by way

of introducing the issue, referred () back to the Caracas resolution which had served the dual purpose of rallying all member nations behind a determined effort to keep communism out of the hemisphere and of serving notice that the United States would not stand idly by should such infection come to pass. () pointed out that developments in Guatemala constituted a serious threat not only to Guatemalan independence but to United States security and that the United States, faced with the grim prospect of involvement in a major war could as a matter of elementary self-preservation not afford to ignore the inroads of communism into the governmental and administrative structure of Guatemala.

25. Going beyond this, () stated that the United States would do everything in its power by methods short of direct intervention or short of economic pressure, to help the Guatemalan people to get rid of its unwanted lodgers. The "consejo" therefore, though operating outside the area of direct governmental control, was acting in the sure knowledge of implementing United States foreign policy. In answer to a question put by (), he was given assurance that the "consejo" was not linked with the State Department and in fact on occasion () had disagreed with the State Department over specific policies and moves. The groundwork having been laid by () in elaborating on the role played by private individuals and privately owned and controlled institutions in the promotion of public causes (Radio Free Europe, Ford Foundation etc.), () left us with the impression that our explanation was satisfactory to him. The unspoken premise that the "consejo" while primarily devoting itself to promoting the cause of

Guatemalan freedom, also considered itself charged with the protection of vital United States interests in seeing normal conditions return to Guatemala as quickly as possible must have further strengthened () conviction that the Americans mean business.

26. As had been anticipated, the CALLIGERIS issue loomed large in our conversation. In reporting on his first talk with ()

() had summed up his impression by stating that in his opinion "the key to the whole situation was () emotional statement that he would do anything if he could, but that it is impossibly to ally himself or collaborate with CALLIGERIS and that he had reached an irrevocable decision on the matter." In voicing strong detestation of CALLIGERIS and in declining any offer of collaboration with him, () claimed to be speaking also in behalf of all the other officers whom he counts among his friends and fellow-conspirators.

27. It is not possible at this stage to convey to you a very clear picture of the strength of this group and of what level in the military hierarchy is occupied by it. () was purposely vague in identifying his friends and we for obvious reasons did not see fit to press him at this stage. Both in his talks with () and with () made veiled reference to a group of Guatemalan officers who are bound by mutual oath to strive only for the good of Guatemala. In talking about this to () he pointed with a dramatic gesture to his safe and stated: "their names are in here." He further stated that this oath bound each of them to kill any member of the group who violated it. He specifically mentioned that ABELA was not one of those who had taken the oath. () asked () never to mention to anyone the existence of this group, nor the oath that bound them. This notwithstanding, he brought up this subject again in the presence

of () this time in order to underscore the point that he could not possibly be party to any plot involving the necessity of liquidating any one member of this group. He particularly stressed that they were all united in a strong feeling of anti-communism, but evaded answering the question what would happen if one of them threw in with communism. () considers it possible that (), in stating that any collaboration with CALLIGERIS would, in the eyes of his "friends," make him a man without honor and that he would lose any influence which he is still exercising among them, may have been referring to the above-mentioned group. He did imply that () belongs to it and that he shares his strong dislike of CALLIGERIS.

28. From stray remarks made by () there emerges a pattern of conflict that is only too familiar to students of the morphology of personal strife/a tightly knit and caste-conscious society, such as a corps of professional officers. Added to this in the case of CALLIGERIS should be the fact that the formative years of his military career fall into a particular turbulent area of Guatemalan history, where violently and irreconcilable enmities were the order of the day and had to be incurred as a prerequisite for political and often physical survival. It may be best to present to you a number of the reasons given us by () to explain why collaboration with CALLIGERIS is out:

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29. CALLIGERIS associated himself with Colonel ARAA, an officer who had reached his colonelcy through the ranks. Being an officer of the line and not a graduate of the Escuela Politecnica, ARAA systematically degraded and insulted military school officers, favoring and promoting officers of the line. In this he was aided and abetted by CALLIGERIS, a product and former superintendent of the Escuela Poli-

technica himself. This threatened to destroy the esprit de corps of the officers. In this connection () with considerable bitterness, referred to the fact that he and his fellow-officers had to recognize as their commander-in-chief an old man who could neither read nor write, General REYES. () stated that even today there is a deep-seated struggle going on between Escuela Politecnica graduates and line officers, with the former holding the upper hand and intending to keep it. () observed that CALLIGERIS' removal from the scene had been of considerable help in assuring the supremacy of military school elements. In speaking about ARANA, () expressed pleasure that he had been killed and emphasized that ARANA was engaged in a conspiracy to gain power for himself.

30. () claims that he was almost the victim of a murder plot, conceived by ARANA and engineered by CAL. IGNIS. The reason why it failed to come off was that the assassins () () () decided that caution was the better part of valor. () is quite convinced that CALLIGERIS was behind this.

31. At the time CALLIGERIS launched his attack against the (), the officer in charge was () () () (), his second in command (). At the time of the attack, () and () had to bear the brunt of the attack. As well known, a terrific slaughter took place and () was wounded. What do you think () would be () reaction today were he asked to make common cause with CALLIGERIS?

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32. (

33. (

) CALLIGERIS, ..

() stated that he was striving for just one goal and that if there was a trench in front of him and he would have to fill it with corpses, he would do so. () cited this incident as an example to underscore his contention that CALLIGERIS would shrink from nothing to achieve his own personal ends in any contest.

34. By way of explaining why a point of honor was involved in their refusal to have any truck with CALIGERIS, () also brought up the point that an Army court composed of the ranking officers of the Army Pigh Command had passed on CALLIGERIS' conduct and had declared him unworthy to be an officer in the Guatemalan Army. We gather that this point was made by () to imply that at least the officers who made up the court of honor can hardly be expected to eat their own words as it were and submit to the leadership of man whom they had stripped of military honors.

35. In the context of discussing what contribution () and his associates could render in hastening the fall of Guatemala City, () again brought up the problem of CALLIGERIS, asking what assurance they could be given that once Guatemala was firmly in their hands, CALLIGERIS would not decide to continue the uprising. Further questioning brought out the fact that () was convinced that CALLIGERIS and the elements under his control would proceed to occupy Guatemala City as the seat of political power, regardless of

whether ARBENZ at that time was still in effective control or in the meanwhile had been ousted by Army elements. () was unimpressed by the argument that the issue of political power and the political ambitions of CALIGERIS are completely beyond the pale of Junta jurisdiction and that CALIGERIS himself had never raised the issue. () very emphatically stated that this proved nothing and that he was absolutely sure that CALIGERIS was bound to be harboring personal ambitions far beyond the elimination of communism.

36. () pointed out that it was the considered policy of the "consejo" to leave the choice of Guatemala's political leadership to the Guatemalans themselves. If in the free play of political forces, CALIGERIS would come out on top, the "consejo" would certainly not raise objections, this being a clear vindication of its own choice. If, on the other hand, the Guatemalan people decided not to elect CALIGERIS and to entrust their political fortune to someone else, that was all right too. () did stress that the "consejo" was adamantly opposed to the establishment of a reactionary military dictatorship, but that did not mean that the "consejo" would arrogate to itself the right to dictate Guatemala's form of government.

37. () stated as his own personal opinion, emphasizing again that this matter had never been a topic of discussion, that if it should become clear that CALIGERIS was using his military position to impose himself upon Guatemala as a dictator, not affording the Guatemalan people any opportunity to have known its own preferences, some remedial action might possibly be taken and could effectively be taken inasmuch as the "consejo" was exercising logistical control.

However, () added, in all our dealings with CALLIGERIS we had never discerned any symptoms of consuming political ambition which, if existent, it would be impossible to conceal completely. On the contrary, we had found CALLIGERIS at all times dedicated to the sole objective of eliminating communism in Guatemala.

38. In order to clarify () stand on the CALLIGERIS issue, he was asked the following leading questions:

A. Would he at this stage advocate that the "consejo" jettison CALLIGERIS, even if this would mean abandonment of the whole enterprise? The answer was that we could not very well be expected to do so, although our choice was regrettable.

B. What would be his action, should (as an academic example) a garrison commander come to him for advice on how to react to the approaches of a CALLIGERIS emissary, asking him to make common cause with the insurgents? This question () refused to answer outright, because - as he put it - a "point of honor" was involved. The rebuttal that a "point of honor" could hardly arise as long as the future of his country and the destruction of communism were involved, did not appear to move him. This more than any other incident convinced () and () that the CALLIGERIS issue is so loaded with irrationalism that a man with () limited capacity for self-analysis and for logical development of thought cannot possibly be expected to resolve it within himself.

39. In order to enable you to view in its true perspective what effective contribution () and his friends can render it may be in order to set forth some of the ideas that guided () in developing this information. When asked point-blank what he had to offer, () replied that he and his "friends" could get into the

act only at the 11th hour, i.e. only after the uprising had started and was showing signs of success. In other words - () stated - we would be able to count on him once the revolution had succeeded. He heatedly replied that he had been scheming against communism long before () ever appeared on the scene and that he did not feel he owed us apologies. When pressed for a closer definition of "the 11th hour", he rather vaguely hinted that the ensuing chaos might enable him and his friends to wrest effective control of the Army from ARBENZ and - more specifically - that they might be able to induce certain Army units in Guatemala City not to quell a civilian uprising.

40. () pointed out that, whereas any contribution along those lines would be most welcome, its prospect was much too vague to entrust the capture of Guatemala City to him and his friends. He as a professional staff officer would appreciate that for the purposes of strategic planning that kind of an offer might as well not be made at all. () further stated that he did not wish to conceal from () that the problem of "Guatemala City" was of grave concern to the "consejo", because there was at this stage no assurance whatsoever that the armed forces stationed in Guatemala City would rise concurrently with the garrisons in the provinces. In other words, we had not been too successful in effecting penetrations of the command of those Army units on a sufficiently high level to warrant any optimism whatsoever in predicting whether they would throw in their lot with the rest of the Army.

41. () deliberately painted a dark picture of the military situation in Guatemala City for the purpose of eliciting () military views on the situation and ~~to determine~~ what effective

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control over this situation they might be able to exercise. It was felt that nothing would be given away by such admission, because () could be presumed familiar with conditions prevailing in the capital and might have been able to show up unfounded boasts. Furthermore, this type of information if getting into the wrong hands would merely serve to lull the government in a false sense of security as regards the situation in Guatemala City. () strove to convey to () that the local situation in Guatemala City, and more specifically the strong control exercised by ARBENZ and his most trusted henchmen over the Army units stationed there, offered a wide field of activity to him and his friends, but not on an 11th hour basis.

42. () successfully drove home the point that the Junta could only disengage itself from immediate concern with military conditions in Guatemala City if there was some tangible assurance that he and his friends were effectively engaging themselves in the defection of those army units. In the absence of such intent or of success along those lines, the Junta would have to cope with the situation in Guatemala City in its own way, committing those, mostly civilian assets, which it now has and ultimately investing Guatemala City by military force brought up from the provinces. We were fully conscious that the latter necessity might spell the prospect of prolonged and bloody civil war, with Army units fighting Army units, a prospect which we are determined to face without flinching. () finally mentioned that this solution would also place CALLIGENIS in effective control of all of Guatemala, as far as we are concerned a secondary consideration, but probably of a little more concern to () and his friends.

43. () added that he occasionally saw some merit in the concern expressed by () that C/L INSTIT might have strong political aspirations, although the "consejo" failed to share this view. Be that as it may, () was sure that the "consejo" would not object to an Army coup engineered by () and his friends. He should, however, bear in mind that the mere replacement of AFBNZ by a man like () with FO TONY still lurking in the antechamber, would not be then considered an acceptable solution of the communist problem and that our plans would therefore have to be implemented as scheduled. () indicated that he was in full agreement with this point of view.

44. While () repeatedly tried to convey the impression that "they" (meaning him and his associates), had a "plan", it can be stated that they probably confined themselves to debating a number of possibilities without ever reaching a firm conclusion, let alone ever getting to the point of trying something. On the basis of his talk with (), () is convinced that a precipitate move on his part need not be apprehended, because there is at this stage nothing to move with. It may help your own evaluation to be presented with some of the ideas which () brought up in the course of our conversations.

45. When first asked by () to tell him what sort of thing he had in mind to bring about the downfall of the government, () remarked that economic pressure would do the trick, because the Nationalist government had during the past year run up a deficit of 14,000,000. () pointed out the trouble with that argument was that the price of coffee had reached such a high point that not only would Guatemala prosper, but the government would probably collect

next year '25,000,000.00 in taxes as opposed to \$8,000,000.00 last year. Furthermore, the gold backing of the quetzal was so strong that the government, without weakening the internal value of the currency, was capable of printing paper money against its gold reserves. Therefore, while the basic idea was good, it simply did not fit into the monetary situation of the country. () in commenting on economic pressure as a solvent of the situation, pointed out that this would be tantamount to an abandonment of the policy of non-intervention and that once that decision had been made the more effective remedy would be to send troops. This, however, would not be the kind of remedy the United States wanted. It would not serve to create the atmosphere in which each individual feels responsibility in a local, national and world-wide sphere.

46. After () had read to () the statement dealing with the inadvisability of an invasion, () - while agreeing that this was a point well taken - stated that "they" had been hoping an invasion would take place, because the Army could take advantage of the ensuing chaos and take over the government. He was sure that the syndicates and carreños would step into the breach. He conceded that an invasion (by an Army of mercenaries) appeared a rather fantastic notion, but that its impact, if tried, might propel the Army into action.

47. A more realistic approach to the over-all problem of revolutionary strategy became discernible after () had outlined to () the basic concept of PESWOCHESS. () was visibly impressed by what he was told, especially by the stress placed upon winning over the ranking officers in the various garrisons and to start from there. He indicated that this, in his opinion, was an

eminently sound approach. Once it had sunk in that any realistic contribution by him and his friends would of necessity have to be conceived within the framework of the RESOURCES concept, he began thinking along lines of practicable strategy and more productive vistas of fruitful collaboration began opening up. What developed will be discussed under the heading of "Guatemala City."

48. () repeatedly stated that a defection of the command of the Army units stationed in Guatemala City would meet with the greatest difficulties, the reason being that the key positions are occupied by officers irrevocably committed to upholding the ARBENZ regime against all comers. Both () he stated, had been given assurance by the President that he would support their presidential aspirations. With this carrot dangling before them, it was out of the question that they would jeopardize their political future by entering into any kind of conspiracy. () turn were in cahoots with the commanding officer. ()

() in the presidency could count on advancing into the position of Chief of the Armed Forces and Chief of Staff, respectively.

() repeatedly emphasized that the defection of the aforementioned officers was completely out of the question and that no inducement, material or otherwise, could possibly sway them in their determination to obey the demands of the President. () ()

() controls also the Guardia Civil through his henchman Colonel CRUZ Uer. We did not discuss the position of the Base Militar although a remark made by () (the exact contents of which we fail to recollect) leads us to believe that one of its ranking officers may belong to the circle of () trusted friends.

U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

49. In answer to the question on how many ranking officers () could absolutely depend upon in an emergency, he stated that there were three of whom two were absolutely safe. Without wanting to identify who they are, he stated that they should obviously not be looked for among the aforementioned group of officers and that only one of them exercised true command. Inasmuch as one of the three is undoubtedly (), there remain two unidentified. It should be stressed in this context that we were only talking about officers stationed in Guatemala City, not below the rank of regimental commander or deputy commander and of the Army High Command. There can be little doubt that among the officers bound by a common oath there must be many more whom he could point out to us as defectionable.

50. The whole problem of what to do about the Army in Guatemala City is in ()'s mind tied up with the homogeneity of the Army command and with the fact that in his opinion the Army is 95% anti-communist. The thought therefore that any uprising may entail internecine strife, with Army units fighting each other and with subordinate officers assassinating their superiors (some of whom may be the very officers committed by special oath to defend Guatemala), is clearly abhorrent to them. He repeatedly tried to elicit information as to how the "junta" proposed to cope with that contingency and whether our plans called for the systematic elimination of certain officers believed unsympathetic. Back of his mind may be lurking the suspicion that under the pretext of enlisting the Army support, CALLIGRIS is planning to conduct a "private" purge on the side, eliminating all Army officers who "could conceivably stand in the way of his political aspirations. () stated that he was not aware of any such plans and that while in some instances officers may have to be removed, this would most likely be the exception rather than the rule. Most of them, () was sure, would be swept along by the momentum of the revolution.

51. () position vis a vis ARENZ is a highly complex one.

(

) claims that

at 8-hour in 1944, ARENZ was two hours late and CALLIGRIS left town that day. Eight men were involved in the conspiracy. ()

(

)

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

he has still some affection left for ARBENZ. About six months ago ()

() asked him to chair a commission ()

() to inform () he would not accept the position because he would () not work with communists. ()

52. Both () and () are of the opinion that () has been driven into a state of utter exasperation and that his friendship for the President has worn thin. Again, however, it does not appear that () has thought out the problem to its logical conclusion. On the one hand he argued very forcefully that what the physical presence of ARBENZ in Guatemala City was bound to militate against a bloodless coup. On the other hand he very inconsistently tried to elicit from () what plans if any had been laid to dispose of the ARBENZ in due. () evaded a straight reply by pointing out this problem was closely tied up with the overall problem of Guatemala City and, after all, it was the underlying purpose of the "consejo" approach to () to learn what he and his associates were thinking about it. () added that, if he were a Guatemalan, an answer to ()'s question would not cause him any particular qualms. () specifically stated that to the best of his knowledge the issue ARBENZ had not so far been taken under advisement by the "consejo" and he was under the impression that, in the absence of all indications to the contrary, its solution one way or the other was not considered a prerequisite for success.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

53. () considered it inadvisable to discuss the problem in concrete terms for a variety of reasons:

A. This happened to be one major issue not included in the guidance provided by LINCOLN for our dealings with ()

B. The breach between () and ARBENZ at this stage may not have fully crystallized and any indication that the President's physical elimination is part of the "junta's" plans (associating this in () mind with CALICERIS' personal intentions), might weaken his resolve to fully associate himself with our cause.

54. There can be little doubt that the assassination of ARBENZ has been a subject of discussion between () and his friends. From his remarks it was impossible to draw any inference as to the conclusion they eventually reached. () statement: "You of course realize that without ARBENZ there would be no communist problem in this country", may have been meant to furnish the cue. ()

~~TOP SECRET~~

55. () strong feelings in regard to what he referred to as the "dignity of the Army" came out when () stated that the part of the public feels that the Army should do something about the present situation, even if this involved giving up its special privileges, rather than waiting to get in on the spoils of an inevitable uprising. () answer was that the Army, except for a few, were among the most selfless servants the nation has. Their salaries had not been raised in spite of the rising cost of living and the majority are living from hand to mouth with no reserves to draw on. In this connection () very heatedly commented upon scurrilous attacks launched by an Army paper, put out by a group of political refugees in Honduras, attacking the Army in a manner designed to destroy the faith of the public and to weaken the control of the officers over the ranks.

56. Only passing references were made to the existence of a civilian resistance organization in Guatemala and particularly in the capital. () assured () that there was a powerful and numerous resistance organization, the strength of which it was impossible to estimate, the reason being that it is not too well organized as yet. () proceeded to state that big strides were being made by its Guatemalan leaders to tighten up the internal security and the discipline of the individuals associated with it. The "junta" was confident that the civilian underground would give an excellent account of itself during the uprising. Quite likely it would be the initial assault by civilian elements in Guatemala City putting the spark to the powder keg. From all available indications there would be an uprising the like Guatemala had never witnessed in its history and its very impact might conceivably suffice to convince ARBEIZ that the game was up.

57. () dwelt at length upon the importance of bringing all public

U. S. ~~OFFICIALS ONLY~~

life to a complete standstill as an effective means of forcing the resignation of the government. He intimated that this was another aspect which he and his friends had been giving considerable thought. Especially the paralysis of all means of transportation would render a decisive contribution to bringing down the government. Again () protested ignorance of what had been planned along those lines and reiterated that the main emphasis of the "junta's" plans was on military action, with all other considerations being subsidiary; if he and his associates could see any effective means of bringing about such a paralysis of the transportation system, the "consejo" would be more than happy to take their plans under advisement.

58. () stated that the arming of the campesinos and of the sindicatos caused him and his friends considerable alarm. He claimed that a recent trial mobilization in Esquintla proved that the communists might be able to rally on very short notice in that area alone as many as 12,000 armed campesinos. He was sure that these forces would be mobilized and committed should there be an internal uprising or an invasion would beyond the shadow of a doubt join in the fracas. () asked () what provisions the "junta" had made to cope with that contingency. () reiterated that he had no knowledge whatsoever of any tactical moves that may be contemplated by the "junta". He could not imagine, () averred, that the "junta" had failed to make the necessary provisions to thwart the effective commitment of paramilitary effectives in Guatemala City or in any other strategic area. Stressing that the following question was a strictly academic one, in no manner reflecting actual or surmised planning of the "junta", () asked whether a strafing attack by planes against the trucks and railroad cars carrying campesinos to Guatemala City would not

with a minimum loss of lives prevent the effective commitment of these partisans. (. . .) thought that at least it might result in their temporary dispersal.

59. (. . .), in the course of our conversation, broached the question whether any member of the U. S. diplomatic establishment in this country was cognizant of the "junta's" plans and authorized to speak in the "junta's" behalf. (. . .) firmly and emphatically denied this, adding that it would be wise for any Guatemalan actively engaged in conspiratorial activities to give the American Embassy and its members a wide berth. The basic policy decision, however, placing the United States into unyielding opposition to Guatemala's communism and the firm resolve not to allow this cancerous growth to keep fostering was known to the American Ambassador and, (. . .) was sure, was known to the Guatemalan Government.

60. In discussing ways and means of fitting (. . .) and his associates into the framework of the conspiracy, (. . .) made the following statements, pointing out that they represented the considered policy of the "consejo":

A. The "junta's" basic strategic concept on how to bring about the liquidation of communism in Guatemala would under no circumstances be subjected to material changes. Too much work had gone into it, too many commitments had been made, too many preparatory steps had been taken -- besides time was running short. No practicable alternative had been suggested which could assure the radical elimination of communism down to its grassroots.

B. There could be only one strategy with the corollary of centralized control. All diversity of effort, all uncoordinated moves, would

merely play into communist hands. The "consejo" could therefore not lend support to any endeavor outside the framework of the "junta's" strategic plans. For that reason also the "consejo" was unprepared to countenance let alone actively support two independent revolutions, one in the provinces and one in the capital city.

C. Without wanting to commit the "consejo" to any such solution, an arrangement could possibly be worked out whereby () within this group would be brought into independent contact with the "consejo" rather than placed under the direct control of CALLIGERIS. A recommendation along those lines would be submitted to the "consejo" as the most effective and probably only means of meeting () strong objections to becoming associated with CALLIGERIS.

D. If the "consejo" approves, a permanent representative in Guatemala will be designated who will be charged with the conduct of all further transactions between "consejo" and ().

E. () will be expected to firm up his personal contacts in the military establishment as expeditiously as possible and to make available to the "consejo" all information that has a bearing on our joint enterprise.

F. The "consejo" in turn through its representative will make available to () and his associates all requisite information of a tactical nature, needed to enable them to coordinate the nature and the timing of their moves with the overall plan of the "junta". It will, whenever this appears appropriate, put () in touch with other collaborators of the "junta".

TOP SECRET

61. A further meeting between () and (), with () attending and interpreting, has been scheduled for May 5th. At this meeting it is proposed to read to () a formal summation of all the points at issue on which it is believed an understanding has been reached. () will be requested to re-confirm our understanding of his willingness to give his full support to our endeavor, under the aegis of the "consejo" and subject to its orders. He will further be given an oral message to be passed to () to the effect that the "consejo" appreciates the reasons for his unwillingness to agree to a direct meeting with its representative and is loath to endanger his personal security unnecessarily. On the other hand, the "consejo" considers him and has considered him all along an active sympathizer of the movement and will attempt to keep in touch with him via () The "consejo" trusts that any doubts regarding the genuineness of our effort which he may still be harboring, will be taken care of by the course of events.

62. The next meeting is likely to change and to some extent modify some of the impressions gained thus far, and a supplementary report will be submitted to you. In view of some of the issues raised in this report, it was found advisable, however, to send it forward in its present raw form.

()

TOP SECRET

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

ALLEN W. DULLES

DIR, CIA

601

21 JUNE 1954

SENIOR REP, GUATEMALA CITY

DIR, CIA

DCI (1)

D/DCI (2), DO/P (L) (3), DH (PBS) (4-6), DS (7), SA/PG/DCI (8)

THIS DOCUMENT WAS APPROVED
FOR RELEASE
CSP/HAGBY [REDACTED]
ON [REDACTED]

DIR 05857 (OUT 56010)

0315Z 22 JUN 54

PRIORITY

PREECEDENCE

TO: GUAT (FOR [] FROM []) INFO: SLING CITE: DIR

RYBT/PBSUCCESS

1. [] AND I HAVE GIVEN MOST CAREFUL ATTENTION TO YOUR MESSAGES, PARTICULARLY GUAT 906 (IN 1956) AND GUAT 91 [] (IN 2151). WE HAVE SINCERE RESPECT FOR YOUR JUDGMENT AND OUR FAILURE TO ACT ON YOUR SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATION WAS DUE TO OVERRIDING CONSIDERATIONS. IN THE TYPE OF OPERATIONS WHICH WE CONDUCT THERE ARE CERTAIN LIMITATIONS. WE DO NOT TAKE ACTION WITH GRAVE FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS EXCEPT AS AGENT FOR THE POLICY MAKERS.

2. WE SHARE YOUR APPRAISAL OF CALLIGERIS' ASSETS AND WE RECOGNIZED THIS FROM THE BEGINNING. THE PURPOSE OF THE CALLIGERIS ACTION WAS PRIMARILY TO MAKE A SHOW OF STRENGTH WHICH WOULD GIVE ARMY THE OPPORTUNITY WHICH [] AND OTHERS INDICATED THEY NEEDED. WE FEEL THIS HAS BEEN DONE.

IN FACT THE REPERCUSSIONS OF CALLIGERIS' ACTION TO DATE HAVE BEEN GREATER THAN WE ANTICIPATED. WE FEEL PARTICULAR ACTION RECOMMENDED WOULD PLAY INTO HANDS OF ARBENZ AND CO. AND BE MERELY ANOTHER STUNT. THE FACT THAT THE GUAT CASE HAS BEEN LARGELY DEVELOPED IN THE US AND THROUGH THE PRESS ON THE FALSE BASIS OF BOMBING AND STRAFING AT GUAT CITY, WHICH IS EASILY DISPROVABLE, TENDS TO BEAR THIS OUT.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

YD

~~CLASSIFIED MESSAGE~~

K-5

22 Feb 2013 16:07

RON

PAGE TWO

DIR 05857 (OUT 56010)

PAGE ONE

3. WE CANNOT PUT THE FOREIGN POSTURE OF THE COUNTRY AT THE MERCY OF THE DEMAND OF ONE ARMY OFFICER WHO REFUSES TO ACCEPT OTHER EVIDENCE WHICH SHOULD BE FAR MORE PERSUASIVE THAN ONE BOMB FOR WHICH FOLLOW-UP POTENTIAL DID NOT EXIST. HERE OUR JUDGMENT MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE BEEN CORRECT BUT CIRCUMSTANCES OF SITUATION LEFT US LITTLE ALTERNATIVE.

4. THE DEVELOPING SITUATION, HOWEVER, MAY CREATE FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES WHERE BOMBING OF OIL STORAGE TANKS OR SOME CLEAR MILITARY OBJECTIVES AT C COULD BE CONSIDERED, ALTHOUGH HAVE SOME DOUBTS AS TO OVER-ALL WISDOM OF THIS STEP. WE WILL BE GLAD TO GET YOUR VIEWS.

5. UNLESS SUBSTANTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE ARMY SHOW SIGNS OF COMING OVER THE CALLIGERIS EFFORT MAY WELL BE CRUSHED ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT PROPOSE TO DISCOUNT THIS EFFORT AS YET OR FAIL TO GIVE HIM ALL PRACTICAL AID WITHIN OUR POWER. FOR SOME TIME WE HAVE BEEN APPREHENSIVE THAT HIGH ARMY LEADERS DID NOT LOOK UPON CALLIGERIS WITH GREAT FAVOR AS A POTENTIAL FUTURE LEADER AND MAY PREFER SOMEONE WITHIN THEIR OWN RANKS NOW IN THE COUNTRY. IF SO, OUR NEXT MOVE SHOULD BE TO EXERT ALL POSSIBLE INFLUENCE TO PERSUADE THE ARMY THAT THEIR NEXT TARGET MUST BE ARBENZ HIMSELF IF THEY ARE THEMSELVES TO SURVIVE AND NOT BE REDUCED TO THE STATUS OF AN ORGANIZATION CONTROLLED

SUSTAINABLE FORESTS

SECRET

MS. A.1.1, VOL. 65, PT. 1

ANSWERING QUESTIONS

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111-10-15-8503

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INFO

PAGE THREE

DIR 05857 (991 56010)

BY COMMUNIST COMMISSARS WHILE MORE "TRUSTWORTHY" COMMUNIST ELEMENTS OBTAIN
THE ARMS AND FAVORS OF THE ARBSENZ GOVERNMENT; AND THAT IF THE ARMY ACTS IT,
NOT CALLIGERIS, WILL RULE THE COUNTRY. PLEASE GIVE US YOUR THOUGHTS ON THIS.

6. FOR CHIEF OF STATION: PLEASE PASS YOUR COMMENTS ALONG WITH THOSE
OF []

END OF MESSAGE.



REF ID: A6510

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

DOC 212

Central Intelligence Agency
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
15 October 1979

GU-153-1

Job 79-C1CLT4
Box 145
79-0972
File Name

The Honorable Thomas Farmer
Chairman, Intelligence Oversight Board
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

PBSUCCESS was the project cryptonym for the overthrow of the communist-dominated regime in Guatemala in 1954. An investigation was conducted by the Directorate of Operations Information Management Staff of an assassination plan which surfaced during a review of the PBSUCCESS file. Mr. Kujovich of your staff was informed orally of the initial finding last summer and that an investigation was underway. While this is a distant historical subject beyond the usual purview of the IOB, I reported it because it concerned assassination planning but had not surfaced during the Senate Church Committee investigations and thus could stimulate press interest in the future should it ever become public knowledge. On 14 September, my deputy informed Mr. Kujovich by telephone that the evidence indicated that the plan was not carried out. The following paragraphs describe the issue and findings:

While undertaking a systematic review for declassification of the records of project PBSUCCESS during June-July 1979, the Classification Review Division (CRD), Directorate of Administration, discovered a file entitled "Disposal List - Guatemala". A memorandum in that file seemed to indicate that in September 1952 consideration had been given to killing 58 Guatemalan communists during a military action (presumably an overthrow of the Guatemalan Government) to be carried out by a Guatemalan exile group. The memorandum also called for the exile or imprisonment of 74 other Guatemalan communists. A second memorandum in the file, dated 31 March 1954, representing an updating of older lists, named 34 Guatemalan communists to be disposed of. The discovery of the file was reported by CRD to Chief, Information Management Staff, and in turn by him to the DDCI on 11 June 1979. The Inspector General and the DDCI were also informed.

ORIGINAL CL BY 020904
 DECL FOR REV CR Oct. 1993
EXCL BY 020904
REASON 3(d)3

SECRET//SENSITIVE

~~SECRET//SENSITIVE~~

Following the discovery, further review of project PBSUCCESS records by CRD surfaced an additional folder entitled "[]" and seven other documents which referred to the subject of disposing of or eliminating Guatemalan communists. Two of the documents record conversations with Department of State officials in which the subject is mentioned. In one of these, a 20 March 1954 memorandum for the record, [] reports a meeting in Mr. []'s office with Mr. [] and Mr. [] of the Department of State to discuss the results of a recent OAS conference and project PBSUCCESS. [] asked [] if he had changed his thinking since the conference on the possible methods to get rid of the ARBENZ government. According to [] Mr. [] repeated that in his opinion "the elimination of 30 of those in high positions of the government would bring about its collapse. He then qualified this statement by saying that perhaps even a smaller number, say 20, would be sufficient."

A second memorandum for the record dated 3 June 1954 by Mr. [] reporting discussions held with [] seems to refer to the subject. The two were discussing a memorandum prepared by Mr. [] in which Mr. [] had presented as a possible alternative to the "originally conceived, carefully-timed paramilitary action, should that prove difficult of fulfillment," a contingency (underlining added) alternative of leaflet drops, specific sabotage, and possibly political assassination as a means of persuading the Guatemalan army to move against the regime. Mr. [] reported:

Concerning one very sensitive type of treatment, which was raised directly for the first time by [] in his memo prepared here, [] considered this and ruled it out, at least for the immediate future, on the grounds that it would probably prove to be counter-productive. This decision was not conclusive and [] suggested that we come up with more specific plans both concerning the individual targets, the timing and the statement of the purpose sought to be achieved with respect to each. This would require a fairly solid showing of the advantage to be gained by this type of activity.

There is no indication in the records of project PBSUCCESS, as reviewed by CRD, that the subject of disposal was pursued further. It never received Agency or State Department approval even as a contingency plan. To the contrary, the project as formally approved

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE BY
C.S.I./R.E.C. ON 03/04/55

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SECRET//COMINT C

5-4

by the DCI on 12 November 1953 called for the removal covertly, and without bloodshed if possible (underling added) the menace of the present communist controlled government of Guatemala. The removal was to be accomplished by bringing to bear a series of progressively heavier pressures including propaganda, economic sanctions, sabotage and finally, to the extent necessary, overt military action by a Guatemalan exile force aimed primarily at achieving the defection of the Guatemalan Army which in turn would bring about the President's resignation.

As matters proceeded, not only was there no disposal of communist leaders during the operation, there was none after. The operation was successful in bringing about the defection of the Army. President Arbenz, who resigned in favor of a Junta, took refuge in the Mexican Embassy. Many other government officials sought similar refuge. U.S. Ambassador John E. Purserifoy negotiated a peace between the Junta and Col. Castillo Armas, leader of the Guatemalan exile force. Castillo Armas was subsequently appointed provisional president and allowed all political refugees to leave the country. President Arbenz was granted political asylum in Mexico. One hundred and twenty Guatemalan communists also departed. The above events are matters of public record. As a check, the Information Management Staff traced the names of the 174 Guatemalan communists included in the various disposal lists. In no case did it appear that any of them died as the result of the upheaval in Guatemala.

All portions of the above are classified SECRET. Should you wish further information we can, of course, make the necessary arrangements.

John H. Waller
Inspector General

OIG/[]:hfs (15 October 1979)

Distribution:


Orig. - Adse.
1 - DCI
1 - DCI
1 - OGC
1 - DDO
1 - IG/Subject (IOB File)
1 - IG/Chrono
1 - CAB/Chrono

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3/27/2014

SECRET//COMINT C

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 6 JAN 54



ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR
 FROM : LINCOLN
 ACTION: WH (1-2)
 INFO : DCI (3), D/DCI (4), DD/P (5)

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
 RELEASE AS SANITIZED
 1998

LINC 079 (IN 47095)2059Z 6 JAN 54ROUTINEPRECEDENCE

TO: DIR


CITE: SLINC

PBSUCCESS RYBAT

1. FURTHERANCE ASCHAMS SUGGESTION RE LABOR LEADER TO
 WSBURNT RECOMMEND IDENTITY 1 ASSEMBLE AVAILABLE LABOR DATA ON
 WSBURNT AND PROCEED TO LINCOLN FOR PREPARATION SPECIFIC PLAN
 PLUS AID IN OTHER LABOR KUGORN PLANNING.

2. DESIRE IDEN PLAN TO REMAIN ABOUT 10 DAYS TDY.

END OF MESSAGE



~~CLASSIFIED MESSAGE~~

DATE : 9 JAN 51

~~SECRET~~
~~GOVERNMENT INFORMATION~~

ROUTING			
1		4	
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3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : LINCOLN
ACTION: WH (1-2)
INFO :

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1996

LINC 111 (IN 48045)

18162 9 JAN 54

ROUTINE

TO: DIB

PRECEDENCE
CITE: SLINC

PBSUCCESS/RYBAT

RE: GUAT 959 (IN 47122)

REQUEST LINCOLN BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE SAID MEETING.

END OF MESSAGE

can be learned in 12 for this would
not be practical because of our efforts to
get as much of the practice as much as
possible.

4

~~SECRET~~
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

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DATE : 02 JAN 54

~~SECRET~~

ROUTINE

1	4
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3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LINCOLN

ACTION: KH (1)

INFO : DCI (2), D/DCI (3), DD/P (4)

**CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1996**

LINC 029 (IN 46023) 1646Z 02 JAN 54 ROUTINE

PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR

CITE: SLINC

RE: (IN 45840)

PBSUCCESS/KYBAT

RECOMMEND FULL CABLE REPLY TO REF MESSAGE:

1. P/A SHOULD BE BRIEFED BY CASE OFFICER THAT LATTER REPRESENTS UNOFFICIALLY A GROUP OF U.S. AMERICAN ANTI-COMMUNISTS WHO PREFER TO REMAIN ANONYMOUS. U.S. INTERESTS SHOULD BE PLAYED DOWN.

2. SHORT RANGE OBJECTIVE OF PROJECT WAS DEFINED IN DIR 31729 (OUT 58903) AS SERVING PBSUCCESS. ALLOTMENT OF FUNDS WILL BE MADE IN STAGES AS CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANT.

3. LONG TERM OBJECTIVE MUST AWAIT DEFINITION UNTIL OUTCOME OF PBSUCCESS. INHERENT VALUE KUOKOK ASPECTS OVER LONG PERIOD SHOULD WARRANT CONTINUING AFTER PBSUCCESS AS NEW PROJECT.

4. PRESENT INTENTIONS ARE TO DEVELOP THIS KUOKOK POTENTIAL IN EVENT REQUIRED FOR SPECIAL ASSAULT OPERATIONS WITHIN PBSUCCESS PROGRAM. WHEN AND IF REQUIRED, PROPOSAL WOULD BE MADE TO (CIA) DIA BY AN ENVOY FROM PBSUCCESS WITHOUT REVEALING U.S. INTEREST. ALL DETAILS OF TRAINING, PREPARATION AND DEPLOYMENT WOULD BE HANDLED THOROUGHLY BY PBSUCCESS. YOUR MISSION IS TO DEVELOP GROUP TO BE READY TO ACCEPT SUCH PROPOSITION BY ABOUT MARCH 1954.

~~SECRET~~

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Linc-29 K

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 02 JAN 54

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO :

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

PAGE TWO

LINC 029 (IN 46023)1646Z 02 JAN 54ROUTINEPREFERENCE

5. FOLLOWING PROCEDURES SUGGESTED BY DUNBAR ORALLY TO WIT: DEVELOP AS TIGHT KNIT CLUB, USE WAR BUDDY THEME, THOSE WHO FOUGHT TOGETHER AGAINST COMMUNISM MUST REMAIN VIGILANT IN THEIR OWN HEMISPHERE. CLANDESTINITY SHOULD BE PRACTICED TO AVOID LOCAL COMMUNISTS HAVING KNOWLEDGE THEIR ACTIVITIES. INSTILL SPIRIT OF AGGRESSIVE DEFENDERS OF DEMOCRACY.

6. REMARIES LEFT TO YOUR JUDGMENT TO MEET INDIVIDUAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND SHOULD BE INTERPRETED AS COMPENSATION FOR TIME DEVOTED TO SUBJECT APART FROM REGULAR JOBS. USE AS DEVICE TO ENSURE INDIVIDUAL SUPPORT AND AVOID PERSONAL HARDSHIP. YOU SHOULD AVOID MENTIONING THIS PERIOD AS YOU ARE ALLEGEDLY ONLY REPRESENTING OTHERS BUT ENDEAVOR TO ASSURE CONTINUING INTEREST SO LONG AS MENACE EXISTS.

7. CABLE WEEKLY PROGRESS REPORT INTO "SLINC" CONTAINING SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS AND YOUR COMMENTS. DO NOT SPECIFICALLY REVEAL DIAFFAIRS UNTIL SO DIRECTED."

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

25 JAN 54

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR
 COM : LINCOLN
 ACTION: WH (1-2)
 INFO : DCI (3), D/DCI (4), DD/P (L)(5)

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
 RELEASE AS SANITIZED
 1996

LINC 226 (IN 11923) 0650Z 25 JAN 54

PRIORITY
PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR INFO: SQUAT
 RE: LINC 186 (IN 10969)
 PBSUCCESS RYBAT

CITE: SLING

1.

... LEARNED AND MADE FOLLOWING CONTACTS
 IN WASHINGTON:

A. DEPARTMENT OF STATE: UNNAMED "CHIEF OF INVESTIGATIONS" HANDLED CASE AND FACILITATED INTRODUCTIONS VARIOUS CONGRESSIONAL AND DIPLOMATIC OFFICIALS. PROMISED NO U.S. GOVT AID, DESPITE THEIR PROMISE TO RID WSBURNT OF COMMUNISTS.

B. SENATORS McCARTHY, MUNDT, AND WILEY SHOWED INTEREST IN CAUSE BUT OFFERED NO FINANCIAL AID. DCI REQUESTED 500,000 DOLLARS FROM McCARTHY BUT ON BEING QUESTIONED CAPACITY ACTION QUICKLY REDUCED DEMANDS TO BEDROCK LEVEL 200,000 DOLLARS. ONLY CAPABILITY WAS CIVILIAN DEMONSTRATIONS PLUS EVENTUAL INSTALLATION PROPER MILITARY LEADER WHO CONFESSED WOULD BE CALLIGERIS

C. UNNAMED POWERFUL TEXAS OILMEN AND REPRESENTATIVES AMERICAN SHIPPING COMPANIES: BOTH GROUPS ALLEGEDLY GREATLY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

25 JAN 54

LINC 226 (IN 11923)

PAGE -2-

INTERESTED IN WSBURNT. PROMISED THEM SPECIAL OIL AND PORT-DOCKING CONCESSIONS IN RETURN FOR FINANCIAL AID. NO DEFINITE AFFIRMATIVE ANSWER GIVEN.

D. DIPLOMATIC REPS TRUJILLO AND VENEZUELA WERE ASKED TO SUPPLY MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES. IN RETURN PROMISED FUTURE AID AGAINST COSTA RICA.

2. ADMITTED NO OFFERS MATERIALIZED ALTHOUGH HE REMAINED NEW ORLEANS TO WAIT UNTIL 22 JAN FOR CONTACT BY GROUP ONE C. ADVISED WILL RETURN WASH TO PURSUE CONTACTS IF NO ACTION FORTHCOMING.

3. SIGNIFICANT NOT INTERESTED FORM NEW GOVERNMENT TO BE SPONSORED BY ALLEGED GROUP.

OPINION MOTIVATED PURELY BY PERSONAL AMBITION AND EVIDENCE BROAD PROMISES MADE VARIOUS GROUPS CONFIRMS FACT.

4. APPARENTLY HAS NO INFO RE: OFFER BY EUROPEANS.

5. REPORT FOLLOWS.

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 26 JAN 54

~~SECRET~~

ROUTINE

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LINCOLN

ACTION: WH (1-2)

INFO : DCI (3), D/DCI (4), DD/P (L)(5)

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1996

LINC 244 (IN 12247)

0759Z 26 JAN 54

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR

CITE: SLING

PBSUCCESS/RYBAT

IMMEDIATE ACTION

1. HEREWITH PROPOSED AGENDA -CALLIGERIS MTG FOR
REVIEW HQS TUESDAY MTG. MYLKES DISCUSSING WITH PRIOR
-C MTG TO OBTAIN HIS VIEW FOR AGENDA.

2. AT C- MTG, IS TO APPEAR AS SPOKESMAN IN OWN RIGHT.
DESIRE ASSUME POSITION AS LEADER OF MOVEMENT AND SO RECOGNIZED
BY "GROUP". (PURPOSE-TO DETERMINE EARLY WHO IS LEADER) AT MTG,
MYLKES TO APPEAR ONLY BRIEFLY AS "GROUP" LIAISON MAN.

3. AGENDA, PART 1:

A. INTRODUCTORY, EMPHASIZES PURPOSE OF MTG IS FIRMING
UP PLANS AND IDEAS-STRESSING UNITY. ENEMY WANTS TO SPLIT
NOTHING MUST COME BETWEEN THEM.

B. REVIEW RECENT EVENTS. REPORTS HIS IMPRESSIONS
GROUP ACCOMPLISHMENTS. C REPORTS FIELD ACTIVITIES. EMPHASIZES
IMPORTANCE C ACCOUNT FUNDS ADVANCED; GROUP WILL ENSURE WHATEVER
NEEDED, BUT ONLY IF SURE USED WISELY; ACCOUNTING IN -C INTEREST.

~~SECRET~~

/ K

~~SECRET~~

26 JAN 54

LINC 244 (IN 12247)

PAGE 2

C. REVIEW MAJOR COMMITMENTS. 1ST, DOMESTIC: KUFIRE,
KUGOWN, ASSETS, OTHERS. 2ND, FOREIGN:

C/111

D. CAUTIONS AGAINST FOREIGN COMMITMENTS OTHER THAN
GROUP, ON FOLLOWING GROUNDS: MAY BE ILLUSIONARY, MAY BE PRO-
VOCATIONS, MAY HAVE TOO MANY STRINGS ATTACHED. SPECIFICALLY,
-C SHOULD NOT OBLIGATE THEMSELVES ASSIST

SHOULD NOT ACCEPT OFFICIAL AID FROM
SINCE MIGHT LEAD WAR AND BLOODBATH IN
WSBURNT. OTHER OFFERS ROLLING IN NOW ONLY BECAUSE GROUP HAS
STARTED BANDWAGON. IF C HAS FOREIGN OFFERS WITHOUT TOO MANY
STRINGS, THEY WOULD BE ENCOURAGED FOR SUPPLEMENTATION PRESENT
PROGRAM.

E. IN LIGHT OF ABOVE, -C REVIEW ASSETS, REAL AND
POTENTIAL.

F. REVIEWS GROUP POSITION AS HE SEES IT: GROUP WILL
SEE THROUGH TO VICTORY; GROUP WILL RENDER NECESSARY
FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE; GROUP EXPECTS NO REIMBURSE-
MENT OF FUNDS; GROUP HAS NO STRINGS EXCEPT PRO-DEMOCRACY; ANY
ACTIONS TAKEN BY GROUP ADVISERS IN FIELD WILL HAVE BEEN CLEARED
C; ANY PROBLEMS TO BE SETTLED BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT
BETWEEN -C AND GROUP.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

26 JAN 54

LINC 244 (IN 12247)

PAGE -3-

4. IF ABOVE REVIEW SHOWS AGREEMENT ~~1 C,~~
AND BETWEEN -C PLANS AND GROUP, PROCEED TO AGENDA, PART 2.

5. AGENDA, PART 2:

A. POLITICAL UNIFICATION.

B. MILITARY STRATEGY: HAVING GREATER POTENTIAL
NUMERICAL STRENGTH BUT LESS UNITY, DISCIPLINE AND ARMS, ANTI-
COMMUNISTS MUST EMPLOY UNCONVENTIONAL METHODS AND TECHNIQUES TO
OFFSET ENEMY'S ADVANTAGES; PARTISAN FORCES, SABOTAGE, ASSAULT OR
SHOCK TEAMS, PSY-WAR ETC.

TACTICS: SPECIFIC TARGETS-GARRISONED CITIES(9). PRI-
MARY TARGETS-THOSE ACCESSIBLE WOULD BE SEIZED (4). SECONDARY
TARGETS-THOSE INACCESSIBLE WOULD BE ISOLATED (4). CAPITAL WOULD
AWAIT CONSOLIDATION AND MOBILIZATION BEFORE ATTACKED MEANWHILE
SUBJECTED INTERNAL HARASSMENT.

LOGISTICS: UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE EQUIPMENT AND METHODS
WITH STANDBY BLACK AIR RESUPPLY.

C. FINANCIAL PROCEDURES. C TO ESTIMATE FORTHCOMING
REQUIREMENTS. TO EXPLAIN GROUP PLANS TO COMPARTMENT DIS-
BURSEMENTS THROUGH ADVISERS IN FIELD. DISCUSS MINIMUM PROCEDURES
FOR ACCOUNTABILITY FUNDS.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

26 JAN 54

LINC 244 (IN 12247)

PAGE -4-

D. COMMO. STATES GROUP WILL PROVIDE -C SECURE CABLE, MAIL FACILITIES AND CONTACTS WITH ALL ASSETS IN CENTRAL AMERICA. AFTER TNG RADIO OPS, THEIR INFO GOES FROM TO C. IN TACTICAL STAGE, RADIO OPS WORK DIRECTLY TO C, (FYI-THIS OUR VERSION TO THEM).

E. POST-REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONAL PLANS. DISCUSS GENERALLY AS REQUIRED FOR KUGONN PURPOSES.

F. REVIEW ALL FOREGOING SPECIFICS TO TIE DOWN WHO DOES WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, AND HOW.

6. APPRECIATE HQS COMMENTS ABOVE IN 26 JAN TELECON TO PERMIT FINAL BRIEFING

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ROUTING

DATE : 26 JAN 54

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LINCOLN

ACTION: WH (1-2)

INFO :

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1996

LINC 252 (IN 12565)0023Z 27 JAN 54ROUTINEPRECEDENCE

TO: DIR

CITE: SLINC

IMMEDIATE ACTION

RYBAT PBSUCCESS

1. REQUEST APPROVAL BY PRIORITY CABLE FOLL KUGOWN GUIDANCE
RE RECENT ARRESTS BY WSBURNT GOVT FOR LINC RELEASE.

2. TO GUAT:

A. IN ACCORDANCE PBSUCCESS STAGE 2 OBJECTIVE B TO
"CREATE DISSENSION AND DEFLECTION WITHIN TARGET", ATTEMPT PLACE
RUMOR THAT ARRESTED MEN ARE UNIMPORTANT. REAL LEADERS OPPOSITION
SECURE IN ENTOURAGES ARBENZ, FORTUNY.

B. FOR OBJECTIVE C TO "DISCREDIT TARGET AT HOME AND
ABROAD", SUGGEST ESSENCE PUBLICATION STRESS FEAR, NERVOUSNESS,
DIVISION IN WSBURNT GOVERNMENT. EXAMPLES ARE DIAZ STATEMENT
THAT ALL IS WELL AND MARTINEZ FLIGHT. THIS FEAR LED TO HASTY,
TERRORISTIC ARRESTS AND IS SIGN WEAKNESS.

C. FOR OBJECTIVE D TO "DEMONSTRATE INABILITY TARGET
REGIME REPRESENT BEST INTERESTS OF PEOPLE", SUGGEST ANTI-COMMIE
PRESS ATTACK TERRORISM AS COVER-UP FOR COMMIE COUP PLANS. ALSO

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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26 JAN 54

LINC 252 (IN 12565)

PAGE -2-

HAVE PRESS NOTE COINCIDENCE THAT SOON AFTER SOVIET PRESS GAVE
WSBURNT HEAVY SUPPORT, WSBURNT GOVT MADE RANDOM ARRESTS JUST TO
LOOK GOOD IN SOVIET EYES.

D. FOR OBJECTIVE E TO "CREATE HOPE AND ENCOURAGE
PATIENCE AMONG NON-COMMUNISTS", SUGGEST ESSENCE GROUP AND
PUBLICATION COUNSEL GREAT CALM, NOTE THAT ANTI-COMMIE STRENGTH
UNAFFECTED, THAT RESISTANCE ACTUALLY THRIVES ON REPRESSION.

3. TO :

A. FOR OBJECTIVE B, IF CUT-OUTS AVAILABLE, SUGGEST
PASS TO SALV PRESS AND RUFUS CONTROLLED RADIO YAXA FOLLOWING
STORY: DECISION TO MAKE ARRESTS MADE BY ARBENZ AND PELLECER.
ARBENZ LETTING ARMY FRIENDS DOWN COMPLETELY, AS WITNESS DIAZ
IGNORANCE ARRESTS AND MARTINEZ FLIGHT. PELLECER CONVINCED
ARBENZ BY COMBINATION BLACKMAIL, FAST TALK, THREATS MOSCOW
REPRISAL IF "EXEMPLARY ARRESTS" NOT MADE. PELLECER TRYING TO
REST PGT POLICY CONTROL FROM FORTUNY, LABOR CONTROL FROM GUTIERREZ.

B. COULD ALSO PLUG LINE ANTI-COMMIES
UNHURT, RESISTANCE THRIVING ON REPRESSION.

C. USE SGUAT THEMES AS FEASIBLE.

4. TO

A. FOR DECEPTION PURPOSES, SUGGEST PLANT STORY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

26 JAN 54

LINC 252 (IN 12565)

PAGE -3-

ALLEGEDLY EMANATING MEXICO WSBURNT EXILES, SAYING HOPE OF
LIBERATING WSBURNT NOW GREATLY DIMINISHED.

C. USE SQUAT THEMES AS FEASIBLE.

5. TO DIR:

COULD QUACID INSPIRE STORY IN ODOYKE PRESS THAT PRESENT
WSBURNT TERRORISM DOCUMENTS ACCUSATIONS THAT MAY BE LEVELED AT
WSBURNT AT OAS CONFERENCE?

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~


Mo

Your wife and return. This would seem to be in conflict with our approach to the problem in the letter despatched to London 26 Jan. On that message we suggested that normal operating procedure be the rule to avoid attracting undue attention to the project.

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1998

~~CLASSIFIED MESSAGE~~

DATE : 27 JAN 54



ROUTING	
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2	5
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TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : LINCOLN
ACTION: WH (1-2)
INFO : DCI (3), D/DCI (4), DD/P (5) (L)

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1996

LINC 262 (IN 12616) 05547 27 JAN 54 ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: SGUAT INFO: DIR CITE: SLINC


PBSUCCESS RYBAT

REF: A. GUAT 010 (IN 11643)
B. GUAT 021 (IN 12233)
C. GUAT 011 (IN 11697)
D. GUAT 019 (IN 12165)
E. DIR 35756 (OUT 66008)

1. REF A: ASSUME YOU WERE IN NO POSITION TO INFLUENCE
... OR INFORM LINC PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE AS LINC CANNOT
CONSIDER FAVORABLY THE CROSSING OF OPERATIONS REPRESENTED THIS
INSTANCE.

2. FYI: SEEKFORD REPORTED (23 JAN, ' (IN 11696) AS
BELIEVED TO BE "VISITED CALLIGERIS REF AS
PERSONAL FRIEND AND SPOKESMAN JMBUG. OFFERED FUNDS, OTHER HELP
AND PLANS VISIT CALLIGERIS HONDURAS 26 JAN".

3. BELIEVE YOUR PARA 1, REF B "PERTURBED BY CONTINUED LOCAL
CONTACT ODACID-CALLIGERIS GROUP", EXPRESSES VIEWS OF LINC AND
APPLIES TO ABOVE.



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~~SECRET~~

27 JAN 54

LINC 262 (IN 12616)

PAGE -2-

4. LINC ENDEAVORING ESTABLISH OPERATIONAL CONTROLS AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE AND NOW UTILIZING MAXIMUM SECURITY PRE-CAUTIONS IN ODOYKE; ALSO DESIRES COMPARTMENTALIZE FIELD OPERATIONS WHEN FULLY OPERATIONAL; THUS ADVENT OF ODACID AGENT INTO SITUATION COMPLICATES MATTERS FURTHER.

5. LINC SEES NO NEED FOR ODACID TO MAINTAIN CONTACT ABOVE MANNER WITH KUBARK AGENT, CALLIGERIS, BUT FEELS WEAKENS SECURITY AND CONTROL. LINC CONCURS FULLY WITH REF C AND CONTEMPLATED PRECISE ACTION WHICH IS ESSENTIAL THROUGHOUT PBSUCCESS. IT INCUMBENT ALL PBSUCCESS PERSONNEL TO PROTECT THEIR OPERATIONS AND ODACID TO AVOID IMPLICATION.

6. LINC WILL QUERY CALLIGERIS UPON ARRIVAL AND UNLESS SERVICES NEEDED IN PBSUCCESS AND ACCEPTABLE TO LINC AN EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO ISOLATE HIM THEREAFTER. BELIEVE PERTIN THAT YOU INFORM ODACID SOURCE (REF A) OF PARA 2 ABOVE IN LIGHT OF YOUR REF C. ADVISE.

7. RE PARA 2 REF B, LINC CONCURS IN REF E AND RECOMMENDS NO CHANGE IN ODACID DECORUM, ASIDE FROM ABOVE.

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

DATE : 27 JAN 54

~~SECRET~~

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : LINCOLN
ACTION: WH (1-2)
INFO : SO (3)

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1995

File

LINC 270 (IN 12905)

2023Z 27 JAN 54

ROUTINE
PRIORITY

TO: DIR

CITE: SLINC

RE: A. SLINC 144 (IN 19471)

B. GUAT 971 (IN 17832)

PBSUCCESS RYBAT SECUR

CONNIEF TO LANGLOUGH

1. REQUEST STATUS OF SPECIAL INQUIRY REQUESTED IN PARAGRAPH
2 REF A.

2. INFO URGENTLY NEEDED TO EFFECT DISPOSITION OF SUBJECT
WHOSE PRESENCE IN GUAT MAY JEOPARDIZE SITUATION PARTICULARLY IN
VIEW OF RECENT ACTION TAKEN BY WSBURNT AGAINST SEQUIN AND SECUR.

3. ACCORDING TO REF B SEQUIN WAS IN WEEKLY CONTACT WITH
SUBJECT.

END OF MESSAGE

NOTE: partially answered by
"in (our) _____)
which said very unreliable &
thoroughly bad character.

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

REF ID: A61451

ROUTING

DATE : 30 JAN 54

REF ID: A61451
SECRET

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : LINCOLN
ACTION: WH (1-2)
INFO : DCI (3), D/DCI (4), DO/P (L)(5)CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1996

File

LINC 298 (IN 13906) 1215Z 30 JAN 54 OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR

CITE: SLING

REF: LINC 297 (IN 13896) } (PARA 5 A)

PSSUCCESS RYBAT

1. FOR MAXIMUM EFFECT URGE FULLEST CONSIDERATION IMMEDIATE REPRODUCTION IN LEAFLET FORM AND BLACK AIR DROP OVER TARGET CITY NIGHT OF 30 JAN. QUANTITY TO BE DETERMINED BY DISCHARGING CAPACITY OF AIRCRAFT I.E. TWO PASSES HIGH ALTITUDE OVER TARGET. FOLLOW EXAMPLE, CEUAGE HANDBILL PREVIOUSLY USED FOR BORMAT.

2. IF TEXT APPROVED REQUEST APPROVAL BY TELEPHONE TO PROCEED WITH PREPARATION VOICE TAPE AND PLANNING FOR SHIPMENT TO ALL POSSIBLE MIDDLE AMERICAN POINTS FOR RADIO TRANSMISSION AND PRESS REPRODUCTION. HQS PLS ADVISE POINTS WHERE OUTLETS READILY AVAILABLE AND APPROPRIATE ADDRESSES.

3. *logged* C EXTREMELY ANXIOUS THIS MESSAGE REACH PEOPLE SOON AS POSSIBLE TO OFFSET DEPRESSING EFFECT WHITE PAPER. IF SUCCESSFUL ON TIME BASIS THEY STRONGLY BELIEVE REACTION WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT IN ESTABLISHING THEIR LEADERSHIP PLUS CAPITALIZING ON STATURE GIVEN TO THEIR ORGANIZATION BY PUBLICATION WHITE PAPER.

REF ID: A61451
SECRETREF ID: A61451
SECRET

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~~SECRET~~

50 JAN 54

LINC 298 (IN 13906)

♦

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4. TEXT IS AS FOLLOWS:

DECLARACIONES DEL CORONEL CARLOS CASTILLO ARMAS

COMO SE SIGUE: (Castillo Armas, Correo de la Lucha, 1954)

COMPATRIOTAS: HA LLEGADO A MI CONOCIMIENTO LA NOTICIA QUE LA OFICINA DE PUBLICIDAD DEL GOBIERNO DE GUATEMALA HA DECLARADO A LA PRENSA LA EXISTENCIA DE UN COMPLÒT EN EL CUAL SE ME SENALA COMO CABECILLA. EL PUEBLO DE GUATEMALA HA LLEGADO YA A FAMILIARIZARSE CON LOS ACTOS DE UN GOBIERNO QUE, APOYADO POR EL COMUNISMO INTERNACIONAL, HA TRAICIONADO A LA NACION, ENTREGANDOLA A LOS DICTADOS DEL IMPERIALISMO SOVIETICO.

QUE NUEVAS FALSEDADES SE CONSIGNAN EN EL PAPEL BLANCO QUE CONTIENE TAL DECLARACION? A DONDE VA EL GOBIERNO CON LA INVENCION DE ESTA OTRO FANTASTICO COMPLÒT? QUE PROPOSITOS SE PERSIGUEN AL INCHUPAR A GOBIERNOS Y PUEBLOS HERMANOS CONSTANTEMENTE CON LA RESPONSABILIDAD DE CONSPIRACIONES IMAGINARIAS? POR QUE ESOS GRITOS DE INTERVENCION EXTRANJERA Y DE INVASIONES DE EJERCITOS MERCENARIOS A NUESTRO SUELO? QUE PERSIGUE ESTA FRENETICA PROPAGANDA ARBENZ-COMUNISTA? SON ACASO MANIFESTACIONES DE UN GOBIERNO FUERTE QUE CUENTA CON EL RESPALDO DE NUESTRO PUEBLO? NO, ABSOLUTAMENTE NO.

LA DECLARACION QUE CONSTITUYE UN PAPEL BLANCO, LEJOS DE ACOBARDAR A LAS GRANDES MAYORIAS, COMO SE INTENTA, ROBUSTECE LA

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

30 JAN 54

LINC 298 (IN 13906)

PAGE -3-

FE DE QUE YA SE APROXIMA LA HORA DE LA SALVACION DE GUATEMALA. EL PROPIO GOBIERNO ESTA DEMOSTRANDO SU DEBILIDAD, SU MIEDO PATOLOGICO, SU TERROR, SU PANICO, SIENTE QUE SUS HORAS ESTAN CONTADAS Y EL TERROR A SU DERRUMBAMIENTO, LO LLEVA A LA DEMENCIA, Y EN SU LOCURA CONCIRE Y SIENTE ENORMES AMENAZAS POR TODAS PARTES.

ESTE PAPEL BLANCO ES LA BANDERA BLANCA QUE ESTA ENARBOLANDO EL ACTUAL GOBIERNO ANTE LA DERROTA QUE SE APROXIMA CADA DIA MAS. COMPATRIOTAS: ES VERDAD QUE HAY UNA GRAN CONSPIRACION CONTRA EL GOBIERNO COMUNISTA DE NUESTRO PAIS. -PERO TAL CONSPIRACION SE ANIDA EN EL CORAZON DE CADA CIUDADANO HONRADO, ES DECIR, EN MAS DEL 95 POR CIENTO DE LOS GUATEMALTECOS, QUE NO PUEDEN CONFORMARSE CON LA TRAICION DE LOS HOMBRES QUE NOS GOBIERNAN Y QUE HAN ENTREGADO EL PAIS AL CONTROL Y DOMINIO DEL COMUNISMO INTERNACIONAL. ES TIMBRE DE HONOR QUE SE NOS LLAME CONSPIRADORES, PORQUE CONSPIRAMOS CONTRA EL IMPERIALISMO SOVIETICO; PORQUE CONSPIRAMOS CONTRA UN REGIMEN QUE ESTA DESTRUYENDO EL PAIS; PORQUE CONSPIRAMOS CONTRA QUIENES NOS ARREBATAN NUESTRA POSICION Y DIGNIDAD DE HOMBRES LIBRES PARA CONVERTIRNOS EN ESCLAVOS; PORQUE CONSPIRAMOS CONTRA LOS QUE ATENTAN DESTRUIR NUESTROS PRINCIPIOS MORALES Y RELIGIOSOS PARA IMPONERNOS EL ETEISMO Y LA BARBARIE; PORQUE CONSPIRAMOS, EN FIN, CONTRA TODO AQUELLO QUE REPRESENTE EL ABSURDO Y LA NEGATIVIDAD DEL COMUNISMO.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION~~

DATE : 30 JAN 54

~~SECRET~~

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TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : LINCOLN
ACTION: WH (1-2)
INFO : DCI (3), D/DCI (4), DD/P (L) (5)

Silo

LINC 298 (IN 13936) 1345Z 30 JAN 54 OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

NOTIFICATION

TO: DIR CITE: -SLING

FINAL SECTION OF TWO

PASUCCESS RYBAT

EL FIRME PROPOSITO DE DERROCAR EL GOBIERNO COMUNISTA QUE ESCLAVIZA A NUESTRO PAIS NO ESTA INSPIRADO POR MACIONES EXTRANJERAS NACE EN LAS ENTRANAS MAS PROFUNDAS DEL PAIS, EN LOS CORAZONES DE LOS HOMBRES Y MUJERES QUE INTEGRAN EL PUEBLO.- PERMANEZCAMOS DE PIE, DISPUESTOS A LUCHAR; QUE NO NOS ARREDREN LAS ACCUSACIONES, LOS ATROPELLOS, LOS SUPLICIOS, NI NINGUN OTRO ACTO SALVAJE CONTRA NUESTRA INTEGRIDAD FISICA Y MORAL.- LA SALVACION DE LA PATRIA EXIGE SACRIFICIOS Y TODOS DEBEMOS ESTAR DISPUESTOS A SER INMOLADOS EN NUESTRA LUCHA POR LA LIBERACION NACIONAL.-

COMPATRIOTAS: EL GOBIERNO HA LEVANTADO UNA BANDERA BLANCA TRATANDO DE CUBRIR CON ELLA SU TRAICION A LA PATRIA.- NO NOS DEJEMOS ENGANAR, CON LAS MENTIRAS Y EMBUSTES TRAS LOS CUALES SE PRETENDE OCULTAR LA GRAN TRAGEDIA QUE PADECE LA REPUBLICA.-

COMO YA DIJE, MANTENGAMOSNOS FIRMES EN LA LUCHA, CADA UNO EN SU PUESTO DE COMBATE Y RESUELTOS A TODA CLASE DE SACRIFICIOS.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

30 JAN 54

LING 298 (IN 13906)

PAGE -2- OF FINAL SECTION OF TWO

QUE LAS FALSAS ACUSACIONES, NI LOS ACTOS DE ARBITRAJERIA NO DOBLEGUEN NUESTRO ESPIRITU.-TENGAMOS FE EN NOSOTROS MISMOS Y SI DENTRO DE ESA FE COMBATIMOS POR LA LIBERACION DE GUATEMALA, TENGAMOS LA SEGURIDAD DE QUE MUY PRONTO LA PATRIA SE HABRA SALVADO.-QUE NUESTRO LEMA SEA: TODO POR LA SALVACION DE GUATEMALA.

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 31 JAN 54

~~SECRET~~

ROUTINE

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TO : DIRECTOR CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
 FROM : LINCOLN RELEASE AS SANITIZED
 ACTION: WH (1-2) 1996 *fib*
 INFO : DCI (3), D/DCI (4), DD/P (L)(5)

LINC 311 (IN 14062) 03577-31 JAN 54 OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
 PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR CITE: SLINC
 PBSUCCESS RYBAT
 RE: DIR 36511 (OUT 67267)

1. IN FULL DISCUSSION WITH MYLKES RE POSSIBLE SOURCES
 WHITE PAPER INFO, CALLIGERIS NAMED IN ORDER: ✓
DELGADO, CAPTAIN RAUL SIERRA, AND SEEKFORD. HE DEVOTED
 CONSIDERABLE TIME TO SPECULATION THAT COULD BE WITTING
 OR UNWITTING SOURCES, BUT COULD GIVE NO MOTIVES FOR SUCH ACTION
 ON THEIR PART. WHEN DIRECTLY QUESTIONED WHY HE HAD NAMED SEEKFORD,
 C REPLIED HAD ONCE TOLD HIM SEEKFORD SECURITY RISK. C
 THEN ADDED HE HIMSELF HAD FULLEST CONFIDENCE IN SEEKFORD. C EXTREMELY
 RELUCTANT TO CONSIDER DELGADO OR SIERRA AS SOURCES, DESPITE HIS
 OWN ADMISSION THAT BOTH KNEW VIRTUALLY ALL HIS PLANS, INCLUDING
 MOST SENSITIVE ITEMS OF WHITE PAPER.

2. CALLIGERIS OBLIQUELY DECLINED TO DIVULGE SIERRA'S TRUE
 NAME TO MYLKES. (NOTE SIERRA ACTION RE KUCLUB TNG SIERRA REPORTED
 SCRANTON #02 (IN 14032). NOTE ALSO SEEKFORD REQUEST POC ON SIERRA
 IN ALIAS PER (IN 46103).

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

31 JAN 54

LINC 311 (IN 14062)

PAGE -2-

3. CALLIGERIS INDICATED TO MYLKE'S HIS DISLIKE OF LUGTON'S REQUESTS FOR BIO DATA ON PERSONNEL IN HIS INTELLIGENCE NETS.

4. WHEN MYLKE'S POINTED OUT THAT DELGADO AND SIERRA WERE ALSO ON STAFF FOR TWO PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS WHICH WERE COMPROMISED AT CRUCIAL JUNCTURES, CALLIGERIS FAILED TO RESPOND DIRECTLY. HE REPLIED THAT GROUP MUST ALSO CONSIDER BOTH AND SEEKFORD AS DEFINITELY POSSIBLE SOURCES OF WHITE PAPER.

5. ABOVE WOULD PERHAPS NOT ORDINARILY RAISE DOUBTS CALLIGERIS LOYALTY OR MOTIVATION AND MIGHT BE INTERPRETED AS PRIDE OR RETICENCE. HOWEVER, IN PRESENT SITUATION, FULLEST OBJECTIVITY, CANDOR AND STRAIGHT TALK ARE REQUIRED OF ALL CONCERNED. ABOVE CALLIGERIS REPLIES EITHER FAIL TO MEET SUCH STANDARDS OR SUGGEST INABILITY OF CALLIGERIS TO FACE SITUATION REALISTICALLY.

6. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE THE OBJECTIVE CONSIDERATIONS THAT:

A. CALLIGERIS HIMSELF HAS NOW BEEN ENGAGED IN THREE COMPROMISED ATTEMPTS.

B. KUBARK HAS INVESTED HEAVILY, FINANCIALLY AND OTHERWISE, IN CALLIGERIS.

C. KUBARK NEEDS FULLEST INFORMATION ON EVENTS LEADING TO PRESENT SITUATION.

7. IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, LINCOLN CONSIDERS IT

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31 JAN 54

LINC 311 (IN 14062)

PAGE -3-

IMPERATIVE THAT HQS GIVE MOST SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO LOFLUTTER FOR CALLIGERIS SOONEST. LINCOLN BELIEVES IT VIRTUALLY UNFEASIBLE TO TAKE THE BASIC DECISIONS SCHEDULED FOR 1 FEB 54 WITHOUT THE EVIDENCE OBTAINABLE THROUGH LOFLUTTER ON THE INTEGRITY OF CALLIGERIS.

8. LINCOLN IS WELL AWARE OF SIGNIFICANCE OF LOFLUTTER AT THIS POINT. CALLIGERIS MAY REFUSE, THUS TERMINATING THEIR PARTICIPATION IN OPERATION, SINCE TO KEEP THEM ON AFTER SUCH REFUSAL WOULD ELIMINATE ANY CHANCE OF CONTROL. LINCOLN CONSIDERS THIS RISK MUCH LESS WEIGHTY THAN THE DANGER OF MAKING KUBARK DECISIONS ON LESS THAN MAXIMUM AVAILABLE EVIDENCE.

9. IN ORDER MINIMIZE POSSIBILITY AFFRONTING CALLIGERIS PRIDE, LINCOLN RECOMMENDS FOLLOWING APPROACH:

A. DISCUSS WITH FIRST, AS INDIVIDUAL LESS INVOLVED OPERATIONAL DETAILS.

B. EXPLAIN TO .. NEED TO APPLY EVERY PRECAUTION PRIOR TO NEW START, PRECAUTIONS BEGINNING AT TOP.

C. EXPLAIN TO THAT MANY PBPRIME COMMERCIAL FIRMS USE LOFLUTTER.

D. EXPLAIN TO LOFLUTTER HAS BEEN USED ON ALL KEY AMERICAN PERSONNEL AND IT THEREFORE CONSISTENT FOR HIM AND

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

31 JAN 54

LINC 311 (IN 14062)

PAGE -4-

CALLIGERIS TO DO SO.

E. IF PERSUADED, HAVE HIM PERSUADE CALLIGERIS.

10. IF LOFLUTTER APPROVED, MYLKS WILL ATTEMPT OBTAIN
ACQUIESCE CALLIGERIS.

11. RECOMMEND LOFLUTTER TEAM BE DISPATCHED LINCOLN IMMEDIATELY. OPERATOR SHOULD BE MOST COMPETENT, AND, IF POSSIBLE, SPEAK SPANISH. UPON RECEIPT ETA, LINCOLN WILL PROVIDE CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS.

12. FYI: ALTHOUGH REQUEST IN EARLY DECEMBER, NO SECURITY CLEARANCES HAVE BEEN RECEIVED ON C TO DATE.

END OF MESSAGE

CABLE SECRETARIAL COMMENT: TEMPO COPY OF THIS MESSAGE ISSUED TO MR. ESTERLINE, WH, 4448, AT 1130, 30 JAN 54.

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

DATE : 31 JAN 54

ROUTINE	ROUTINE
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : LINCOLN
ACTION: WH (1-2)
INFO : DCI (3), D/DCI (4), DD/P (L)(5)

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1996

File

LINC 318 (IN 14083) 0643Z 31 JAN 54

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR INFO: SGUAT CITE: SLINC
RE: LINC 274 (IN 12997), (IN 14045)
PBSUCCESS BYBAT

1. LINC CONSIDERED AVAILABLE INFORMATION ADEQUATE TO
DEDUCE CONCLUSION LINC 274. UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES AND URGENT
NEED TO ELIMINATE ALL POTENTIAL DANGERS TO PBSUCCESS LINC
UNWILLING TAKE CHANCE.

2. BELIEVE CONFIRMS DEDUCTION. IF SO BELIEVE,
CAREFUL EXAMINATION HYPOCAUST REPORTING WARRANTED.

3. NOTE TOGETHER WITH DELGADO, PANAMANIAN COMMERCIAL
ATTACHE, NICARAGUA, THIS CASE MAKES TWO SUCH DIPLOMATS IN
DISBURN PAY.

END OF MESSAGE

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COMINT/INT/NSA/NSC/CIA

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

DATE : 31 JAN 54

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LINCOLN

ACTION: WH (1-2)*

INFO : DCI (3), D/DCI (4), DD/P (L) (5)

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1998

LINC 323 (IN 14166)

2119Z 31 JAN 54

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR

CITE: SLINC

RE: A. DIR 36514 (OUT 67270), PARA 4B
 B. LINC 297 (IN 13896), PARA 5B
 C. (IN 14061)
 D. SCRANTON 002 (IN 14032), PARA 5
 E. (IN 14107)
 F. LINC 307 (IN 14037)

PBSUCCESS RYBAT

1. RECOMMENDATION IN REF B WAS PREDICTED ON POSSIBLE NEED
 TO ENCOURAGE TO MAKE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC REPLY TO WHITE
 PAPER. HOWE HAS ABLY DONE THIS ON HIS OWN

2. LINCOLN FEELS THAT APPROPRIATE FOLLOW-UP IS NOW DESIRABLE.
 3. IN VIEW PAST REQUESTS FOR NOD FROM "BIG BROTHER,"
 IT MAY BE APPROPRIATE TO HAVE APPROPRIATE ODACIO REPRESENTATIVE CALL
 ON HIM INFORMALLY TO CHUCKLE OVER WHITE PAPER AND INQUIRE WHAT NEWS
 AMB TO WSBURNT HAS BROUGHT. IN COURSE CONVERSATION, ODACIO
 REP COULD DROP REMARK THAT OF COURSE HAD FREE COUNTRY AND

SECRET

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K

31 JAN 54

~~SECRET~~

LINC 323 (IN 14165)

PAGE -2-

1. NATURALLY WOULD EXTEND ASYLUM TO PERSECUTED IF NECESSARY.

ODACID REP COULD ADD, APROPOS OF NOTHING MUCH, THAT ODOYKE HAD A PUBLIC POLICY OF RECRUITING SELECTED IRON CURTAIN REFUGEES INTO ITS ARMY.

4. ON OPERATIONAL SIDE, APPEARS TO BE TAKING PROPER PRECAUTIONS (REFS D AND C) AND STANDING GROUND. IN VIEW NEED TO KNOW HE NOT LEFT OUT ON LIMB, LINCOLN RECOMMENDS CONSIDERATION OF THE FOLLOWING:

A. PIVALL AUTHORIZED RECONNOITER WITH VIEW CONTINUING KUHOOK TRG ON LIMITED BASIS.

B. MIDDLECOTT REMAIN IN READINESS TAKE FEASIBLE STEPS TO INITIATE KUCLUB TRG AT NEW SITE. ✓

5. ABOVE PERSISTENCE IN OPERATIONS WOULD SERVE 2 PURPOSES:

A. SUGGEST FIRM STAND TO

B. MAINTAIN PBSUCCESS ASSETS TO MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE.

6. CALLIGERIS NOW NOT IN POSITION TO ASSIST ABOVE. ✓

7. PLS ADVISE.

FND OF MESSAGE

*CABLE SECRETARIAT COMMENT: TEMPORARY COPY OF THIS MESSAGE ISSUED TO MR. ESTERLINE, WH DIV., EXT 4448, AT 1615, 31 JAN 54.

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

DATE : 1 FEB 54

ROUTING

1		4
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3		6

TO : DIRECTOR CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
 FROM : LINCOLN RELEASE AS SANITIZED
 ACTION: WH (1-2) 1990 *file*
 INFO : DCI (3), D/DCI (4), DD/P (L) (5)

LTNC 327 (IN 14175) 0129Z 1 FEB 54 ROUTINE
 PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR CITE: SLINC

RYBAT PBSUCCESS

IMMEDIATE ACTION

RE: A. LINC 297 (IN 13896) PARA 1B
 B. (IN 14156)
 C. (IN 14161)

1. AFTER REVIEW OF COMPROMISED OR POSSIBLE COMPROMISED ASSETS, IT IS APPROPRIATE TO REVIEW THE INTACT AND POTENTIAL ASSETS.

2. REF A.

3. KUFIRE ASSETS:

A. CALLIGERIS CP PENETRATION AND MAIL SURVEILLANCE IN WSBURNT APPEARS INTACT.

B. CALLIGERIS POLITICAL REPORTING NET IN WSBURNT APPEARS INTACT.

C. ASSETS OF WSBURNT, DTFROGS, KFLUSH ARE INTACT.

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1 FEB 54

LINC 327 (IN 14175)

PAGE -2-

4. KUGOWN:

A. ASSETS IN WSBURNT SUBSTANTIALLY INTACT, THOUGH
NEED EXERCISE GREATER CAUTION.

B. DTFROGS ASSETS INTACT

C. WSHOOF'S ASSETS INTACT

D. LINCOLN ASSETS INTACT

5.

REF B

6. KUCLUB:

REF C

7. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

REMAINS AVAILABLE

8. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT:

REMAINS AVAILABLE

9. POTENTIAL ASSETS:

A. FACT THAT COMMUNISM IS WRONG AND WRONG FOR WSBURNT

B. TENSIONS WITHIN WSBURNT GOVT

C. GROWTH POSSIBILITIES OF EXISTING WSBURNT RESISTANCE
GROUPS.

D. HIGH PERCENTAGE ANTI-COMMUNISM OF WSBURNT PEOPLE

10. ECONOMIC WARFARE:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1 FEB 54

LINC 327 (IN 14175)

PAGE -3-

RISING COFFEE PRICES HAVE CREATED PBPRIME INDIGNATION.
AT SAME TIME, WSBURNT HAS INSULTED AND ACCUSED PBPRIME. FOR
FIRST TIME, TWO STRONG PEGS AVAILABLE ON WHICH TO HANG ECONOMIC
WARFARE.

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE 1 FEB 54

~~SECRET~~
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
ROUTING

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
FROM : LINCOLN RELEASE AS SANITIZED
ACTION: WH (1-2) 1996
INFO : DCI (3), D/DCI (4), DD/P (L)(5)

LINC 331 (IN 14238) 1220Z 1 FEB 54 OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR CITE: SLINC

RE: A. DIR 36529 (OUT 67332)
B. LINC 325 (IN 14167)
C. DDIR 36526(OUT 67320)

ATTN: DUNBAR

1. WITH REGARD TO MEXICO TRIP, CALLIGERIS MAJOR WORRY WAS THAT ELEMENTS OPPOSED TO HIM IN WSHOOFS MIGHT USE TRIP AS PRETEXT TO DEMAND WSHOOFS GOVT EXPEL HIS MENAAND HIM. USE OF TAPES WOULD LEAVE HIM PLAUSIBLE DENTAL TO SUPPORT WSHOOFS GOVT POSITION, IF NECESSARY PERSONAL APPEARANCE WOULD NOT. BEFORE MAKING PERSONAL APPEARANCE, CALLIGERIS WANTED BE SURE WSHOOFS GOVT WOULD APPROVE. CALLIGERIS LESS CONCERNED ABOUT KMFLUSH. PRIMARILY WISHED AVOID BYPASSING.

2. LINC SHARED CALLIGERIS CONCERN OVER CONTINUED AVAILABILITY OF WSHOOFS AS OPS BASE. CALLIGERIS SUGGESTED "GROUP" HAVE OOACID IN WSHOOFS EXPLORE WSHOOFS GOVT ATTITUDE, WHICH LINC DISAPPROVED. LINC SAW NO ALTERNATIVE BUT HAVE CALLIGERIS ASCERTAIN POSITION PERSONALLY. CALLIGERIS WISHED COORDINATE WITH

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EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
ROUTING

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1 FEB 54

LINC 331 (IN 14238)

PAGE -2-

KMFLUSH BY PHONING IN PBPRIME, WHO WOULD PASS MESSAGE TO
LINC FELT IF CALLIGERIS WENT WSHOOFS, COULD THEN ALSO
EXPEDITIOUSLY GO KMFLUSH.

3. FLIGHT LEAVES HERE 1145, ARRIVES HAVA 1300, MEXICO
CITY 1810.

4. IN VIEW IMPORTANCE CALLIGERIS AND MISSION, LINCOLN WISHES
REVIEW TRAVEL PLANS WITH HQS:

A. IF PERSUASION SUCCESSFUL, CALLIGERIS TO BE ESCORTED
BY CONNIEF TO VICINITY LOCAL MEXICAN TOURIST COMMISSION. APPLIES
FOR TOURIST CARD WITH PRESENT DOCUMENTATION. IF QUESTIONED
AND/OR CONNIEF TAKES ACTION.
DETAINED

B. PRIOR DEPARTING, CALLIGERIS PHONES
IN MEXICO CITY TO MEET H12 AND ARRANGE LODGING.

C. OUTSIDE AIRPORT, CONNIEF INTRODUCES MATTHEW H.
ONTRICH TO CALLIGERIS AS "JUAN", WHO WILL TAIL HIM AND PROVIDE
FAST EMERGENCY COMMUNICATION TO GROUP.

D. IN TRANSITTING HAVANA, ONTRICH NOTIFIES KUBARK
IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, SUCH AS DETENTION FOR QUESTIONING.

E. IN MEXICO, ONTRICH GOES TO HOTEL AND NOTIFIES CALL
CALLIGERIS.

F. CALLIGERIS ENTERS MEXICO UNDER FALSE DOCUMENTS AND
HIS MISSION REQUIRES HIS REVELATION OF TRUE NAME. IF QUESTION
OF FALSE DOCUMENTS AND ILLEGAL ENTRY RAISED, ONTRICH CONTACTS

~~SECRET~~

1 FEB 54

~~SECRET~~

U LINC 331 (IN 14238)

PAGE -3-

G. AT PRESS CONFERENCE, CALLIGERIS NOT TO REVEAL HIS LOCATION PRIOR TO HAVANA.

H. CALLIGERIS RETURNS NEW ORLEANS. HQS ARRANGES WITH APPROPRIATE ODUKE AUTHORITIES FOR CALLIGERIS RE-ENTRY, SINCE CALLIGERIS HAS BEEN FORCED LABEL HIS DOCUMENTATION FALSE IN MEXICO. PROTECTION OF HAVANA AGAINST PRESS.

I. CALLIGERIS ULTIMATE DESTINATION IN PRIME TO RECEIVE FURTHER STUDY TO MINIMIZE REVELATION HIS "GROUP" CONTACTS BY PRESS.

J. HOPE ALL ABOVE CONTINGENCY PLANS PROVE UNNECESSARY BUT ESSENTIAL BE PREPARED IMPLEMENT THEM.

K. PLS PROVIDE PHONE NUMBERS HAVANA AND MEXICO FOR ONTRICH AND ALERT TO HIS CALLING.

L. PLS ADVISE SOONEST.

END OF MESSAGE

CABLE SECRETARIAL COMMENT: MR. (WH) NOTIFIED RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE AT 0730 1 FEB 54.
TREATED AS PDSUCCESS.

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 13 FEB 54

SECRET
REFUGEE INFORMATION

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : LINCOLN
ACTION: WH (1-2)
INFO : DCI (3), D/DCI (4), DD/P (L)(5)

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1990

File

LINC 342 (IN 14978)

0615Z 3 FEB 54

ROUTINE

TO: DIR

INFO: SGUAT

PRECEDENCE

RYBAT PBSUCCESS

CITE: SLINC

1. IN VIEW PROBABILITY EITHER JUAN JOSE AREVALO OR GUILLERMO TORIELLO WILL REPRESENT TARGET CARACAS CONF, SUGGEST OPERATION TO DISCREDIT THEM THRU FABRICATED CP DOCUMENTS.
2. REQUEST PROCURE THEIR PHOTOS AND SIGNATURES. A BONAFIDE SAMPLES OF TARGET CP MEMBER CARD AND CP CERTIF COMMENDATION AND OTHER SIMILAR DOCUMENTS. LETTER OF C FROM CP VENEZUELA WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO NEWSPRINTNESS P DOCUMENT FROM ARGENTINA, FRANCE, ITALY OR OTHER COUNTR VALUABLE. PRECISE FORM OF DOCUMENTS CAN NOT BE OUTLINED LINC, SINCE TO ACHIEVE CREDIBILITY THEY WOULD HAVE TO FOLLOW FORM OF BONAFIDE CP DOCUMENTS.
3. IF HQS APPROVES AND ABLE FABRICATE SUCH DOCUMENTS BEARING PHOTOS AND/OR SIGNATURES, NEXT STEP WOULD BE PLANT PHOTOSTATS OF DOCUMENTS IN PRESS ON EVE OF INTER-AMER CONFERENCE.
4. CLIPPINGS WOULD THEN BE POUCHED FOR RE-PLANTING OTHER AR

auxiliary
by Felder

SECRET

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action taken K
LINC-34

~~SECRET~~

3 FEB 54

LINC 342 (IN 14978)

PAGE -2-

5. WOULD FOLLOW UP BY "DISCOVERING"
AND PLANTING ANOTHER DOCUMENT OR 2. NOT PREVIOUSLY PLANTED IN
CARACAS, THUS GIVING CREDENCE COMIN AFFILIATIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

~~CLASSIFIED MESSAGE~~

DATE : 2 FEB 54

F. F. C. G. T.

1		4
2		5
3		6

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : LINCOLN
ACTION: WH (1-2)
INFO : EC1 (3).

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1996

file

1 INC 346 (IN 14948) 0120Z 3 FEB 54

ROUTINE
REFERENCE

TO: (PRIORITY) SGUAT, INFO: DIR,

CITE: SLINC

BYRAT PBSUCCESS

1. IMPERATIVE ALL PBSUCCESS DEVOTE IMMEDIATE PRIORITY
TO COLLECTION, DOCUMENTATION AND FORWARDING DIRECT TO HQS, INFO
LINC, ANY AND ALL EVIDENCE WHICH WILL TEND TO SUPPORT ODOYKE
POSITION FORTHCOMING OAS CONFERENCE CARACAS CONCERNING GUATEMALAN
SUBVERSIVE AND/OR INTERVENTIONIST ACTIVITIES IN NEIGHBORING
COUNTRIES.

2. OODYKE MUST BE FIRMLY PREPARED TO DOCUMENT GENERALLY RECOGNIZED COMMIE ACTIVITIES INSPIRED OR INSTIGATED FROM WITHIN GUAT. EXAMPLES: PROPAGANDA SPONSORING COMMUNISM; LABOR, OFFICIAL, CULTURAL AND OTHER REPS FROM GUAT ESPOUSING COMMUNISM; IDENTIFIABLE SUPPORT OTHER COMMIE GROUPS OUTSIDE GUAT.

3. ASIDE FROM ABOVE ODOYKE NEEDS SUPPORTING EVIDENCE UNJUST
COMMIE PRACTICES WITHIN GUAT, EXAMPLE: LOCALLY NOTARIZED STATE-
MENTS FROM REFUGEES OR FORCED EXILEES WHO HAVE SUFFERED MALTREAT-
MENT HANDS OF COMMIES.

E-C-R-F

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2 FEB 54

LINC 346 (IN 14948)

PAGE 2

4. TIME FACTOR IMPORTANT. WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE AND HOW
ARE ESSENTIAL WHEN AVAILABLE.

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 3 FEB 54

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR
 FROM : LINCOLN
 ACTION: WH (1-2)*

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
 RELEASE AS SANITIZED

1996

INFO : DCI (3), D/DCI (4), DD/P (L) (5)

File

LINC 352 (IN 14939)

0045Z 3 FEB 54

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

PRECEDENCE

INFO: DIR

INFO: (PRIORITY)

CITE: SLINC

RYBAT PBSUCCESS

RE:

1. FROM PHOTOSTATS CONTAINED REF, RECD THIS DATE, LINCOLN LEARNS OF HEMISPHERE-WIDE ANTI-RED CONFERENCE TO BE HELD MEXICO CITY 5-7 FEB. ASSUME THIS A KUGDOWN OP. IS INFO CORRECT?
2. IF SO, PROPOSE SEND

INFO

MEXICO CITY (THUS BROADENING LIONIZER-DIVERSIONARY PURPOSE). ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMITTEE TO BE MAJOR FINAL ACTION TAKEN BY CONFERENCE.

3. IF FOREGOING CORRECT AND PROPOSAL APPROVED DESIRE ARRANGE, IF POSSIBLE:

- A. HALF TO FULL HOUR SPEAKING TIME

- B. INTRODUCTION RESOLUTION

- C. FORMATION COMMITTEE UNDER CONTROLLED CONDITIONS.

4. ELMO R. LANGTRY SCHEDULED DEPART 1615 FEB 3 FOR MEXICO

*arranged
+ tel by*

~~SECRET~~

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LINC-14939

~~SECRET~~

3 FEB 54

1. LINC 352 (IN 14939)

1. PAGE 2

VIA

, PER APPROVAL GALBOND RE PBSUCCESS/

KUGOWN OPS. WOULD BE ON HAND ASSIST ABOVE ARRANGEMENTS.

5. ADVISE SOONEST HQS COMMENTS OR APPROVAL VIEW

POSSIBLE IMPORTANCE ABOVE AND TIME FACTOR INVOLVED.

NOT APPROACHED SO FAR. SPEECH THEMES WOULD BE CABLED FOR

APPROVAL UPON RECEIPT HQS REPLY.

END OF MESSAGE

1. CABLE SECRETARIAT COMMENT:

TEMPO COPY OF THIS MESSAGE ISSUED TO MR. , WH,
EXT 4443, AT 2130, 2 FEB 54.

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ROUTING

DATE: 3 FEB 54

~~SECRET~~
REF ID: A65142

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO: DIRECTOR
FROM: LINCOLN
ACTION: WH (1-2)
INFO:

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1996

Side

LINC 359 (IN 15195)

1757Z 3 FEB 54

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR

INFO:

CITE: SLINC

RTBAT PBSUCCESS

RE: LINC 352 (IN 14939)

IMMEDIATE ACTION

1. AGREES GO MEXICO FOR CONFERENCE BUT OWING
VULNERABILITY HIS BACKGROUND, HE PREFER NOT
MAKE PUBLIC APPEARANCE. WILL STIMULATE AND GUIDE PROPAGANDA
OF LIONIZER AND WOULD BE OUR FUNDING CHANNEL. WILL

2. WILL DEPART VIA IMMEDIATE UPON
HQS APPROVAL. VISA PROBLEMS MAY DELAY HIM
3. CONTEMPLATE PROVIDING HIM \$1000 FOR EXPENSES, PERSONAL
AND ORGANIZATIONAL.

4. UPON RECEIPT HQS APPROVAL LINC WILL SUBMIT THEMES FOR
TO AMPLIFY AT MEETING THROUGH OTHERS.

5. "LATIN AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR LIBERATION OF SISBURN" IS
PROPOSAL RECOMMENDED LINC 297 (IN 13896) PARA 4F. DIP 36514
(OUT 67270) REPLIED TO THIS "FAVOR...PARA 4".

*answred
4 Feb 54*

~~SECRET~~
REF ID: A65142

END OF MESSAGE

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LINC-35

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 3 FEB 54

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4
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3		6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LINCOLN CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
ACTION: WH. (1-2) RELEASE AS SANITIZED
INFO : 1996

File

SLINC 363 (IN 15232) 111825Z 3 FEB 54

PRIORITY
PRECEDENCETO: DIR
RYBAT PBSUCCESS
IMMEDIATE ACTION

CITE: SLINC

1. NEED: SLINC CONSIDERS PRE-OAS MTG PERIOD AS MOST CRITICAL SECURITYWISE FOR PBSUCCESS THEREFORE URGE EMPLOYMENT DECEPTION EFFORT TO ATTEMPT ALLAY COMMUNIST PREOCCUPATION IMPENDING DISTURBANCE
2. NEED TO KNOW: ONLY CALLIGERIS WILL HAVE FULL KNOWLEDGE OF DECEPTION. KUGOWN AND WILL PROCEED AS PLANNED. TO IMPLEMENT ONLY KUFIRE NEED-TO-KNOW PERSONNEL WILL HAVE KNOWLEDGE.
3. DECEPTION MATERIAL: THE WHITE PAPER HAS SO EFFECTIVELY DISORGANIZED REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT THAT CONSIDERABLE TIME, AT LEAST A YEAR, IS NOW REQUIRED TO RECOUP.
4. PROPOSED EMPLOYMENT: THIS INFORMATION WILL BE LEAKED BY CALLIGERIS OR A PERSON SELECTED BY HIM TO AN ECA (ENEMY CONTROLLED AGENT), SO THAT THE INFO WILL REACH ONLY THE TOP ENEMY LEVELS.

END OF MESSAGE

answred
DIR 36958

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTINE

1	4
2	5
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DATE : 5 FEB 54

TO : DIRECTOR CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
FROM : LINCOLN RELEASE AS SANITIZED
ACTION: WH (1-2) 1998
INFO : DCI (3), D/DCI (4), DD/P (L)(5)

*answer to
CE suggestion*

LINC 402 (IN 15770)

0528Z 5 FEB 54

ROUTINE

PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR

CITE: SLII

RYBAT PBSUCCESS

FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION

REF: DIR 36958 (OUT 68126)

file
Answered 11 Feb 17

1. LINC DESIRED ONLY HQS CONCURRENCE IN PRINCIPLE AND ANTICIPATED FURTHER CLEARANCE AND CLARIFICATION UPON IMPLEMENTATION OF PROPOSAL. THINKING HERE ON BASIS NOTHING VENTURED NOTHING GAINED, PARTICULARLY AS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF DAMAGE RESULTING THEREFROM.

2. REVIEWED MATTER WITH QUESTION OF PRECISE MANNER OF LEAKING TO BE DETERMINED FROM CURRENT CE ANALYSIS DESIRE CONCURRENCE PARTICULARLY PRIOR CALLIGERIS' DEPARTURE FORETESTING PURPOSES TO DETERMINE HIS DISCRETION PENDING AN SUBSEQUENT RELEASE TO ECA. THUS SERVING DUAL PURPOSE.

3. BELIEVE MERIT THIS EFFORT PRIOR TO OAS MEETING AND APPRECIATE

A. PRIORITY CONCURRENCE RESPECT CALLIGERIS

B. SUGGESTED ECA LEADS FROM HQS

C. HQS COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS IN GENERAL. END

~~SECRET~~

MESS

DATE : 5 FEB 54

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTINE

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TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LINCOLN CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
ACTION: WH (1-2) RELEASE AS SANITIZED

1998

INFO :

LINC 403 (IN 15771)

0528Z 5 FEB 54

ROUTINE

~~PRECEDENCE~~

TO:

INFO: DIR

CITE: \$LINC

RYBAT PBSUCCESS

RE: DIR 36974 (OUT 68185) (NOT SENT

FOR MIDDLECOTT

1. LINC DESIRES CONTINUATION SCRANTON TRAINING CIRCUMSTANCES PERMITTING. FYI: CALLIGERIS EXPECTED ARRIVE FEW DAYS. WILL CLARIFY.

2. INSTRUCTIONS:

Paul Sierra

A. HAVE IDEN A ADVISE IDENS B AND C THAT SEEKFORD UNABLE RETURN KMFLUSH IMMEDIATE FUTURE, AUTHORIZED YOU MEET IDEN B TO RELEASE GEAR: THAT IDEN D, IDEN C'S WITH SEEKFORD AT IDEN E, CAN AUTHENTICATE YOU.

B. WHEN GEAR RELEASED, ACCOMPANY IT TO AND PROCEED SET UP NEW SITE. DRAW HELP FROM IDEN A AND PIVALL, BILINGUAL IF POSSIBLE. LINC REQUESTING CALLIGERIS FURNISH YOU INTERPRETER AND TRAINEES.

C. RESUME RADIO SCHEDULES AT NEW SITE SO LINC CAN PROVIDE DIRECT GUIDANCE.

~~SECRET~~

~~AMERICAN INFORMATION SYSTEM~~

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MAIL NO. A/4C-2/

5 FEB 54

~~S E C R E T~~

LINC 403 (IN 1577)

PAGE 2

3. KUCLUB INSTRUCTOR, FLUENT SPANISH, REPLACING MERTON.
ETA MANA APPROX 18 FEB. MERTON WILL BRIEF AT LINC.
4. LINC FULLY APPRECIATIVE YOUR SITUATION AND HAS
CONFIDENCE YOUR ABILITY TO KEEP THINGS IN BALANCE. BEST OF LUCK.

END OF MESSAGE

~~S E C R E T~~

ROUTING
PBSUCCESS

OUTGOING CABLE

LINCOLN STATION COPY

Routing

1.

2.

3.

Files

TO: DIR

FROM: SLMG

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1996

76 Feb 94

07472

INFO:

TO: DIR

FROM: LINCOLN

RTBAT/PBSUCCESS

REFERENCE: LINO 167

page 7

CITE:

424

ATTENTION:

1. CALLIGARIS ACKNOWLEDGES RECEIPT OF DURING JANUARY AS FOLLOWS:
8 JAN FROM BEEFORD, \$2,000.00, 11 JAN FROM SEEKFORD, \$11,100.00, 25 JAN FROM

PER CONVERSATION WITH SADORUS REQUEST YOU OBTAIN FROM
SEEKFORD HIS FIGURE AMOUNTS PASSED CALLIGARIS FOR ABOVE PERIOD.

2. CALLIGARIS DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT \$20,000.00 GIVEN SEEKFORD 23 DEC.
WHICH BELIEVE PASSED HIM IN EARLY JAN.

3. REQUEST DISPOSITION \$10,000.00 IN FOREIGN CURRENCY IN ORDER LINO MAY DRAW
UPON BANK IN PERIOD

END OF MESSAGE

DISTRIBUTION:
1 - Station file
1 - Originator
1 - Subject

ORIGINATOR:

APPROVED BY C/PI

AUTHENTICATIONS:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE: 7 FEB 54

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: LINCOLN

ACTION: WH (1-2)

INFO:

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1998

LINC 125 (IN 16463)

17242 7 FEB 54

ROUTINE
PRIORITY

TO: (PRIORITY)

INFO: DIR, SGUAT

CITE: SLINC

RYBAT/PBSUCCESS

FOR LANGTRY

1. HEDIGER REPORTS IDEN NOW OFFICIAL OF IN MEXICO. IDEN NOT CLEARED BUT WAS CONTACT OF STATION IN WSBURNT AND SIGNED RECEIPTS
2. IDEN HOPES START LABOR ORGANIZER SCHOOL IN MEXICO UNDER AUSPICES. HIS PLANS VAGUE.
3. REQUEST YOU ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH IDEN THROUGH CUT-OUT AND SECURE FULL DETAILS HIS STATUS, SCHOOL PLANS, SCHOOL FINANCIAL NEEDS, ETC.
4. FYI: LINC BELIEVES OVERT SCHOOL COULD PROVIDE COVER FOR PBSUCCESS TNG OF WSBURNT PERSONNEL FOR KUGOWN/ CELLS.
5. ALSO REQUEST YOU DETERMINE FROM IDEN PERSONNEL IN WSBURNT AVAILABLE FOR:
 - A. SETTING UP LABOR FRONTS IN WSBURNT, PRINCIPALLY FOR THEIR PROPAGANDA VALUE.
 - B. ANTI-COMMIE TNG OUTSIDE WSBURNT.

~~SECRET~~

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LINC-425

~~SECRET~~

7 FEB 54

LINC 425 (IN 16463)

PAGE 2

6. IDEN MAY ALSO BE GOOD SOURCE ON NATURE AND EXTENT
OF PROPAGANDA AND ORG IN WSBURNT.

END OF MESSAGE

~~S E C R E T~~

~~CLASSIFIED MESSAGE~~

~~SECRET~~

1	2	3	4
			5
			6

DATE : 9 FEB 54

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1996

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : LINCOLN
ACTION: WH (1-2)

INFO : DCI (3), D/DCI (4), DD/P (L) (5)

file

LINC 447 (IN 16824)

0517Z 9 FEB 54

ROUTINE

~~PRECEDENCE~~

CITE: SLINC

TO: DIR

RYBAT PBSUCCESS

UNDERSTAND KINCHELL 7 FEB BROADCAST URGED ACTION AGAINST
IMPORTATION OF GUAT COFFEE IN FIGHT AGAINST COMMUNISM. ADVISE
TRYING OBTAIN FULL TEXT THROUGH FACILITIES RADIO DIVISION PP
STAFF FOR USE PLAYDON ON HIS RETURN 10 FEB.

END OF MESSAGE

*Sent to
Linc*

office in RQM/OIS
says OO has told it
might be able to get text
through secure channels + is
trying to do so now (10 Feb)

NOTE: said that if
RQM deal with OO fails though,
he will try his way - but
doesn't want us to leave
two

K

~~SECRET~~

345-0522-22-0000000000

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LINC - 447

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 9 FEB 54

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4
2		5
3		6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LINCOLN

ACTION: WH (1-2)

INFO :

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1996

LINC 457 (IN 17200)

2341Z 9 FEB 54

ROUTINE

PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR

CITE: SLIM

PBSUCCESS RYBAT

PLEASE REQUEST RQM/01S FORWARD FOLLOWING DATA ON WSBURNT AND NEIGHBORING SOUTHERN BORDER AREAS COVERING NEXT SIX MONTH PERIOD; DRY AND RAINY SEASONS; AREA WEATHER FORECASTS; DEGREE FLOODINGS PRINCIPAL RIVERS AND SWAMP AREAS; MOON PHASES SHOWING TIME RISE SET; SUNSET AND SUNRISE TIMES; PREVAILING SEASONAL WIND; AIR CURRENTS AND GENERAL TURBULENCE INFORMATION UP TO 2,000 FEET; TIDES PRINCIPAL PORTS BOTH OCEANS AND EFFECT SURROUNDING RIVER SWAMP AREAS IF APPLICABLE. ALSO, STUDY ON NIGHT VISIBILITY AND FOG FORECASTS BOTH COASTS, PRINCIPAL PORTS, INTERIOR CITIES AND MILITARY AIRPORTS; MUCH ABOVE BELIEVED AVAILABLE THROUGH PM CONTACTS DEPARTMENT DEFENSE ALSO TSS.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

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LINE-457

FROM:

CABLE

ACTION

-SECRET-

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. _____
Date Received SA _____

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Received	Forwarded		
1. Esterline		11 Feb 57		AF	LybAT/PB500055
2.		14 Feb			
3. Esterline				JP	
4.					2-3. NF is enquiring to ascertain DIAZ' political attitude in view of these U.S. citizens in New York approached by unnamed Greek who indicated areas to overtake present Govt. This unknown Greek said DIAZ was principal seeking the areas.
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.				--	
9.					
10. Cable desk					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.

A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.

Officer designations should be used in To column.

Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.

Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.

Routing sheet should always be returned to registry.

For officer designations see separate sheet.

-SECRET-

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